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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the implementation of FRS 13 by UK non-financial 
conlpanies, and assesses the impact of the Standard on both users and preparers of 
Annual Reports. The investigation involves (i) a content analysis of the reporting 
practices of companies on their derivatives usage before and after the introduction of FRS 
13. in order to ascertain whether the standard had any significant effect on the contents of 
company financial statements, and (ii) interviews with both the preparers (treasurers) and 
the users (fund managers) of the information provided under FRS 13, in order to facilitate 
an understanding of the implications of the standard for their operations. The study 
focuses in particular on the effects of the increased derivatives-related disclosures for 
corporate governance structures and accountability relationships. 
The results suggest that the amount of disclosure in company annual reports increased 
significantly following the introduction of the standard; companies were now disclosing 
far more about their hedging and risk management activity than they had before. In 
general, treasurers responded favourably to the standard, and considered the narrative 
disclosures to be particularly useful. The numerical disclosures \vere considered to be 
very detailed and specialised; interviewees thought that users might have difficulty in 
understanding them. However, the implementation of lAS 39, which will be mandatory 
for all EU companies from 2005, was causing treasurers far more concern. Many 
treasurers expected to purchase expensive new systems and establish sophisticated 
procedures in order to comply with the hedge accounting rules of lAS 39. In general, the 
institutional investors interviewed expressed similar views to those of the treasurers; they 
Xlll 
found the narrative parts of the annual reports useful, but agreed that the numerical 
disc losures were too specialised. The investors thought that the disclosures did improve 
the corporate governance process and highlighted issues that they wished to raise with 
their investee companies' management as a result of the information gleaned from the 
financial statements. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
2 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
Recent years have seen a proliferation of new and increasingly complex financial 
instruments being employed in a large number of international financial markets 
tGrant and Marshall, 1997; Mallin et aI., 2001). As a result, many entities now 
employ such instruments to transform their financial position, reported performance 
and risk profile. There are a variety of factors that have stimulated the recent 
explosive growth in the use of derivative financial instruments. For example, the 
success of the finance industry in creating a variety of over-the-counter (OTC) and 
exchange-traded products has been suggested as one possible reason for the increase 
in derivatives usage (Froot et aI., 1993). Other important factors include the 
deregulation of the financial services industry, the increased level of competition 
among financial institutions, changes in tax regulations and advances in computer 
technology (Chau et aI., 2000). 
In tandem with the large increase in the use of these innovative financial products, 
there has been a dramatic rise in reported scandals attributed to the use of financial 
derivatives (Jorion, 1995; Culp and Miller, 1995; Edwards and Canter, 1995; 
Overdahl and Schachter, 1995; Walmsley, 1995; Gapper and Denton, 1996; Leeson, 
1996; Hogan, 1997; Jayaraman and Shrikhande, 1997; Arnold, 1998; Chance, 2001; 
Drummond, 2002; Dunne and Helliar, 2002; Brealey and Myers, 2003). The number 
of scandals, as well as the funds 'lost' from unauthorised derivative transactions 
associated with these scandals, have undoubtedly contributed to calls for greater 
disclosure of derivatives activities (McDonough, 1993; Grant and Marshall, 1997; 
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Beresford, 1998; Bodnar et aI., 1998; Blankley et aI., 2002). The lack of infonnation 
(both internally and externally) about the usage of derivative instruments is frequently 
cited as a reason for many of the scandals associated with these innovative products 
over the last decade. 
To address the urgent need for improved disclosure, the ASB issued FRS 13 
'Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments - Disclosures' in September 1998. This 
Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) requires companies to disclose both narrative and 
numerical details about the extent to which they use derivative products to control 
various financial risks. These specific disclosures relate to (a) the objectives, policies 
and strategies for holding derivative financial instruments; (b) interest rate risk; (c) 
currency risk; (d) liquidity risk; ( e) the fair values of financial instruments; (f) the use 
of financial instruments for trading; (g) the use of financial instruments for hedging; 
and (h) the details of specified commodity contracts. Thus, the UK financial reporting 
authority adopted a very different perspective from its US counterpart, which 
emphasised the valuation of these products and included them in a company's balance 
sheetl. 
One of the major Issues to emerge from the discussion of the corporate use of 
derivative financial instruments involves the lack of control exercised over these 
products (Blankley et aI., 2002). The failure of corporate governance and internal 
1 However, despite the reforms initiated by the accounting standard-setting bodies around the globe 
with respect to the increasing demands for disclosure of derivative activity and uniform accounting 
practices, concern still exists about these products. In his annual letter to shareholders in Berkshire 
Hathaway, Warren Buffet described derivatives as "time bombs" (Parker et aI., 2003). He called these 
products "fmancial weapons of mass destruction" carrying potentially lethal dangers. Mr. Buffet 
mentioned the dangers of accounting for derivatives arguing that companies used derivative deals to 
create earnings that were supposedly accounted for at market value. He argued that these values were 
more likely to be "mark-to-myth". 
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control procedures is frequently cited as a contributing factor in the many scandals 
involving derivative products (Overdahl and Schachter, 1995; Hogan, 1997; 
Jayaraman and Shrikhande, 1997; Dunne and Helliar, 2002; Burton et aI., 2003). The 
notion of internal control has been central to discussions about corporate governance 
since the 1990s. This inclusion led to the alignment of corporate governance 
processes with the risk management objective of the firm; failings in corporate 
governance are seen to have an adverse impact on business operations in general, and 
on treasury departments in particular. The increased focus on corporate governance in 
an international context initiated a focus on the legitimate demands for increased 
accountability. The Cadbury Report in the UK focused attention on the accountability 
and risk management aspects of corporate governance by highlighting notions of 
control. This report had the objective of securing the 'accountability' of the board of 
directors and the chief executive whilst ensuring that effective risk management and 
control systems of companies were developed and maintained, a responsibility 
reinforced in the subsequent Turnbull report (Cadbury, 1992; ICAEW, 1999). These 
demands necessitated the exercise of two fundamental duties of accountability: the 
responsibility to undertake certain actions (or forbear from taking actions) and the 
responsibility to provide an account of those actions (Gray et aI., 1996). The annual 
report is seen as a means of discharging this accountability. The requirement to report 
to shareholders by means of the annual report, is one of the very few instances of 
explicit accountability established within the law itself (Gray et aI., 1996). Acceptance 
by management of their need to account for the resources entrusted to them as well as 
for the organisation's operating and other policies is key to managerial legitimacy; 
this stewardship should be reflected in the financial statements of organisations 
(Khoury, 2001). 
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This thesis assesses the impact of FRS 13. It will utilise elements from broad notions 
of corporate governance and accountability theories to interpret the data provided by 
the content analysis of corporate annual reports, as well as insights gleaned from 
interviews with fund management and treasury department staff. No systematic 
analysis of the impact of derivatives reporting standards has been undertaken to date, 
in the UK. The enforced publication of derivatives usage details following the 
introduction of FRS 13 offers a tremendous opportunity to remedy this deficiency. 
The rest of the introductory chapter is structured as follows. The core research 
questions investigated in the study are outlined in Section 1.2. An introduction to the 
methodology and methods utilised is also provided. The chapter concludes with a 
brief guide to the structure of the dissertation. 
1.2 Scope of the Research 
The primary objective of this study is an examination of the impact of FRS 13 on 
corporate reporting practices and accountability relationships. This objective is 
facilitated by an examination of corporate annual reports before and after the 
implementation of the derivatives accounting standard. Preparer and user perspectives 
regarding the implementation of the standard are also sought in order to provide a 
broad understanding of the issues associated with the introduction of this FRS, and the 
associated impact on accountability relationships. Although numerous motivations 
may be articulated for the disclosure of derivatives related information, the present 
6 
study is primarily focused on the effects of these disclosures for accountability 
relationships2. 
In seeking to examine the impact of FRS 13 on corporate reporting and accountability 
practices, this study attempts to add to the extant literature on accounting standard 
setting, derivatives usage, corporate governance and accountability. It does this 
initially by providing a detailed analysis of the particular effect of FRS 13 on the 
reporting practices of companies with respect to their derivatives usage. It then 
endeavours to understand and explain the views of preparers and users about this 
information. Potential consequences of the derivative-related information for 
corporate governance and accountability are also explored. 
There is little empirical evidence that examInes the nature of derivatives-related 
disclosure in a UK context. Despite the fact that the use of derivative financial 
instruments have been implicated in many corporate failures and scandals worldwide 
(Overdahl and Schachter, 1995; Hogan, 1997; Jayaraman and Shrikhande, 1997; 
Dunne and Helliar, 2002; Burton et aI., 2003), little work has been undertaken on the 
consequences of reporting information relating to the usage of these products in 
corporate financial statements (but see Adedeji and Baker, 1999; McIlwraith and 
Dealy, 2000; Marshall and Weetman, 2002). One of the aspirations of this study is to 
2 The reasons for this choice include (i) the interest of the author in accountability issues, and (ii) the 
feeling that an accountability framework would facilitate a broader examination of the issues 
surrounding the introduction of FRS 13 rather than concentrating on a narrower principal-agent model 
or decision usefulness approach. In addition, it was felt that many of the scandals which gave rise to the 
standard centred on breakdowns in corporate governance and the lack of accountability in certain areas 
for the fIrms concerned. Thus, the usage of an accountability framework seemed ideal since it appeared 
prominent in the minds of the standard setters when arriving at this standard; indeed, the standard was 
issued at roughly the same time as the Turnbull Report. For further discussion on this issue see Chapter 
3. 
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fill this gap, firstly by recording derivatives-related disclosure practices and secondly 
by examining the perspectives of preparers and users of this information. It is 
contended that these perspectives will facilitate an understanding of the difficulties 
associated with, and consequences of, derivatives reporting practice in a UK context 
to see if the information provided leads to the enhancement of corporate governance 
and accountability. 
The study is exploratory in nature and firmly located within the interpretive paradigm 
identified by Burrell and Morgan (1979). The aim is to provide a descriptive account 
of derivatives-related disclosures, and to examine the perspectives of treasurers as 
preparers of the information, and the perspectives of fund managers as potential users 
of the information provided by FRS 13. Such an approach was thought appropriate 
because of the dearth of prior work in this area and because such a paradigm accords 
with the world views of the researcher. Other strategies could have been followed but 
were not adopted here. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The study is organised into eight chapters. Following the current introductory chapter, 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature concerning the issues to be investigated 
in the present thesis. Specifically, it outlines the studies that have examined both the 
theoretical and practical motivations for corporate risk management, accounting 
standard setting and risk management disclosure. The chapter outlines the results from 
studies that examine the corporate usage of derivative financial instruments. The 
theoretical motivations for corporate risk management are also discussed, while 
empirical investigations concerning corporate risk management are also described. 
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The need for accounting standards in general is examined, and the impact of UK and 
international attempts to regulate derivatives reporting is observed. The literature 
concerning risk disclosures to date is also reviewed. Thus, Chapter 2 attempts to draw 
together different strands of a number of related literatures in order to set the scene for 
the remainder of the thesis. Such an eclectic approach was thought to be necessary 
since the research questions to be addressed straddle different aspects of the 
accounting and financial management literatures. To omit some of the research areas 
covered might have led to a very partial view of the topic being investigated. 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to discuss the theoretical framework adopted in the 
present study. This theoretical framework is based on the corporate governance and 
the corporate accountability literature. The chapter highlights the theoretical 
underpinning of the corporate governance concept. The corporate governance and 
internal control framework that exists in the UK is examined; information about the 
framework in the US is provided for comparative purposes. The role of institutional 
investors in the corporate governance framework is discussed, as is the potential role 
for increased regulation. The notion of accountability is described in detail. Various 
interpretations of what constitutes accountability are documented and differing 
classifications of accountability are discussed. An attempt is made to integrate the 
insights offered by the corporate governance and the accountability frameworks. The 
notion of internal control is offered as one possible link between the two. The 
implications of corporate governance and accountability for treasury management are 
also presented. 
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Chapter 4 considers the research methodology, and discusses the methods 
underpinning the analysis in this dissertation. Views on the nature of reality and the 
contribution of knowledge have direct implications for methodological choices 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The researcher's assumptions about the world are likely 
to implicitly or explicitly influence the research questions asked, the data sought and 
the conclusions drawn. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the various 
methodological frameworks in the extant literature in order to document the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions that characterise the 
choice of methods utilised in the present study. The core philosophical assumptions 
that guide any academic research project are outlined. The particular research 
objectives of the present study and the choice of appropriate methods of analysis are 
then discussed. The ontological and epistemological assumptions of the researcher 
support the choice of a primarily qualitative, interpretive methodological approach to 
the research. The chapter explains the link between this approach and the two 
methods employed to examine whether FRS 13 is perceived to be useful: namely, (i) 
an investigation of the perspective of preparers and users of financial statements, and 
(ii) a study of how the contents of the annual reports of companies altered in response 
to the standard. These two qualitative research methods are outlined. 
Chapter 5 is the first of three empirical chapters presented in the dissertation. This 
chapter examines the impact of FRS 13 on the financial statements of UK quoted 
companies. In particular a content analysis survey is used to investigate: (i) UK 
companies' reporting on derivatives in their annual financial statements prior to the 
introduction of FRS 13; and (ii) changes in UK companies' reporting practices for 
derivative instruments since the standard was mandated. The chapter therefore 
assesses whether the introduction of FRS 13 has had a material effect on the quantity 
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of information about derivative usage included in financial statements; such an 
assessment is important as the main aim of FRS 13 was the provision of additional 
information about the usage of derivative financial instruments. The study presents 
this analysis for the total level of disclosure, as well as for different categories of 
disclosure, market types and sectors. This breakdown should help to investigate if 
individual classes of company have been particularly affected by the standard. 
Chapter 6 examines the implementation of FRS 13 by UK companies. Visits were 
made to 1 7 companies, and the implementation of the standard was discussed with 
corporate treasurers. Views were sought as to the problems that arose from the 
introduction of the standard, how the data and information was collected to meet 
reporting requirements and the problems that were envisaged in the future when 
complying with International Accounting Standards (lASs), in particular IAS 39. 
Treasurers were also asked about whether they had any views on the requirements of 
the US standard, FAS 133, or the suggestions put forward by the Joint Working 
Group on Derivatives. Finally, treasurers were asked for their opinions about whether 
the disclosures required by FRS 13 were likely to improve internal control within 
their firms and aid in their discharge of their accountability to different stakeholder 
categories. 
Chapter 7 takes a different approach, and examines the implications of the standard 
from a user perspective. Many of the corporate scandals arising from derivatives 
usage in the past were often found to be a result of corporate governance failures. The 
introduction of a Financial Reporting Standard that made treasury activities more 
transparent might have implications for corporate governance. In particular, it might 
11 
result in large investors asking questions about treasury policy and procedures, 
thereby making management more accountable to their stakeholders. A series of 
interviews was therefore undertaken with large institutional investors to investigate 
whether: (i) UK institutional investors' general attitudes towards treasury 
management and derivatives usage had changed since the introduction of FRS 13; and 
(ii) the introduction of FRS 13 had any implications for corporate governance 
practices and procedures. 
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the main findings from the three empirical chapters. 
It also offers some limitations of the current research. Potential avenues for further 
developments and future research are also explored. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Background to the Derivatives 
Reporting Standards 
l3 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review and Background to the Derivatives 
Reporting Standards 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a reVIew of the literature concernIng the issues to be 
investigated in the present thesis. Specifically, it outlines the studies that have 
examined both the theoretical and practical motivations for corporate risk 
management, accounting standard setting and risk management disclosure. The 
remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 of the chapter outlines 
the results from studies that examine the corporate usage of derivative financial 
instruments. The theoretical motivations for corporate risk management are also 
discussed, while empirical investigations concerning corporate risk management are 
also described. Section 2.3 discusses the need for accounting standards. The impact of 
UK and international attempts to regulate derivatives reporting is described in Section 
2.4. Section 2.5 reviews the literature concerning risk disclosures to date. Finally, 
Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 The Corporate Use of Derivatives 
Financial instruments are contracts whose values depend on, and are derived from, the 
price of an underlying asset, a reference rate or an index (Fabozzi and Modigliani, 
1992). Derivative instruments comprise various types of contracts ranging from the 
more usual (such as futures, options and swaps), to the more complex products (such 
as swaptions) (Wilmott, 1998). The strategic use of derivatives and other financial 
instruments enhances a firm's ability to manage its financial exposure in an 
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environlnent characterised by fluctuating interest rates, variable exchange rates and 
turbulent commodity prices3. The use of these financial products in corporate risk 
management has grown rapidly in recent years. For example, Goldberg et al. (1998) 
clain1 that the volume of exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
increased at an annual rate of 48 per cent, between 1986 and 1991. The Bank of 
England documented a 61 per cent rise in the average daily turnover in OTC currency 
and interest rate derivatives since April 1998 (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
2001). Section 2.2.1 outlines the theoretical debate surrounding the necessity for 
corporate risk management. 
2.2.1 The Theoretical Motivations for Corporate Risk Management 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the notion of risk management is 
irrelevant to the firm. They suggested that companies did not need to hedge risk 
because value was only created when a company made a positive net present value 
investment. The choice of funding had no impact on the value of the firm. Further, 
investors could replicate whatever risk management strategy a company might decide 
to pursue. Therefore, if a company was exposed to exchange rate or interest rate risk, 
there was no need for them to hedge such an exposure, since investors could 
accomplish this task themselves. However, Modigliani and Miller assumed the 
existence of perfect markets4, where, for example, the cost of financial distress was 
considered to be zero. Consequently, the various economic rationales that have been 
advanced in an attempt to explain corporate risk management activity all depend on 
3 "Hedging" generally denotes the activities in which entities engage to reduce their exposure to price, 
interest rate, or exchange rate risk (Melumad et aI., 1999). 
4 Modigliani and Miller (1958) also assumed the existence of no taxes, no bankruptcy costs and no 
asymmetric information. 
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the violation of one or more of the restrictive conditions required for this irrelevance 
proposition to be valid. 
Despite the Modigliani and Miller (1958) argument, the increase in derivatives usage 
has continued. There are a variety of factors that have stimulated the recent explosive 
growth in the use of derivative financial instruments. This increase has in part been 
attributed to the success of the financial industry in creating a variety of OTC and 
exchange-traded products (Froot et aI., 1993). Other important factors include the 
deregulation of the financial services industry, the increased competition among 
financial institutions, changes in tax regulations and advancements in computer 
technology (Chau et aI., 2000). Several motives for the corporate use of hedging 
techniques are cited in the literature. These motivations relate to: (i) managerial 
motives5; (ii) taxation6; (iii) regulatory arbitrage7; (iv) economies of scale arguments8; 
(\') reductions in the costs of financial distress9; (vi) capital market imperfections and 
5 Froot el aI. (1993) argued that through the use of hedging, management could smooth the earnings of 
the company, thus influencing the market's perception of their abilities. Stulz (1984) argued that 
management might engage in hedging activities to minimise the chance of themselves being forced to 
leave the company. 
6 This argument states that companies use hedging in order to ensure that the same tax rate was 
maintained in consecutive years. (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Rawls and Smithson, 1990; Froot et aI., 1993; 
Graham and Smith, 1999). Hedging through the use of derivatives may result in companies paying less 
tax compared with their non-derivative user counterparts (Graham and Smith, 1999). 
7 Companies may try to avoid excessive costs in their domestic market by raising [mance overseas 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985; Eckl and Robinson, 1990). 
8 Nance et aI. (1993) argued that there were economies of scale in the costs associated with derivatives 
transactions that would make it cheaper for larger fIrms to hedge. Large companies could engage 
professional expertise in order to take full advantage of the many opportunities afforded by derivative 
fInancial instruments, as well as participating in speculative transactions where the cost of larger 
transactions might be cheaper than those of smaller transactions. Further, larger fIrms may have a 
greater range of exposures for which the use of derivative fInancial instruments might be appropriate 
(Bodnar et aI., 1995; Prevost et aI., 2000), a conclusion disputed by Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) who 
found that derivatives usage was consistent across all companies irrespective of size. 
9 A number of writers have suggested that hedging minimises cash flow volatility, thus reducing the 
probability of defaulting on fInancial obligation and decreasing the costs of fInancial distress (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985; Rawls and Smithson, 1990; Froot et aI., 1993; Mian, 1996). 
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information asymmetries 10; and (vii) ensuring sufficient internal funds are present to 
fund attractive investment opportunities 11. The findings of studies that have examined 
these hypotheses have been fairly mixed. 
2.2.2 Previous Empirical Studies 
A number of studies have tried to ascertain how corporations manage their financial 
risks in volatile environments; they have explored the broad array of new and 
innovative financial products available to corporate management. Grant and Marshall 
(1997) and Mallin et aI. (2001) carried out surveys of how UK firms use derivatives. 
However, studies on the usage of derivatives are not confined to UK firms. Several 
academics have examined the extent to which derivatives are employed in large 
multinational companies. For example, Bodnar et aI., (1995; 1996; 1998) and Philips 
(1995) examined derivatives usage among large US multinational firms. A number of 
studies have focused on derivatives usage among firms in New Zealand and Australia 
(Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Berkman et aI. 1997a; 1997b; 2002; Jin and Fang, 
1999; Petersen and Thiagarijan, 2000). De Ceuster et aI. (2000) investigated 
companies in Belgium, while Silva and Dias (2001) conducted a survey of derivatives 
10 Hedging can exploit any information asymmetries between the market participants, thus enabling 
corporate executives to gain benefit from insider knowledge. Companies can therefore exploit 
imperfect capital markets (Froot et aI., 1993). 
11 Froot et aI. (1994) argued that companies relied on cashflow projections in order to decide on their 
investment strategies. Froot et aI. (1993) suggested that variations in the cashflows earned by assets 
might lead to variability in investments. Firms might be compelled to raise additional finance through 
external funding. Nance et aI. (1993) suggested that firms with an abundance of growth options were 
more likely to engage in hedging activities aimed at reducing volatility in their firm's value. 
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usage by Portuguese firms. All of these surveys have documented evidence of an 
increase in the use of derivatives and other financial instruments in recent years. Some 
of the principal findings of these and other empirical studies will now be examined in 
greater detail. Table 2.1 provides a comparison of some of these studies. 
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Table 2.1: A Comparison of some Previous Studies on Derivatives Usage 
Study Country Data Sample Size Overall Reasons for Using 
Collection Derivatives Derivatives 
Method Usage 
Bodnar et al. (1995) US Questionnaire 2000 (530 35% 1. To hedge contractual commitments 
(mail) responses) 2. To hedge anticipated transactions of < 12 months 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996) New Zealand Data Set 124 (80 53% N/A 
responses) 
Bodnar et al. (1996) US Questionnaire 2000+ (350 41% 1. To manage volatility in cash flows 
(mail) responses) 2. To manage fluctuations in accounting earnings 
Grant and Marshall (1997) UK Combined 250 90% N/A 
Data Set 
Bodnar et al. (1998) US Questionnaire 1928 (399 50% To hedge identifiable contractual commitments 
(mail) responses) 
DeCeuster et al. (2000) Belgium Questionnaire 334 (73) 65.8% 1. To hedge contractual commitments 
(mail) 2. To hedge anticipated transactions of < 12 months 
Prevost et al. (2000) New Zealand Questionnaire 334 (155 67.1% To hedge anticipated transactions of < 12 months 
(mail) responses) 
Mallin et al. (2001) UK Questionnaire 800 (230 60% 1. To hedge contractual commitments 
responses) 2. To hedge anticipated transactions of < 12 months 
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The first of these Bodnar et aI. (1995) reported that at least 35 per cent of companies 
used some form of derivative financial instruments. In New Zealand, Berkman and 
Bradbury (1996) documented empirical evidence that corporate derivative usage 
increased with certain financial characteristics such as leverage size the existence of , , 
tax losses and the proportion of shares held by directors 12. The use of these 
instruments was reported to have decreased with the existence of high interest 
coverage and high liquidity (Berkman and Bradbury, 1996)13. More recently, Chan 
and Gunasekarage (2001) also examined derivatives usage amongst companies in 
New Zealand. They found that four major factors influenced the usage of financial 
instruments; interest cover, managerial options, the quick ratio and size14. 
In the US, Mian (1996) found some evidence to support the hypothesis that firms 
hedged their risk to reduce contracting costs, to exploit capital market imperfections 
and to lower their tax liabilities. Geczy et aI., (1997) also investigated the use of 
currency derivatives by US firms; they found that firms with greater growth 
opportunities and tighter financial constraints were more likely to use currency 
derivatives than other companies. In the UK, Dunne et aI. (forthcoming) found that 
company size, the percentage of sales that companies exported overseas, the presence 
12 For example, Berkman and Bradbury (1996) argued that the optimal hedging decision from the 
management perspective depended on the individual compensation contract of managers. In a situation 
where an individual manager's wealth is a function of firm value (by means of share options), then it 
might be optimal for these individuals to engage in hedging activities aimed at boosting firm value. 
Directors and managers who held a greater proportion of shares were more concerned about the 
variability in firm value and were therefore more likely to hedge. 
13 Berkman and Bradbury (1996) argued that a high proportion of liquid assets reduced the need to use 
derivatives to lower agency costs. 
14 They suggested that firms that were vulnerable to financial risk because of their inability to generate 
sufficient earnings in order to meet interest payment obligations, and in order to maintain enough liquid 
funds, were more likely to be users of derivative products. 
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of financial distress and under-investment problems were important factors In 
determining derivatives usage 15 • 
Amongst those firms that used financial products, the rate and frequency of usage had 
increased (Bodnar et aI., 1995; 1996; 1998). Derivatives were predominantly 
employed for the management of easily identifiable risks (Bodnar et aI., 1995; 1996; 
1998). \vith the use of derivatives in the management of foreign exchange exposures 
topping the list (Bodnar et aI., 1995; 1996; 1998). The minimisation of cash flow 
fluctuation was determined to be the most important goal of risk management, with 
the reduction in accounting earnings variability and the protection of the Balance 
Sheet ranking a distant second and third respectively (Bodnar et aI., 1995). 
Some regional variations with respect to derivatives usage have also been noted. US 
firms were reported to be more risk averse than their UK counterparts (Collier et aI., 
1990). Perhaps the existence of more centralised control systems in UK treasury 
departments might have an influence on perceived riskiness (Collier and Davis, 
1985). Relative to their size, New Zealand firms were found to be more active users 
of derivative financial instruments than their US counterparts (Berkman et aI., 1997b). 
This finding was attributed to the relatively high exposure of companies in a small 
open economy such as New Zealand. In contrast, New Zealand state-owned 
IS Company size was found to be the major influence on the results. This finding supports the view that 
economies of scale are important in determining corporate usage of derivatives. The other significant 
explanatory variable related to the percentage of sales that companies exported overseas. Where these 
sales were material, and companies needed to engage in hedging strategies using derivatives, this 
variable might also reflect the impact of company size on the results since larger companies tend to 
engage in more overseas selling. 
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enterprises were not fOlmd to be above-average users of derivative products (Berkman 
and Bradbury, 1998). In Belgium, a large number of firms were found to engage in 
active risk management (De Ceuster et aI., 2000). The main focus in these firms was 
the decrease in earnings volatility (as opposed to cash-flow volatility), whereas for 
firms in Portugal the primary emphasis was on successful management of interest rate 
and foreign exchange risk exposures (Silva and Dias, 2001). Derivatives usage in 
Portugal was not widespread, although the variety of instruments used had increased 
in recent years (Silva and Dias, 2001). 
Several studies have focused on the specific use of derivatives in the management of 
interest rate risk. Swaps were frequently found to be the most popular instrument 
employed in the management of interest rate risk (Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1998; 
Prevost et aI., 2000; Li and Mao, 2003). In addition, Borokhovich et ai. (2000) found 
a significant positive relation between interest rate derivatives usage and the 
proportion of outside directors for firms with significant research and development 
(R&D) expenditure16• At a more general level, Faff and Howard (1999) explored the 
interest rate risk of Australian financial sector companies and found evidence of 
reduced interest rate sensitivity in large banks and finance companies in recent 
years 17, while Dertmann et ai. (2000) noted that the effect of interest rate changes on 
16 Borokhovich et al. (2000) argued that R&D expenditure is commonly as a proxy for the growth 
options of a firm. The higher the R&D expenditure, the more likely a company is to develop a 
profitable new product. Therefore, the evidence suggested that outside directors influenced the decision 
to use derivatives in the best interests of the shareholders (including themselves), especially in finns 
with high levels of growth options. 
17 Faff and Howard (1999) found that the deregulation of the Australian financial system during the 
1980s reduced the level of interest rate sensitivity experienced by financial institutions in that country. 
They attributed the reduced sensitivity to the improved systems adopted for the measurement and 
management of interest rate risk. 
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equity returns of large European corporations' depended on corporations' business 
activities 18. 
In contrast to these investigations, other studies examined the use of derivative 
financial instruments in the management of foreign exchange risk. Currency forwards 
were documented as the most common financial instruments to be utilised in the 
managenlent of foreign exchange exposures (Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1998; Prevost et 
aI., 2000). Several reasons were offered about why companies engaged in foreign 
exchange management. Geczy et ai. (1997) examined currency hedging activities for 
a sample of Fortune 500 firms and found that the use of currency derivatives was 
directly related to the amount of research and development expenditurel9. Brown 
(2001) investigated the foreign exchange risk management programme at a 
manufacturer of durable equipment. The smoothing of earnings volatility was the 
primary motivating factor used to explain the firm's use of foreign exchange 
instruments. Issues concerning accounting treatment, exchange rate and exposure 
volatility determined how the firm conducted its hedging2o. Using a larger sample, 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found evidence that firms used currency derivatives to 
hedge, rather than to speculate, as their use significantly reduced the exchange rate 
exposure that companies faced. The findings of Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
18 They noted that the share returns of industrial corporations were positively affected by interest rate 
changes, while those of financial companies were negatively affected. They concluded that the 
commonly presumed negative relation between interest rate shifts and share returns was largely driven 
by the fmancial companies in the market. 
19 A similar argument to that articulated by Borokhovich et al. (2000) was advanced, namely that R&D 
expenditure was commonly as a proxy for the growth options of a firm. The higher the R&D 
expenditure, the more likely a company is to develop a profitable new product. Therefore, the evidence 
suggested that outside directors influenced the decision to use derivatives in the best interests of the 
shareholders (including themselves), especially in firms with high levels of growth options. 
20 Brown (2001) found that the company was very concerned about the impact ofFAS 133; an internal 
evaluation on the likely impact of the standa'ffl suggested that there would be a noticeable increase in 
reported-earnings volatility following adoption. 
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confirmed this view; they uncovered evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the 
use of foreign currency derivatives for hedging purposes caused an increase in firm 
value21. Belk and Glaum (1990) concluded that accounting exposures were actively 
managed by the majority of UK firms; the management of transaction exposures was 
seen as a vital element of foreign exchange risk management. 
International differences emerge with respect to currency risk management objectives 
and practices. Chow and Chen (1998) examined the exchange rate risks of Japanese 
firms and found that these firms were exposed to adverse movements in the year. 
Marshall (2000) surveyed the foreign exchange risk practices of large multinational 
companies operating in the UK, the USA and the Asia Pacific region; the author 
found statistically significant differences in the objectives and the techniques used in 
foreign exchange risk management across the regions. In particular, companIes 
operating in the Asia Pacific region placed a great deal of emphasis on foreign 
exchange risk management and economic exposure. The author concluded that this 
difference was a response to the Asian economic crisis, when exchange rates 
throughout the region declined quickly by sizeable amounts (Marshall, 2000). Nydahl 
(1999) investigated the effect of exchange rate exposure for a sample of Swedish 
firms. He found that the estimated exposure was positively related to total sales and 
negatively related to the use of currency derivatives. 
The foreign exchange risk management practices operating in institutional investment 
organisations have also been documented. Solomon (1999) found that UK 
21 They found evidence that firms that begin a hedging policy experience an increase in value above 
those fmns that choose to remain unhedged and that firms that stopped hedging experienced a decrease 
in value relative to those firms that chose to remain hedged. 
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institutional investors adopted a dual strategy for managing currency risks; not only 
managing their own foreign exchange risk, but also requiring that their investee 
companies manage foreign exchange risk as well. She also found evidence to suggest 
that the institutional investors required their investee companies to disclose 
information relating to their foreign exchange risk management policies. This 
information was similar to that mandated under FRS 13. 
All of the documented research in this area points to the increased use of derivative 
financial instruments by a large number of companies. This increase has been 
reported for companies from different countries throughout the world. However, in 
tandem with this increase, there has been a dramatic rise in reported scandals 
attributed to the use of financial derivatives. The number of scandals, as well as the 
funds 'lost' from unauthorised derivative transactions associated with these scandals, 
have undoubtedly contributed to calls for greater disclosure of derivatives activities. 
2.2.3 Scandals Associated with the Use of Derivatives 
Despite the fact that companies try to reduce their financial risks by using derivatives, 
there have been a plethora of scandals and insolvencies due to losses attributable to 
trades involving these products. For example, in March 1991, Allied Lyons lost $250 
million in writing and selling currency options (Chance, 2001), while, in February 
1993, Showa Shell Sekiyu suffered a $1,580 million loss on foreign exchange 
forwards (Brealey and Myers, 2003). In April 1994, Kashima Oil lost $1.5 billion on 
currency derivatives (Chance, 2001). In the same year, Proctor and Gamble lost $102 
million in equity swaps following an increase in interest rates (Arnold, 1998) and 
Gibsons Greetings lost $19.7 million on interest rate derivative transactions (Overdahl 
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and Schachter, 1995). Overdahl and Schachter (1995) highlight the failure of 
corporate governance structures to avert the huge losses, at the time of the Gibson's 
Greetings crisis. Orange County in California was forced into bankruptcy as a result 
ofa $1.7 billion loss from investments including derivatives (lorion, 1995; Walmsley, 
1995). Also in 1994, the German metals and oil-trading conglomerate 
Metallgesellschaft AG, disclosed losses of $1,340 million on energy derivatives (Culp 
and Miller, 1995; Edwards and Canter, 1995; Jayaraman and Shrikhande, 1997). 
J ayaraman and Shrikhande (1997) stated that the German corporate governance 
structure did not help in averting financial distress at Metallgesellschaft AG. 
However, they did acknowledge that the corporate governance structure in place in 
the company aided the recovery process. 
In 1995, Barings Bank became insolvent with losses of $1,400 million (Gapper and 
Denton, 1996; Leeson, 1996; Drummond, 2002). Hogan (1997) claims that the 
collapse of Barings had "little to do with the use of derivative financial instruments", 
but more to do with "the failure of management in its monitoring and analysis of 
trading activities and the risks associated with them" (p. 14) - in other words, the 
failure of internal corporate governance structures and the absence of external 
accountability. More recently, Allied Irish Bank suffered a $750m loss due to 
suspected fraud by a trader in the headquarters of its US subsidiary, Allfirst Financial 
(Dunne and Helliar, 2002; Bhandari, 2002; Gallagher, 2002; Moore, 2002). Off-
balance sheet finance vehicles were implicated in the collapse at Enron, one of the 
largest bankruptcies in US corporate history (Benston and Hartgraves, 2002; Clark 
and Demirag, 2002; Lev, 2002; Revsine, 2002; Blyth, 2003; Wilson and Campbell, 
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" 2003t-. Despite the losses associated with the use of financial instruments, 
proponents of these products argue that derivatives continue to playa crucial role in 
the intermediation of risk in the financial system. However, the high-profile losses 
have led to calls for more stringent regulation of derivatives activity from both 
regulators and legislators (Blankley et aI., 2002). The lack of information (both 
internal and external) about the usage of such instruments is frequently cited as a 
reason for many of the scandals associated with these innovative products over the 
last decade. One of the areas where such calls are most evident is with respect to the 
need for greater transparency in the disclosure of derivatives activity (Grant and 
Marshall, 1997). McDonough (1993) noted that the increased use of derivatives 
coupled with the inadequacy of the accounting requirements for dealing with these 
instruments had reduced the transparency of company exposures. More recently, 
Beresford (1998) argued that the existing accounting guidance on derivatives and 
hedging was incomplete, inconsistent and difficult to apply. He suggested that the 
effects of derivatives were not transparent in the basic financial statements. The 
Jenkins Report (AlCPA, 1994) expressed a similar concern about the lack of adequate 
disclosures in financial statements to assist investors in understanding the effects of 
derivative transactions. Bodnar et aI. (1998) reported that 74 per cent of their survey 
respondents expressed a "high or moderate degree of concern" regarding the 
accounting treatment of derivative activity. Consequently, regulatory bodies such as 
the ASB in the UK and the F ASB in the US came under increased pressure to make 
the development of a comprehensive set of rules for the reporting of corporate 
22 Enron management created a scheme that provided a vehicle to keep true economic losses off of 
Enron's earnings statement. They created 'special purpose vehicles', linked to the Enron share price, in 
order to offset investment losses. The scheme worked while Enron' s share price continued to rise, 
however, there was not a backup plan when the share price declined and the questionable transactions 
were exposed (Wilson and Campbell, 2003). 
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derivative usage a matter of some priority. To address the urgent need for improved 
disclosure, the ASB issued FRS 13 'Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments -
Disclosures' for application in the UK, and the FASB issued FAS 133 'Accounting 
for Derivative Instrmnents and Hedging Activities' for application in the US. 
2.3 Accounting Standard Setting 
The deriyatives reporting project was precipitated by the large losses suffered by 
several corporations using derivatives. However, there are a number of key issues that 
need to be examined in association with the introduction of any new accounting 
standard. The purpose of a framework for financial reporting needs to be examined in 
order to ascertain the appropriateness and suitability of a particular financial reporting 
procedure. The reasons advanced concerning the need for accounting standards and 
the orientation of approaches adopted by accounting standard setters are examined in 
this section. The standard setting process operating in the UK is discussed. The issue 
of lobbying practices is documented, with particular attention devoted to studies that 
highlight the relative influence of particular interest groups in the lobbying process. 
2.3.1 A Framework for Financial Reporting 
Gray and Haslam (1990) argue that there is no single framework within which 
empirical evidence about the external reporting activity of organisations can be 
conceptualised, articulated and collected. Kirk (1981) states that a conceptual 
framework is necessary in order to identify the particular notion of reality that is most 
appropriate, and which would therefore need to be reflected in financial statements. 
Once the objectives for financial reporting are explicitly stated, a conditional 
normative approach makes it possible to evaluate the appropriateness and suitability 
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of a particular reporting practice (Shapiro, 1997). Many attempts have been made to 
develop a conceptual framework for financial reporting. For example, Laughlin and 
Gray (1988) and Gray et al. (1996) employed a model derived from general systems 
theory, in an attempt to conceptualise reporting activities23 , while Laughlin and Puxty 
(1981) highlighted the notion of 'organisational control' as a possible basis for a 
suitable conceptual framework24 . 
NU111erOUS reasons have been advanced to explain the need for accounting standards. 
In 1977 the American Accounting Association (AAA) published its 'Statement on 
Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance' (SOATATA). SOATATA identified 
three dominant theoretical approaches to financial accounting: (i) the classical ('true 
income') model; (ii) the decision usefulness approach; and (iii) the information 
economics model. Proponents of the 'true income' paradigm argue that income 
measured using a single valuation base met the needs of all users of financial 
statements (Belkaoui, 1992). Current price information is regarded as more useful 
than conventional historical-cost information to users in making economic decisions 
(Belkaoui, 1992). 
The decision-usefulness perspective suggests that the primary concern of accounting 
standard setting is the improvement of decision-making capabilities and consequences 
for certain users of financial statements (Chambers, 1966; Beaver and Demski, 1974). 
This approach is built on the view that the central purpose of financial accounting and 
23 General Systems Theory (GST) conceives of everything as a system. It recognises that each system 
is both part of a larger system and comprises sub-systems of its own. Understanding of one system 
requires an understanding of both the systems that comprise the system under study and the systems of 
which it is a part (Laughlin and Gray, 1988; Gray et aI., 1996; Gray, 2002). 
24 They suggested that external reporting by organisations could be viewed as the means by which 
management sought to influence the organisational environment and attempted to control the firm. 
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reporting is to satisfy the information needs or wants of users situated in the 
substantive environment of any focal organisation (Laughlin and Gray, 1988). This 
results in a user orientation, where the fulfilment of the information needs of financial 
statement users is the main concern (Davis et aI., 1982). Financial reports are deemed 
to be necessary in order to provide information to reasonably informed users to aid 
thenl in their investment decisions (FASB, 1978, p. viii). Multiple users with varying 
needs are recognised and conceptual alternatives are related to these needs (Kelly-
Newton, 1980). 
The proponents of the information economics perspective argue that the primary 
concern of accounting standard setters should be the economic consequences of 
changing accounting conventions for decision makers or preparers of financial 
statements. Accounting information is seen as a type of organisational resource which 
is demanded and supplied in much the same way as other economic goods and 
services (Bebbington et aI., 2001). Therefore, because this information is produced 
and distributed at a cost to the firm any material that is found to be of little benefit 
should be eliminated (Hendriksen, 1982). The intrinsic characteristics of financial 
reporting concepts are viewed as an end in themselves, with a monolithic class of 
users implied but irrelevant to the resolution of accounting issues (Kelly-Newton, 
1980). Thus accounting standards identify 'best' practice and develop technical rules 
and concepts to which organisations should adhere25 (Gilfedder and 0 hOgartaigh, 
1998). 
25 However, Warnock (1997) suggested that the rules formulated by the Accounting Standards 
Committee CASC), the precursor to the ASB, left ample scope for the exercise of professional 
judgement. 
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Building on the SOAT AT A classification Laughlin and Puxty (1981) also 
documented three perspectives on financial accounting: (i) the weak decision 
usefulness approach; (ii) the strong decision usefulness approach; and (iii) the 
organisational control approach. The weak decision usefulness approach was similar 
to the true income approach documented by SOAT AT A but extended to include 
accountability models. The strong decision usefulness approach was almost identical 
to SOATATA's decision usefulness model in terms of catering towards the 
informational needs of decision-makers. Finally, the organisational control 
perspective argued that information is a vital organisational resource that can be used 
as a type of tool to control the organisational environment. 
Davis et al. (1982) adopted an alternative classification for financial accounting. They 
maintained that four principal 'images' shaped the development of financial 
accounting26 ; (i) accounting as a historic record; (ii) accounting as a descriptor of 
current economic reality; (iii) accounting as an information system; and (iv) 
accounting as a commodity. The image of a 'historic record' encompasses the 
processes involved in recording economic transactions and regards the function of 
accounting as to faithfully render a historical record/account of the organisation to the 
owners; accounting records are provided in order to document a history of the 
manager's stewardship of the owner's resources. The image of accounting as a 
descriptor of current economic reality is concerned with using true economic/ current 
values instead of historical values. The image of an information system views 
accounting as the process of interpreting and communicating information to the user. 
Finally, accounting as a commodity treats accounting information as an economic 
26 Images are the "set of constructs used to shape and understand the reality being investigated" (p. 
307). These images affect what is seen and what is investigated. 
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comnl0dity produced (in the absence of regulation) in accordance with the laws of 
supply and demand. 
The different approaches offered by SOAT AT A (AAA, 1977), Laughlin and Puxty 
(1981) and Davis et al. (1982) contain a degree of overlap. Certain common themes 
can be identified. Bebbington et al. (2001) collated the three perspectives and 
identified these common characteristics. Based on their integration of the three 
approaches, Figure 2.1 reproduces the overlap amongst the different classification 
systems. 
Figure 2.1: Commonalities in Classification Schemes of Financial Accounting 
Basic Common 
Approach 
Data-Oriented 
Decision 
Usefulness 
Organisati onal 
Resource 
SOATATA (1977) 
Classical Models 
Decision 
Usefulness 
Information 
Economics 
Laughlin and 
Puxty (1981) 
Weak Decision 
Usefulness 
Strong Decision 
Usefulness 
Organisational 
Control 
Davis et al. (1982) 
Historical Record 
and Current 
Economic Reality 
Information System 
Commodity 
Reproduced from Bebbington et al. (2001), p. 414. 
The three classifications offered previously are all based on different attitudes by the 
supplier concerning the purpose for which the information is supplied (Bebbington et 
al. 2001). From an agency perspective the development of new standards or the 
change to an existing standard carries the potential for wealth transfers from some 
people to others, and thus become a political process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
Brown and Tarca, 2001). Within this perspective, accounting standards exist because 
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they are considered to be a relatively efficient solution to a serious agency problem 
(Brown and Tarca, 2001; Marshall and Weetman, 2002). It was frequently argued that 
strict disclosure requirements led to liquid and efficient markets and reduced the cost 
of capital for quoted firms (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1999). Therefore, potential 
winners and losers had an incentive to lobby the legitimating authority - the standard 
setters, or ultimately the government - in an attempt to influence the outcome (Brown 
and Tarca, 2001). This viewpoint reflects the political dimensions inherent in 
differing policy choices (Gilfedder and 0 hOgartaigh, 1998). The consequences of 
these differing policy decisions reflect conflicts of interest that affect resource 
allocation and re-distribution of wealth amongst an entity's stakeholders. Tutticci et 
aI. (1994) claimed that the setting of accounting standards involved the restriction of 
the behaviour of financial statement preparers. Such restrictions therefore implied that 
policy choices might not be neutral, but reflections of unequal amounts of power and 
influence among the interested parties (Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Tutticci et aI., 1994; 
Gilfedder and 0 hOgartaigh, 1998). Hope and Gray (1982) stated that any description 
of the political process of accounting standard setting should include a consideration 
of how, when and by whom power was exercised. Given the existence of due process, 
constituents (that is, shareholders, prep arers , managers, auditors) who were 
economically disadvantaged by the introduction of a proposed standard, would be 
expected to utilise the process in an attempt to influence the regulators (Tutticci et aI., 
1994). 
A critical-interpretative perspective on financial accounting maintains that financial 
reporting should be used as an instrument of social change. This sociological 
perspective of standard setting recognises the many interest groups involved and 
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facilitates a positioning of management in the process. Within this perspective, the 
standard setting function is viewed as a programme for planned social change by 
policy makers and fosters an understanding of the process of change in accounting 
practices (Kelly-Newton, 1980). Young and Mouck (1996) adopted a 'social 
constructivist' perspective based on Foucault and Derrida's insistence that the 
contingency of the present is a partial product of past discursive arguments. They 
noted that although the standard setting bodies did not claim to have a moral or legal 
authority to establish public policy, the accounting standards produced by the process 
did have social and economic consequences. However, they added that the success or 
failure of particular accounting standards was judged on technical issues, rather than 
in response to the particular social or political concerns that had prompted the 
standard's initial construction27 . 
The ASB released the "Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting" in December 
1999. This Statement was intended to be a comprehensive and reasonably detailed 
description of the approach that the ASB believed should underpin all financial 
statements. According to these principles, the objective of financial statements was: 
"to provide infonnation about the reporting entity's financial perfonnance and 
financial position that is useful to a wide range of users for assessing the 
stewardship of the entity's management and for making economic decisions." 
ASB (1999, Chapter 1) 
This thesis argues that the 'economic reality', as represented by financial reporting, 
aims to provide a representation of 'social reality'. The representations provided by 
financial reporting are not just the result of passive mappings of some objective, 
27 Much of the commentary on FRS 13 (and the other derivatives standards) to date has been concerned 
with technical issues, rather than on the potential of these standards to provide a solution to the 
previous scandals involving derivatives. 
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external reality, but contribute reflexively to the social construction of economic 
reality. Thus, accounting standards such as FRS 13, which lay down the rules to be 
followed by preparers of financial statements, involve presuppositions about the 
economic reality to be represented. 
2.3.2 The Accounting Standard Setting Process 
The standard setting process in the UK operates via a system of open consultation 
through the issue of a financial reporting exposure draft (FRED) which precedes the 
publication of a financial reporting standard. Lobbying forms an integral part of the 
due process employed in this standard setting arena. Such lobbying activity can be 
conducted through formal and informal channels. Formal lobbying typically takes the 
form of written submissions, position papers, questionnaire responses and via 
membership of the standard setting board. Informal lobbying includes luncheon 
discussions, telephone conversations and other word-of-mouth communications. 
Lobbying in the standard setting process has been examined on numerous occasions. 
Obtaining evidence of informal lobbying activity is difficult, as such activity is 
usually not directly observable. Therefore, previous studies have typically examined 
the formal submissions made to the various standard-setting bodies (Gorton, 1991; 
Grinyer and Russell, 1992; Tutticci et ai. 1994; Weetman et aI., 1996; Larson, 1997; 
o hOgartaigh and Reilly, 1997; Gilfedder and 0 hOgartaigh, 1998; Saemann, 1999; 
Fox and Russell, 2001; Weetman, 2001)28. 
The success of various lobbyist groups and the interplay of the power relationships 
have been subjected to academic scrutiny on several occasions. Research by Sutton 
28 For example, Tutticci et al. (1994) examined the submissions made to the Australian standard setting 
body on ED 49 (Accounting for Identifiable Intangible Assets). 
35 
(1984) and Weetman et aI. (1996) indicated that producers of financial statements 
were more likely to lobby than were the users of such financial statements. The 
incentives for preparers of financial statements to engage in lobbying activity are 
great given the potential economic consequences of any new accounting standards 
(Gilfedder and 0 hOgartaigh, 1998). Further, there has been a suggestion that the 
ASB favours the users of financial statements, representing the demand side of the 
market, rather than the preparers (Puxty et aI., 1987; Weetman, 2001). With respect to 
the preparers of financial statements, one possible reason why they dislike full 
disclosure is because such disclosure is costly to their firms (Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1999). Saemann (1999) claimed that preparers are likely to oppose requirements that 
increase disclosures because such disclosures might draw attention to unfavourable 
results or excessive profits. He argued that the costs of obtaining the necessary data 
for compliance, in addition to the increased printing requirements, also motivated 
financial statement preparers to oppose any additional disclosures. The additional 
information might also need to be disclosed or certified by third parties, such as 
accounting firms, thus increasing costs even further (Saemann, 1999). Further, 
because increased disclosure might reveal information to competitors or others who 
interacted strategically with the firm, they could cause the firm to lose competitive 
advantage or bargaining power in certain situations (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1999). 
Any standards that resulted in increased volatility in terms of reported income were 
likely to be opposed by managers because of the effect on any performance-related 
bonuses (Saemann, 1999). 
Georghiu (2001) examined less observable forms of lobbying as part of the ASB 
standard setting process. He found that the majority of the lobbying activity took 
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place at the public exposure stages of the standard setting process. The most popular 
lobbying method was considered to be appealing to external auditors for support 
(Sutton, 1984; Georghiu, 2001; Georghiu, 2002). There has been considerable debate 
concerning the effectiveness of comment letters (Sutton, 1984; Walker and Robinson, 
1993; Weetman et aI., 1996)29, however, Georghiu (2001) found that the submission 
of such letters was an effective form of lobbying. 
Although the preparers of financial statements are more likely to lobby than are the 
users of these reports (Sutton, 1984; Weetman et aI., 1996; Gilfedder and 0 
hOgartaigh, 1998; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1999; Saemann, 1999), users are also 
impacted by the release of financial reporting standards. There are many external 
users of financial statements - shareholders, bondholders, financial institutions, taxing 
authorities, potential investors, regulatory agencies, employees, customers, suppliers, 
and so on. It is likely that these users have different informational requirements from 
financial reports, but there are also identifiable similarities. For example, prior 
research tends to indicate that all users favour uniformity and full disclosure in 
financial reports (Weetman et aI., 1996). However, other conflicting objectives 
between user groups might result in different preferences for the content and the form 
of accounting reports (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). Such conflicting objectives may be 
satisfied either by publishing different accounting reports directed towards each 
specified group30, or by designing general purpose accounting reports which attempt 
29 Much of this debate centres on the assumption that comment letters are representative of overall 
corporate lobbying behaviour. For example, Weetman et aI., (1996) challenge this assumption; they 
claim that written submissions "are almost certainly not indicative of the entire lobbying process" (p. 
75). 
30 This option has been criticised because of the excessive use of resources involved in potentially 
producing several different annual reports for the various user groups (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). 
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. f 31 to satls y the preferences of all user groups . Nevertheless, in general, the annual 
report is seen by the accounting profession, as an important device for financial 
communication between management and stakeholders (Gray et aI., 1995a; 1995b; 
Bartlett and Chandler, 1997). Arnold (1977) highlights the fact that although 
accounting information is generally historical by nature (and is therefore seen as 
pro\'iding little insight into the process of assessing future worth), such information 
may still have a control value in enabling investors to monitor companies' 
performance. 
Investors are likely to hold well-diversified asset portfolios, whereas lack of 
diversification may render the preparer more exposed to the adverse economic 
consequences of a proposed standard on their firm (Gilfedder and 0 hOgartaigh, 
1998). Users are found to be more likely to lobby in private and by means of informal 
meetings with standard setters (Weetman et aI., 1996; Martens and McEnroe, 1998). 
Sutton (1984) postulated that because the lobbyist bore the costs of lobbying and 
received only a fraction of the benefit, the wider ranging the group (as is the case with 
users), the less likely individual members were to lobby. 
Purdy (1997) criticised the ASB for defining its objectives to include all users of 
financial statements, but then restricting the application of the standards. He argued 
that by focusing on the needs of investors, the ASB specified the information that had 
to be provided to investors, but other user groups did not benefit. Purdy also argued 
that the use of the term 'relevant' with accounting standards implied that financial 
31 Cooper and Sherer (1984) highlight a potential difficulty with such an approach; any user conflict 
concerning content preferences would need to be dealt with by choosing one method of accounting 
over another. 
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statements represented attributes that could only be expressed in money terms with 
either predictive or confirmatory value32 • 
At an international level, the IASB claim that the objective of an international set of 
accounting standards is to standardise firms' financial disclosures and accounting 
method choices among different nations (Wyatt, 1989; Ashbaugh, 2001; Damant, 
200L Parker and Morris, 2001). International Standards are gaining visibility and 
acceptance in the international marketplace for financial reporting information 
(Larson, 1997)33. Proponents of international standards claim that if all firms follow 
the same set of accounting standards, firms' external financial reports will provide 
more uniform disclosures and accounting variables will be more useful to investors 
(Wyatt, 1989; Purvis et aI., 1991; Damant, 2001). It is further argued that companies, 
in addition to investors, will benefit from disclosing financial information prepared in 
accordance with an internationally acceptable set of accounting standards (Parker and 
Morris, 2001). 
2.4 Accounting for Derivatives 
The derivatives reporting project was precipitated by large losses suffered by several 
corporations using these novel financial products. The emergence of new more 
complex financial instruments was seen as a challenge to existing financial 
accounting practices. Accounting claimed to provide the information necessary in 
32 This would have implications for wider accountability. Further, FRS 13 makes extensive use of 
narrative disclosures; where can such disclosures fit within the overall framework? 
33 Horton and Macve (2000) would dispute this. They claim that international accounting standard 
setting is in crisis. They highlight both the political arguments over the required structure necessary to 
ensure worldwide credibility and applicability as well as the technical disputes concerning a suitable 
conceptual framework, as fundamental flaws in the establishment of international standards. They 
found that this argument was particularly relevant with respect to accounting for financial instruments 
by means of lAS 39. 
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order to assess the financial condition as well as the operational results of an entity. 
Yet, the absence of information about financial instruments, which had the potential 
to alter risk within an organisation, threatened the maintenance of this claim. 
Therefore, standard setters proposed to make the use of financial instruments more 
transparent and to represent the effects of these instruments on an entity's financial 
.. ~4 posltlon- . 
In order to examine the impact of FRS 13 on preparers of the financial statements, a 
brief summary of the Standards that are relevant to treasury operations are discussed 
in Table 2.2. Parker and Morris (2001) argued that US GAAP had increasingly 
become an influence on accounting practices in other countries, even aside from those 
jurisdictions traditionally considered under direct US influence. For example, a survey 
by PWC and the Euro Association of Corporate Treasurers (EACT) in 2002, found 
that although local standards predominated, 50 per cent of companies across Europe 
complied with the US or International Accounting Standards (Masquelier and Di 
Paola, 2002). Therefore, because many UK companies are affected by both US and 
International Accounting Standards, a summary of the key US and international 
standards relating to disclosures about the use of derivatives is also supplied. Table 
2.2 highlights some of the key differences between the principal derivatives reporting 
standards. 
34 However, Young (1996) argued that the standard setting bodies, rather than accept the challenge 
posed to the existing reporting framework, chose to try to fit financial instruments within its confines, 
in order to maintain claims about representational faithfulness and to fit these instruments within 
existing accounting categories. Therefore, he maintained that the accounting issues associated with 
financial instruments were framed in established and programmed ways. 
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Table 2.2: A Comparative Analysis of the Main Derivatives Reporting Standards 
FRS 13 FAS 133 lAS 39 Joint Working FRED 23 FRED 30 
Group Proposals 
Application UK companies US companies and All companies All companies UK companies UK companies 
( other than insurance companIes reporting under reporting under 
companies) reporting under IAS IAS 
SFAS 
Coverage Disclosure only Disclosure, Disclosure, Disclosure, Hedge accounting Measurement and 
Measurement and Measurement and Measurement and Recognition 
Recognition Recognition Recognition 
Principal Obj ecti ves and All derivative All deri vati ve All derivative Hedge accounting Implementation of 
Disclosures Policies, Interest rate financial financial financial only permitted if IAS 39 fair value 
risk, Currency risk, instruments should instruments should instruments should pre-designated and prOVISIons. 
Liquidity risk be reflected at fair be reflected at fair be reflected at fair if meets hedge Insurance 
value. value. value. effectiveness tests compames no 
Hedge accounting Hedge accounting Does not allow longer exempt 
allowed allowed hedge accounting from FRS 13. 
Prohibit use of 
"recyc ling" 
techniques 
Effective March 23 rd, 1999 June 15 t\ 2000 January 1 st, 2001, N/A N/A N/A 
Date Compulsory in 
2005 for all EU 
companIes 
This table presents a summary of the main derivative reporting standards: FRS 13, FAS 133, lAS 39, the proposals of the Joint Working Group (JWG) and the two exposure 
drafts (FRED 23 and FRED 30. 
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2.4.1 Financial Reporting Standard 13 
In July 1993, an international association of bankers and fonner government officials 
published a document which called for improved disclosure in financial statements of 
transactions involving derivatives and other financial instruments (Group of Thirty, 
1993). However, it took the ASB three years to produce a discussion paper on 
financial instruments in July 1996 and a further two years to issue FRS 13 in 
September 1998. 
FRS 13 defines a financial instrument as "any contract that gives rise to both a 
financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another 
entity" (ASB, 1998, par. 2). The stated objective of FRS 13 is to ensure that reporting 
entities "provide in their financial statements disclosures that enable users to assess 
the entity's objectives, policies and strategies for holding or issuing financial 
instruments" (ASB, 1998, par. 1). The standard is effective for accounting periods 
ending on or after, 23 March 1999. 
FRS 13 reqUIres publicly traded entities, and all financial institutions other than 
insurance companies, that use financial instruments, to give sufficient narrative and 
numerical disclosures regarding their use of derivatives and other financial products. 
The main purpose of the narrative disclosures seems to be the stimulation of 
discussion on a company's reasons for using financial instruments. The idea is to put 
the numerical disclosures that are required into some sort of context. The ASB also 
hopes that narrative infonnation will help stakeholders evaluate the role that these 
instruments have played in the overall risk management strategy of a company (ASB, 
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1998)35. A key objective of the standard is that users should be able to receIve 
relevant and reliable infonnation about the extent to which financial instruments 
contribute to business risk. The narrative disclosures focus primarily on the risks that 
arise in connection with the use of derivative financial instruments and how such risks 
have been managed. Therefore, the narrative disclosures typically include (i) a 
discussion of the role of financial instruments in creating or changing the risks that an 
entity faces in its activities; (ii) a description of the objectives, policies and strategies 
for holding and issuing financial instruments; (iii) an explanation of how the year-end 
figures reflect the agreed objectives; and (iv) an outline of how financial instruments 
are (or are not) recognised in the financial statements. 
The numerical disclosures aim to show how the policies are implemented and to 
provide supplementary infonnation for evaluating the magnitude of any significant 
exposures (ASB, 1998). The main numerical disclosures required by FRS 13 fall 
under four headings: ( a) interest rate risk disclosures; (b) currency risk disclosures; (c) 
liquidity risk disclosures; and (d) fair values disclosures. There are also further 
numerical disclosures related to the use of financial instruments for trading and 
hedging purposes as well as the provision of details relating to specified commodity 
contracts. 
The interest rate risk disclosures relate to all significant financial assets and liabilities. 
An analysis of the carrying amount by principal currency, subdivided between: (i) 
35 FRS 13 does not specifically state where the narrative disclosures should be made and instead allows 
companies to make them "in the financial statements or in some other statement such as the operating 
and financial review" (ASB, 1998: par., 23). A survey by Arthur Andersen (2000) found that overall, 
48 per cent of the companies surveyed decided to make the narrative disclosures principally in the 
OFR. 
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those at fixed interest rates; (ii) those at floating interest rates; and (iii) those on which 
no interest is paid, is required. This analysis should be after taking account of any risk 
management that the entity has undertaken using derivatives. 
With respect to currency risk disclosures, FRS 13 requires an analysis of the net 
monetary assets and liabilities at the balance sheet date by reference to the principal 
functional currency of operations. The purpose of this analysis is to explain the 
currency exposures that give rise to exchange gains or losses. As with the interest rate 
risk disclosures these should be after taking account of any risk management that the 
entity has undertaken using derivatives. 
Liquidity disclosures focus on the maturity profile of the financial instruments. The 
FRS requires disclosure of the maturity profile in the following bands: (i) in one year 
or less, or on demand; (ii) in more than one year, but not more than two years; (iii) in 
more than two years, but not more than five years; and (iv) in more than five years. In 
addition to requiring disclosure of the maturity profile of financial instruments FRS 
13 also requires a similar analysis of any committed but un-drawn borrowing 
facilities. The required analysis is of facilities expiring: (i) in one year or less; (ii) in 
more than one year, but not more than two years; and (iii) in more than two years. 
The basic requirement of the fair value disclosure is that an entity should divide its 
financial assets and liabilities into appropriate categories and to disclose either: (a) the 
aggregate fair value at the balance sheet date compared to the aggregate book value; 
or (b) the aggregate fair value of those financial instruments at the balance sheet date 
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with a positive fair value (i.e. in excess of book value) and separately, those with a 
negative fair value. 
FRS 13 encourages, but does not require, the disclosure of overall market price risk. 
This involves attempting to predict the overall effect on an entity of changes in key 
indicators such as interest rates and exchange rates. A more detailed summary of the 
key requirements of FRS 13 is provided in Appendix 2.1. 
Very little research has been conducted into the impact of derivatives reporting 
standards in the UK36. Adedeji and Baker (1999) conducted a review of derivatives 
reporting practice prior to the introduction of FRS 13. They uncovered a large gap 
between the requirements of FRS 13 and the reporting practice that existed prior to 
the introduction of the standard. In a survey carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Mcllwraith and Dealy (2000) conducted a review of FRS 13 's implementation based 
on the disclosures made by 60 companies from the FTSE 500. They found that of the 
60 fInns whose fInancial statements were reviewed, 10 were 'early adopters', having 
a year-end before the standard became mandatory in March 1999, while the other 50 
were obliged to comply. The authors found that the explanations that were put 
forward concerning the use of derivatives and the policies in place seemed 
"incomplete" (p. 88). 
Much of the early commentary concernIng FRS 13 was negative (Dealy, 1998; 
Bircher, 1999). Certain aspects of FRS 13 were criticised for being "unclear" 
(Bircher, 1999). Companies were also having diffIculties implementing the standard. 
36 To the best of my knowledge, this is the most comprehensive study to have been undertaken to date, 
into the implications of derivatives reporting standards in a UK context. 
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The Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) has issued a general warning on FRS 
13, stating that it has already had to take a number of companies to task about their 
failure to abide by the guidelines (Hinks, 2001). Companies that have incurred the 
wrath of the FRRP include Artisan, Ensor Holdings and Wiggins; the latter was 
forced by the panel to restate their accounts from 1996 to 2000 (Hinks, 2001). 
Howeyer, the introduction of the US standard (F AS 133), the International 
Accounting Standard (lAS 39) and the proposals of the JWG met with much greater 
resistance (Di Paola, 1999a; Di Paola, 1999b; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2000; Di Paola 
and Cattoor. 2000; Horton and Maeve, 2000; Alby, 2001; Chopping, 2001; Michell, 
2001; Osterland, 2001; Bodurtha and Thornton, 2002). 
2.4.2 International Derivatives Accounting Standards 
F AS 133: "Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities was issued 
in June 1998" 37,38,39. This standard represents the culmination of the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board's nearly decade-long effort to develop a comprehensive 
framework for derivatives and hedge accounting. The goal of FAS 133 is to provide 
investors with more information on companies' risk management practices and 
derivative transactions. However, the standard goes much further than that of FRS 13 
by requiring that the financial statements not only provide notes and disclosures, but 
also decrees that the impact of certain hedging activities be reflected through the 
37 'FAS 137 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities-Deferral of the Effective 
Date of FASB Statement No. 133-An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 133' was issued in June 
1999 deferring the adoption date for FAS 133 to January 2001. 
38 'FAS 138 Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities-An 
Amendment ofFASB Statement No. 133' was issued in June 2000. 
39 'FAS 149 Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities' was 
issued in April 2003. This document offered some clarification of the FAS 133 definition of a 
derivative; it identified the circumstances where a contract with an initial net investment met the 
characteristics of a derivative. It also clarified when a derivative that contained a financing component 
required special reporting in the statement of cashflows. 
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earnings statement. In particular, FAS 133 requires that: (i) an entity recognise all 
derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the financial statements; (ii) derivative 
financial instruments are measured at fair value; (iii) accounting for changes in the 
fair value of a derivative (that is, gains and losses) be dealt with through the earnings 
statement; and (iv) special rules exist for hedge accounting (FASB, 1998)40. These 
hedge accounting rules state that there must be formal documentation commencing at 
the inception of the hedge that explains how the hedge will work and how 
effectiveness will be measured. 
The International Accounting Standards Board issued International Accounting 
Standard 39 "Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement" (lAS 39 
hereafter), which became effective for annual statements covering financial years 
beginning on or after 1 January 200141. The European Commission has mandated that 
all EU listed companies must prepare their accounts under international accounting 
standards by 2005 (European Commission, 2001). According to IAS 39, all financial 
assets and liabilities are recognised on the balance sheet, including derivatives. They 
are initially measured at cost, which is the fair value of whatever was paid, or 
received, to acquire the financial asset or liability and are then regularly re-valued to 
reflect their fair value (IASC, 1998). Table 2.3 summarises some of the key 
differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39. 
40 FAS 133 made it harder for a derivative position to qualify for hedge accounting. Those hedges that 
fail the 'effectiveness test', or are not properly designated as hedges at inception, must be regularly 
marked to market with changing valuations going directly to the profit and loss account, rather than the 
balance sheet. 
41 Prior to the introduction of lAS 39, the lAse released lAS 32 "Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentation". This standard dealt with issues relating to disclosure and presentational format. 
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Table 2.3: Some Major Differences between FAS 133 and lAS 39 
FAS 133 
• Covers only instruments which fall • 
under the definition of a derivative 
• Includes hedges of firm commitments • 
within the definition of a fair value 
hedge 
• Includes a third category of hedge, • 
namely the foreign currency hedge 
• Requires that firm commitments be • 
recorded at their fair value on the 
balance sheet 
lAS 39 
Covers derivatives, but also any 
financial asset and liability 
Considers hedges of firm 
commitments to be cash flow hedges 
Recognises a third category of hedge, 
namely hedges of a net investment in 
a foreign entity 
Does not alter the old rule that firm 
commitments are not recorded 
The Joint Working Group (JWG) on fair value accounting was set up by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (lASC) in November 1997 and 
comprised ten national accounting standards setters. The committee was disbanded on 
the formation of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), but the 
findings of the JWG, covering over 300 pages, were reported in December 2000, and 
were adopted for discussion by the IASB. The three central tenets of the JWG 
proposals are summarised here. First, entities should measure all financial instruments 
at fair value, and should recognise all changes to those fair values immediately in the 
Profit and Loss account. Second, the fair value of an instrument should be its 
estimated market exit price. Finally, there should be no hedge accounting for financial 
instruments. This final requirement has proved to be the most controversial issue. 
2.4.3 The Issue of Hedge Accounting 
The central difference between the approaches adopted by the ASB, the JWG, the 
F ASB and the IASB relates to the issue of hedge accounting. FRS 13 is a disclosure 
only standard; it does not deal with measurement or valuation of derivative financial 
instruments. Therefore, the standard does not contain any pronouncements concerning 
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the use of hedge accounting. FAS 133 and lAS 39 allow hedge accounting while the 
JWG approach does not allow the use of this approach. Much of the discussion 
concerning what form the accounting rules should actually take centres around (i) the 
relatiye merits of hedge accounting and fair value accounting42 and (ii) the question of 
what the qualifying criteria for hedge accounting should be. Chalmers and Godfrey 
(2000) offer a sumnlary of the alternative accounting methods and their respective 
implications. This summary is adapted and reproduced here43 . 
42 The terms mark-to-market accounting, fair value accounting, market-value based accounting, and 
market value accounting are often used as synonyms. 
43 The original Chalmers and Godfrey (2000) figure contained more detail than the simplified version 
presented here. 
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Figure 2.2: Alternative Treatments of Accounting for Derivative Financial 
Instruments and Hedging Activities 
Fair value 
accounting 
.\ \ \ financial 
instruments 
recorded at 
fair \'alue 
Current 
period P&L 
Hedged item 
is a specific 
recognised 
commitment 
Gainlloss 
transferred to ..... 
a reserve \.1 ..... _----1 
account 
r 
" 
Depending 
on type of 
specific I 
instrument 
Hedged item 
is an 
unrecognised 
anticipated 
transaction 
Gain/loss 
deferred as a 
separate 
balance sheet 
item until 
future 
transaction 
occurs 
Gain/loss Current 
deferred and \.I~"""-----.l...---.J ~ period's P&L 
incorporated 
into carrying 
amount of 
asset/liability 
Hedge 
accounting 
Hedging 
instrument 
marked to 
",<lrlrpt 
Mark to 
market 
hedge ) 
" ccounting • 
Deferral 
I hedg~ I 
V 
." 
S-oth 
hedging 
instrument 
and hedged 
item are 
marked to 
market 
Gain/loss 
hedged item 
and hedging 
instrument 
reported in 
P&Lin same 
neriod 
-
Equity hedge 
accounting 
-" 
,r 
Realised 
gain on 
hedging 
instrument 
Current \.1 ..... _-------' 
period's P&L ...... 
" 
Unrealised 
gain on 
hedging 
instrument 
Gain/loss 
reported in 
equity and 
transferred to 
P&Lwhen 
realised 
Adapted from Chalmers and Godfrey (2000): p. 41. 
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Figure 2.2 depicts two alternative treatments of accounting for derivative financial 
instruments and hedging activities: fair value accounting and hedge accounting. 
Broadly speaking, hedge accounting is the preferred method of accounting from a 
company's viewpoint44. Essentially, hedge accounting refers to a method of 
accounting for derivative financial instruments whereby gains or losses on a particular 
instrument are only recognised in the Profit and Loss Account when the 
corresponding losses or gains on the item being hedged are recognised4s. The use of 
hedge accounting complies with the "matching concept" and may be useful to 
treasurers in their attempts to smooth their bottom line earnings. There are a number 
of tests to determine whether a hedge is allowable or not. The first of these tests 
examines the "effectiveness" of a transaction, whereby broadly, 80 per cent to 120 per 
cent of any gain or loss on the asset or liability being hedged is matched by an 
opposite and offsetting gain or loss on the hedge instrument. However, there are a 
number of different calculations for the effectiveness test, and companies have to 
decide before the outset which method they will use; this method is not allowed to 
44 This preference arises from the perceived reduction in earnings volatility associated with hedge 
accounting (Di Paola, 1999b). The use of 'hedge accounting' techniques is considered to be imperative 
in terms asset and liability management, because this technique assures that gains or losses associated 
with hedging instruments contribute to earnings simultaneously with the risks being hedged (Kawaller, 
2003). Without hedge accounting the effect of the gain or loss on the hedging instrument and the item 
being hedged would impact earnings in different accounting periods, resulting in an elevated level of 
income volatility which could obscure the risk management objectives of the hedging activity 
(Kawaller, 2003). 
45 Three variants of hedge accounting are recognised. First, the fair value of the derivative is recorded 
on the balance sheet as an asset or liability and any realised gains or losses which result are recorded in 
the income statement immediately. This method would only be appropriate ifunrealised gains or losses 
on the item being hedged are accounted for in this way. Second, the fair value of the derivative is 
recorded on the balance sheet as an asset or liability and any gains or losses are recorded as either a 
stand alone balance sheet item, an adjustment to the reserves figure in the balance sheet, with 
disclosure of the figure in the Statement of Total Recognised Gains or Losses. This procedure would be 
particularly appropriate for a derivative which is being used to hedge an existing asset or liability which 
is recorded on the balance sheet but for which gains or losses are only recognised as income when 
realised. Third, no accounting entries are made in respect of the derivative until some time after the 
position is established, in other words, the derivative is treated as an off balance sheet item until this 
time. Melumad et al. (1999) argued that the use of 'no-hedge' accounting did not allow for the 
communication of important and relevant information and reduced the level of hedging. They found 
that long-term shareholders preferred comprehensive fair value hedge accounting, while short-term 
shareholders preferred either comprehensive fair value hedge accounting or 'no-hedge' accounting. 
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change. The results can be dramatically different between the two: under one method 
a hedge Inay be effective, while under another method, it may not be (Finnerty and 
Grant. 2002). 
In contrast, under fair value accounting, the fair value of the derivative is recorded on 
the balance sheet as an asset or liability and any unrealised gain or loss which results 
is recorded in the Profit and Loss Account in the accounting period the change occurs, 
irrespective of the accounting treatment afforded to the item being hedged. Advocates 
of fair value accounting believe that fair values provide more relevant measures of 
assets, liabilities, and earnings than historical costs (Barth, 1994). For example, Simko 
(1999) found that fair values were more informative than historical costs for long-
term debt, but were less relevant for financial assets. This conclusion was in line with 
the earlier work done by Eccher et a1. (1996) who also found that fair value 
disclosures were value relevant. Fair value accounting has also been praised because 
performance measurements are more difficult for management to manipulate through 
the realisation of financial instruments when fair values are used; hence it is thought 
to provide a fairer representation of company performance (Chau et a1., 2000). 
However, fair value accounting has been criticised. Opponents point to the reduced 
reliability of fair value measures relative to historical costs; their argument suggests 
that investors would be reluctant to base valuation decisions on the more subjective 
fair value estimates (Barth, 1994). Detractors also highlight the potential for increased 
volatility associated with fair value estimates and the potential for misleading 
reporting of gains and losses not yet realised. Despite these criticisms, the fair value 
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approach to derivatives reporting has been favoured by regulatory authorities to date; 
they have attempted to restrict the use of hedge accounting by specifying stringent 
conditions that must be met before this method is permitted. 
2.4.4 Reactions to International Developments 
The initial response to the recent international developments has been extremely 
negatiye. Osterland (2001) cited an Association for Finance Professionals (AFP) 
survey, \vhich found that more than two-thirds of the respondents considered that F AS 
133 imposed an excessive burden on reporting companies. Murphy and Maguire 
(2001) described the standard as "conceptually challenging" (p. 14) and argued that 
the standard was complex and "tedious to apply" (p. 14). Osterland noted that most of 
the frustration with FAS 133 stemmed from the issue of hedge accounting. The 
requirements of F AS 133 to document every hedge from the outset in order to avail of 
hedge accounting, and to mark-to-market their derivatives every quarter, were proving 
quite difficult, even for larger companies. For example, General Electric were 
reported to have spent $8 million over the past two years developing systems to 
perform these functions (Osterland, 2001). It was also noted that some, arguably 
sensible, hedging strategies were being abandoned because company boards did not 
want to see volatility in the accounts (Osterland, 2000; 2001; Michell, 2001; Bodurtha 
and Thornton, 2002). 
The crux of the argument appears to be that the increased volatility which resulted 
from not adopting hedge accounting techniques will make firms appear riskier than 
they are really (Di Paola, 1999a; 1999b; Di Paola and Cattoor, 2000; Horton and 
Macve, 2000; Osterland, 2000; 2001; Michell, 2001; Murphy and Maguire, 2001; 
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Bodurtha and Thornton, 2002)46,47. Further, although treasurers had always preferred 
plain-vanilla derivative products such as exchange rate forwards and interest rate 
swaps, the use of these plain-vanilla products was exacerbated at the expense of more 
complex interest rate and currency options. Di Paola and Cattoor (2000) indicated that 
FAS 133 would therefore drive changes in treasury policy. Thus, treasurers' 
operational practices seemed to have been changed by FAS 133, even though it was a 
financial reporting standard. 
Howeyer, not all the commentary on F AS 133 has been negative. Essaides (1999) 
argued that the adoption of the standard imposed greater discipline on risk 
management programmes; companies would be compelled to articulate their risk 
management policies more clearly. More precise forecasts and measurement of 
exposures would ensue, in addition to the more frequent and accurate measurement of 
the performance of hedging strategies. For example, Farley (2002) argued that a well-
constructed derivatives accounting process was "critical" in order to enhance 
corporate governance and add value to companies. 
IAS 39 has also been the subject of widespread comment. Horton and Macve (2000) 
described lAS 39 as "conceptually flawed and unworkable in practice" (p. 26), while 
Alby (2001) considered the standard to be "the most complicated accounting standard 
ever released". The implications of the standard for small companies are reported to 
46 This attitude may be a little naIve; given adequate disclosure, users should be able to "strip out" the 
source of the volatility which should therefore have no value relevance. Perhaps this masked a concern 
that the proposed standard would not enable firms that are using derivatives for legitimate hedging 
purposes to properly distinguish themselves from firms that are using then for speculative purposes. 
47 In June 2003 US mortgage provider giant Fannie Mae announced a 52 per cent fall in profit in 
January 2003 despite a surge in business. The company went to great lengths to explain away this 
increase to investors due to the imposition of FAS 133 and the need to reflect increases orland 
decreases in the fair value of derivative instruments in the financial statements (Crenshaw, 2003). 
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be even more pronounced48 (Chopping, 2001). Di Paola (1999a) commented that both 
F AS 133 and lAS 39 would dramatically change the figures reported in the balance 
sheet and profit and loss account of any company using financial instruments; this 
impact would be even more pronounced for heavy users of derivatives. Other 
comn1entators have pointed out that the rationale for a particular financial decision 
should not be based on accounting implications and treatments. Yet it appears as if 
this \\'ould be the result of the standard. For example, Di Paola (l999b) argued that 
those implementing accounting or treasury systems would face fundamental 
challenges and difficulties because of the imposition of these accounting standards. 
The two main objections to the JWG proposals were that: (i) a company's own debt 
had to be held at fair value; and (ii) hedge accounting would be abolished. Chalmers 
and Godfrey (2000) argued that the abolition or curtailment of hedge accounting 
would require companies to alter their current accounting practices and risk 
management strategies: it would probably force companies to assess their use of 
derivatives. Horton and Macve (2000) agreed, claiming that the JWG would benefit 
from adopting accounting concepts that showed an understanding of economic and 
commercial reality. They added that there were both balance sheet and income 
statement problems inherent in adopting the particular version of a "current value" 
basis of accounting for financial instruments developed by the JWG49. They also 
argued that the lASC and the JWG concept of capital maintenance was inadequate5o. 
48 There is no current international equivalent of the Financial Reporting Standard for Smaller Entities 
(FRSSE). 
49 Horton and Macve (2000) claimed that balance sheet problems related to the fact that the FASB and 
the lASe definition of 'value' had no theoretical basis in economic logic or capital market theory. 
50 Horton and Macve (2000) claimed that "book" gains (or losses) appeared when there was a reduction 
(or increase) in market value of liabilities (whether these variations resulted from changes in interest 
rates or other company-specific factors) while the overall impact on the value of the equity was as 
likely to be negative (or positive). 
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2.4.5 Other Potential Future Standards 
In May 2002, the Accounting Standards Board issued FRED 23, 'Financial 
Instruments: Hedge Accounting', to become mandatory for companies in 2003, until 
the lASs become mandatory in 2005. This was followed in June 2002, by FRED 30, 
'Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, Recognition and Measurement'. 
The introduction of these proposals has not been popular, because, they will only be 
effectiye for 1\vo years and although similar to lAS 32 and lAS 39, they differ with 
respect to the notion of 'recycling'. The provisions contained in lAS 39 require 
certain gains and losses recognised in the statement of total recognised gains and 
losses to be recognised subsequently in the profit and loss account (a practice known 
as 'recycling'). However, FRED 30 would prohibit the use of these recycling 
techniques (ASB 2002b). Therefore, most companies would need to set up systems to 
comply with FRED 23 and then change them again to meet lAS 39 requirements. 
Preparers are, arguably, unhappy about implementing a new standard for just one, or 
possibly two years. From a corporate governance standpoint, following the recent 
accounting scandals, the accountancy profession needs to restore faith in the value of 
financial statements (Abdel-khalik, 2002; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002; Lev, 2002; 
Revsine, 2002). The effects of changing the financial reporting demands placed on 
company management, as well as the difficulties associated with achieving year-on-
year comparisons, are likely to make this objective more difficult to achieve (Raeburn 
and Boyle, 2002). 
In conclusion, Di Paola and Cattoor (2000) noted that despite changes to treasury 
processes and procedures, many companies were beginning to see the positive side to 
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derivatives reporting standards. They indicated that some companies viewed F AS 133 
as an opportunity to get treasury "out of its ivory tower" and closer to the central 
business function (p. 38). Di Paola and Cattoor (2000) also noted that the 
inlplementation of the standard allowed companies to ensure that exposures were 
properly captured and that hedging policies were aligned to corporate objectives. It 
could be argued that the imposition of an accounting standard that placed the 
responsibility for ensuring that staff were adequately trained, informed and supported 
in their use of derivative financial instruments on company management, was an 
improvement. Such a standard could also afford companies the unique opportunity to 
reinforce financial risk management practices thus improving treasury management 
guidelines and practices and ensuring that more robust control mechanisms were in 
place. 
2.5 Risk Disclosure - Research and Practices to Date 
This section examines the research into the practices and disclosures of companies 
with respect to risk reporting in corporate annual reports. The nature of voluntary 
reporting mechanisms, which existed prior to the recent introduction of derivative 
reporting standards, is explored. The suitability of narrative versus numerical 
presentation of information is discussed. Finally, the extant literature exploring the 
response of financial entities to the derivatives reporting requirements is presented. 
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2.5.1 The Nature ofVo)untary Reporting 
Most of the reported research concerning risk-related disclosures was conducted at a 
time \vhen such reporting was produced on a voluntary basis51 • Some prior research 
suggests that firms nlight benefit from providing voluntary disclosures (Botosan, 
1997). It has been shown that voluntary disclosures can be socially more efficient and 
privately beneficial as such disclosures can improve risk sharing, reduce information 
costs for investors, lower a firm's cost of capital and signal the absence of negative 
conditions such as maturity mismatch in an institution's assets and liabilities (Dye, 
1990; Botosan, 1997). However, various commentators noted that through the use of 
voluntary reporting, management might have incentives to represent their companies 
performance in the best possible light, which could potentially result in "selective 
financial misrepresentation" (Tweedie and Whittington, 1990; Revsine, 1991; Beattie 
and Jones, 1997). Birnberg et al. (1983) identify "biasing" (the selection of favourable 
signals) and "focusing" (the enhancement/degradation of aspects of the information 
set) as two types of information manipulation facilitated by the use of voluntary 
reporting (p. 120-122). Such "framing effects", also described as "interpretative 
shading", have been shown to alter significantly the meaning attributed by readers to 
certain data (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Bazerman, 1990; Beattie and Jones, 
1997). Hofstedt (1972) shows that such "framing effects" extend to financial 
reporting. 
51 There has been a marked increase in the volume of voluntary information produced in corporate 
annual reports (Beattie et aI., 2002). This has partly been explained by some commentators as the 
exploitation of the potential of the annual report as a public relations and promotional vehicle (Hanson, 
1989; Lee, 1994; Hopwood, 1996; Beattie and Jones, 1997). 
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2.5.2 Narrative versus Numerical Disclosures 
The presentational format of accounting information has also been demonstrated to 
affect hunlan perceptions and judgements of performance and the interpretation of 
this information may be contingent on environmental variables (Thomas, 1991; 
Beattie and Jones, 1997). Narrative statements offer a different way of 
communicating with investors and other stakeholders (Rutherford, 2002). However, 
accounting narratives have been shown to be non-neutral in presentation (Aerts, 
1994). The ratio of words to numbers used in corporate annual reports has increased 
rapidly (Rutherford, 2002). According to a survey by Arthur Andersen, between 1996 
and 2000 the weight of words tipped the balance, and on average, narrative reporting 
occupied more than half the annual report (Arthur Andersen, 2000). This can be 
viewed as a decision by companies to voluntarily disclose more than just numerical 
information, and/or it might be interpreted as acknowledging an awareness by 
regulators that the information needs of users extend beyond the numerical 
(Rutherford, 2002). FRS 13 is an example of an accounting standard that explicitly 
mandates narrative disclosures. These narrative disclosures may be provided in the 
financial statements or within the Operating and Financial Review (with reference in 
this latter case being made in the financial statements themselves). The information 
contained within the financial statements is subject to the usual audit process, 
however, the Statement of Auditing Standard 160 (SAS 160) only requires the auditor 
to perform a review of the narrative information provided outside the financial 
statements in order to check for inconsistencies with the financial statements. 
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2.5.3 Risk Reporting to Date 
Prior to the introduction of FRS 13, a comprehensive reporting framework did not 
exist for the disclosure associated with the use of derivative financial instruments 
(Porterfield, 1994; Linsley and Shrives, 2000). This situation resulted in a lack of 
transparency. about the effects of these products on the basic financial statements of 
companies52 . A central motivation for the various derivatives reporting projects was 
the need to integrate the various fragmented and inconsistent approaches adopted by 
companies. Enlpirical research studies supported the notion that several deficiencies 
in accounting practice regarding derivatives disclosure existed prior to the 
introduction of the reporting standards. For example, Goldberg et al. (1995) surveyed 
the foreign exchange derivatives disclosures made by 98 companies in response to 
F AS 105 and F AS 10753 . They found inconsistencies in how the notional or contract 
amounts of transactions were reported; only approximately one-third of sample firms 
reported enough information to calculate ratios based on notional values, book values 
and fair values. Duangploy and Cheung (1995) also revealed a great deal of diversity 
in both the recognition and disclosure procedures employed when accounting for 
currency swaps. 
Prior to the introduction of FRS 13 in 1998, recommendations concernIng risk 
management and risk reporting arose mainly from the various corporate governance 
codes of practice that were issued during the 1990s (Cadbury Report, 1992; 
Greenbury Report, 1995; Hampel Report, 1998; Turnbull Report, 1999; Linsley and 
52 This fact was highlighted by the FASB in the text ofFAS 133 (FAS 133, 1998: par. 234-237). 
53 FAS 105 "Disclosure of Infonnation about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance Sheet Risk and 
Financial Instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk" was issued by the F ASB in July 1990. F AS 
107 "Disclosure about Fair Value of Financial Instruments" was issued by the FASB in December 
1992. These standards provided for voluntary disclosure of derivatives usage. 
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Shrives, 2000; Myners Report, 2001; Higgs Report, 2003; Smith Report, 2003)54. The 
central tenet of these recommendations advocated the notion of internal control. 
Adequate internal reporting structures were deemed appropriate as a means of 
ensuring sufficient control of the treasury and risk management functions. However, 
the accountancy profession and some business representatives criticised the Hampel 
Committee report on corporate governance for failing to tackle the issue of risk 
nlanagelllent adequately (Accountancy, 1998a; 1998b). Solomon et al. (2000b) used a 
questionnaire survey to canvas the attitudes of UK institutional investors towards risk 
disclosure in relation to their portfolio investment decisions. The results indicated that 
almost one third of the institutional investors agreed that increased corporate risk 
disclosure would help their portfolio investment decision-making. There was also a 
strong indication among the responses that risk disclosure was an important issue on 
the agenda for corporate governance reform. However, since companies privately 
disclosed information which could potentially affect share prices to analysts and 
institutional investors at their annual meetings, it was possible that the information 
contained in financial reports was not sufficiently timely to have a strong effect on 
institutional investors' day-to-day investment decisions (Solomon et aI., 2000b). 
Many of the Solomon et al. respondents appeared keen to see some increase in the 
level of risk disclosure, thereby endorsing recent efforts to formalise and encourage 
better internal control systems (for example, in the Turnbull Report). Respondents 
considered that further developments in corporate risk disclosure should be nested 
within the agenda for corporate governance reform. Thus, the research suggests that 
institutional investors perceive a strong link between corporate risk disclosure and the 
wider agenda for corporate governance reform. 
54 Further details about the recommendations of the various corporate governance codes will be 
presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Prior empirical studies have also focused on the practical problems associated with 
the reporting of derivative activities. De Marzo and Duffie (1995) documented the 
fact that decisions concerning accounting policy and derivatives disclosure could 
influence corporate hedging decisions. They found that alternative accounting 
standards could substantially affect the equilibrium level of hedging. They viewed 
profits as a signal about a manager's talent and showed that the accounting for hedge 
positions might lead to SUb-optimal hedging on the part of the manager55. They found 
that \vith disclosure of only aggregate accounting earnings, managers would always 
choose a policy of full hedging. However, if separate disclosure of the two 
components of profits was mandated (operating profits and hedging gains/losses), this 
was no longer the case with the result that no hedging might occur in equilibrium. 
Damant (2000) noted that companies were unlikely to welcome accounting standards 
that would highlight the internal mechanisms of treasury departments. Chacko et al. 
(2001) agreed with this view arguing that accounting treatment occasionally 
discouraged firms from engaging in risk management; following their analysis of the 
financial statements of Cephalon Inc., the authors concluded that the accounting 
treatment in this instance served to encourage the company to engage in a different 
risk management strategy. 
55 De Marzo and Duffie 1995) argued that hedging could minimize the 'noise' around corporate 
earnings produced by financial risk exposure. The improvement of the informativeness of those 
earnings may motivate managers to favour risk management in order to better communicate their skills 
to the market. Thus, De Marzo and Duffie argued that managers might incorporate private interests 
such as career and future wage considerations when determining the optimal hedge strategy for the 
firm. Because managers' compensation is frequently tied to reported earnings, increased volatility 
might affect managers' compensation and reputation. This might also have a real impact on managers' 
hedging decisions. 
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Much of the enlpirical research conducted to date concerns an examination of the 
disclosure practices with respect to derivatives activities at banks and other financial 
institutions. Banks tend to be the focus for a lot of this research, because of the 
\videspread usage of derivative financial instruments at these institutions. For 
example, Wong (2000) investigated the usefulness of F AS 119 derivatives disclosures 
in assessing the sensitivity of equity returns to currency fluctuations. However, these 
studies are not directly relevant to the present research, where the focus is on the 
reporting practices of non-financial companies. Moreover, the FRS 13 reporting 
requirements differ for financial institutions because of their extensive trading in 
derivative financial instruments. 
The value relevance of derivative and fair value disclosures has been the focus for 
much of the empirical research concerning financial instrument reporting and 
accounting (Barth et aI., 1996; Eccher et aL 1996; Simko, 1999; Mozes, 2002). Barth 
et al. (1996) investigated the value relevance of fair value disclosures made by banks 
under F AS 107, by examining whether differences between the market and book 
values of common equity could be explained as a function of differences between fair 
value estimates disclosed under the standard and their related book values. They 
found that the disclosed fair value estimates provided significant exploratory power 
for bank share prices beyond that provided by book values. F AS 107 disclosures were 
also under the spotlight in the Eccher et aL (1996) study. They documented that the 
fair value of investment securities was value relevant, and, dependent on the model 
utilised, for other investment types. These studies again concentrated on the 
infonnativeness of fair value disclosures in financial finns. However, Simko (1999) 
examined the value relevance of fair value disclosures in non-financial finns. The 
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results suggested that the fair value of long-term debt had incremental explanatory 
power over its historical cost counterpart, but this additional informativeness did not 
appear to be the case for financial assets or net off-balance sheet instruments. 
Evidence was also provided that the usefulness of fair value disclosures was limited 
by the absence of information on the fair value of non-financial instruments. Sapra 
(2002) investigated the consequences of hedge disclosures on a firm's risk 
n1anagement strategy. The results of this study indicated that the greater transparency 
afforded by additional hedge disclosures was not necessarily a panacea for imprudent 
risk management strategies. Further, firms can adopt prudent risk management 
strategies in the absence of hedge disclosures. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has documented the previous literature associated with some 
of the central concerns of this thesis. The theoretical motivations for corporate risk 
management were examined. Previous empirical evidence on the corporate usage of 
derivative financial instruments was highlighted. The framework of financial 
reporting was discussed. The various international attempts to regulate derivatives 
reporting activities were explored. Initial research attempts at exploring extant risk 
reporting disclosures were investigated. 
Chapter 3 will explore the theoretical underpinning of the current research. The 
corporate governance and the accountability literatures will be examined, in order to 
develop a framework in which the investigation of the impact of FRS 13 and other 
derivatives reporting standards can be explored. 
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A Theoretical Framework: The Role of Corporate 
Governance and Accountability 
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Chapter 3 - A Theoretical Framework: The Role of Corporate 
Governance and Accountability 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 outlined the studies which have examined the theoretical and practical 
motiyations for corporate risk management, which precipitated the need for 
accounting standard setting with respect to risk management disclosure. The purpose 
of the present chapter is to discuss the theoretical framework adopted in the present 
study. This theoretical framework is based on the corporate governance and the 
corporate accountability literature. Section 3.2 highlights the theoretical underpinning 
of the corporate governance concept. The corporate governance and internal control 
framework that exists in both the United Kingdom and the United States are 
examined. The role of institutional investors in the corporate governance framework 
is discussed, as well as a potential role for increased regulation. Section 3.3 examines 
the notion of accountability. Various interpretations of what constitutes accountability 
are documented and differing classifications of accountability are discussed. Section 
3.4 attempts to integrate the insights offered by the corporate governance and the 
accountability frameworks. The notion of internal control is offered as one possible 
link between the two. The implications of corporate governance and accountability for 
treasury management are presented in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
3.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
Change is ubiquitous in contemporary society, and is particularly evident in large 
corporations. The depth and rapidity of these changes has compelled a reassessment 
of the applicability of the various governance structures in existence within corporate 
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entities. This situation has resulted in major companies receiving widespread attention 
in recent years regarding their corporate governance practices (O'Sullivan, 2000; 
Goodwin and Seow, 2002). In particular, the monitoring and control procedures in 
existence within publicly held corporations have been researched (Dunne and Helliar, 
2002; Helliar and Dunne, 2004). Concerns like these have grown markedly in the last 
year following difficulties at high profile organisations such as Enron, W orldcom and 
AIB (Abdel-khalik, 2002; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002; Betit, 2002; Clark and 
Demirag, 2002; Cohan, 2002; Dunne and Helliar, 2002; Fearnley, et aI., 2002; Gerde 
et aI., 2002; Lev, 2002; Puri and Borok, 2002; Revsine, 2002; Sullivan, 2002; Swift 
and Dando, 2002; Vinten, 2002; Zandstra, 2002; Blyth, 2003; Hunt, 2003). Such 
failings in corporate governance can have an adverse impact on treasury operations; a 
company with poor corporate governance may find it harder to access funds, may face 
higher finance costs, may suffer credit rating downgrades and experience a weakening 
of investor confidence (ICAEW, 1999; Abbott et aI., 2000; Bushman and Smith, 
2001; 2003; Burton et aI., 2003). 
Modem corporations have to balance many competing considerations, reflecting 
material obligations to shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and 
others, as well as wider social responsibilities to the communities in which they 
operate. There is no single, accepted definition of corporate governance, but a number 
of perspectives can be elucidated. A narrow definition of corporate governance 
focuses on the relationship between a company and its shareholders. In this vein, the 
Cadbury Report (1992) defined corporate governance as "the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled" (Cadbury, 1992, par. 2.5). The need to reflect 
the shareholders' desires has typically been the focus for debate regarding corporate 
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governance reform (Bushman and Smith, 2001; 2003; Vinten, 2001). This reflection 
is largely a result of the "agency" problems that arise from the separation of 
ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Donaldson, 1963; Jensen and 
Meckling. 1976; Byrd, et aI., 1998). From this perspective, corporate governance 
issues are said to arise in an organisation whenever two conditions are present (Hart, 
1995). First, there is an agency problem, or conflict of interest, involving principal 
and agent members of the organisation in a situation characterised by information 
asymmetry - these might be owners, managers, workers or consumers (Hart, 1995). 
Second, transaction costs are such that this agency problem cannot be dealt with 
through a contract (Hart, 1995). The basic assumption of agency theory leads directly 
to a perceived need by shareholders to place limits on management discretion (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Burton, 2000; Prevost et aI., 2002). The protection of investors 
from agency risks associated with the separation of ownership and control has been 
the central preserve of corporate governance recommendations throughout the world 
(Bushman and Smith, 2001; 2003; Vinten, 2001). This rather narrow and limited view 
of the governance problem, where the focus is primarily concentrated on the 
relationship between the firm and its capital providers, has become so dominant in the 
literature that it is, arguably, almost automatically accepted56. 
The mechanisms of corporate governance are seen as integral tenets in the operation 
of modem corporations; "good" corporate governance is seen as essential in terms of 
safeguarding company assets and maintaining and enhancing investor confidence, 
thus providing greater access to funds and reducing the potential risks associated with 
56 Shleifer and Visbny (1997) in their review of the corporate governance literature, readily admit that 
their "perspective on corporate governance is a straightforward agency perspective, sometimes referred 
to as separation of ownership and control" (p. 738). 
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fraud or incompetence (ICAEW, 1999; Abbott et aI., 2000; Bushman and Smith, 
2001: 2003; Burton et aI., 2003)57. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in their review of the 
corporate governance literature, maintained that much of the subject matter dealt with 
the self-imposed constraints of management in their attempts to reduce the ex-post 
misallocation of funds and induce investors to provide more funds ex-ante. 
A broader definition of corporate governance examines a wider set of stakeholder 
relationships encompassing interactions between employees, customers, suppliers, 
creditors and society at large (Tricker, 1984; Baker and Owsen, 2002). Implicit and 
explicit relationships between the company and these stakeholders, and interactions 
among these various constituents, fall within the remit of this wider definition of 
corporate governance58 . Such definitions of corporate governance stress a broader 
level of accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders. Tricker (1984) defined 
corporate governance in terms of identifying rights and responsibilities, legitimising 
actions and determining accountability. Tricker explained the corporate governance 
process in terms of four principal activities: (i) formulating the strategic direction for 
the future of the enterprise in the long term; (ii) influencing crucial executive 
decisions; (iii) monitoring management performance; and (iv) recognising the 
responsibilities of management to those with a legitimate demand for accountability. 
The first two activities are management functions whereas the latter two relate to 
governance. This latter notion of corporate governance emphasises the wider notions 
57 Copnell (2002) argued that corporate governance was about knowingly taking risks, rather than 
being unwittingly exposed to them. He added that "good" corporate governance might never put a stop 
to all corporate failures, but that "it should better equip companies to face recessionary times and 
reduce surprises for both directors and shareholders alike" (p. 11). 
58 Donaldson and Preston (1995) indicated that stakeholders could be "identified through the actual or 
potential harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate experiencing as a result of a firm's 
actions or inaction". Thus, influences can come from internal or external sources, which results in an 
array of potential stakeholders. Turnbull (1997, p. 183) provides a listing of potential influences 
affecting the operations of publicly traded firms. 
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of corporate social responsibility, which have attracted greater attention in recent 
years (Gray et aI., 1987; Gray et aI., 1996; Moir, 2001). 
In the UK, the corporate governance debate was stimulated by a series of corporate 
scandals and collapses in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Weir and Laing, 2001). 
Press coverage of BCCI, Polly Peck and the Maxwell Communications Group caused 
much public questioning about how effective the boards of these companies had been 
in monitoring the actions of their executive management (Stiles and Taylor, 1993; 
Kay and Silberston, 1995; O'Sullivan, 2000; Pye, 2000). The most visible 
manifestation of the interest in improved governance has been the emergence of 
numerous governance guidelines and codes (Laing and Weir, 1999). Codes have now 
been drafted in a number of countries and by a variety of institutions. An overview of 
the UK and US systems of corporate governance and internal control is provided in 
section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2 respectively59. 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance and Internal Control in the UK60 
Chapter 2 provided a review of the extant literatures associated with the corporate use 
of derivative financial instruments. One of the major issues to emerge from this 
discussion was the lack of control exercised over the corporate use of derivative 
products. For many years, internal control was largely a private affair for companies. 
However, this situation has changed dramatically. Internal control moved to the centre 
of discussions about corporate governance during the 1990s, which led to the 
59 The overview of corporate governance systems provided in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2 is limited 
to the UK and the US, because the primary focus of the thesis is on the implementation of derivatives 
accounting standards in the UK, where many companies adopt US and International Accounting 
Standards (Masquelier and Di Paola, 2002). 
60 This overview is not concerned with all areas of corporate governance, but reflects the literature 
pertinent to aspects of internal control, the role of institutional investors and issues associated with 
transparency, accountability and the role of corporate reporting. 
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alignment of corporate governance processes with the risk management objective of 
the firm. The pUblication of the Cadbury Report in December 1992 witnessed the first 
attempt to formalise UK corporate governance best practice. The Cadbury Code was 
not legally binding on boards of directors. However, the Stock Exchange Yellow 
Book61 required conlpanies to provide a "statement of compliance" with the code62 . 
One of the requirements of The Cadbury Report on the financial aspects of corporate 
goyernance was that compliant UK companies must report to shareholders on the 
effectiYeness of internal control procedures63 . Short et al. (1999) noted that this 
recommendation has proved problematical in practice because of the difficulty in 
defining the scope of the notion of internal control. 
The subsequent Rutteman Working Group guidance, issued in December 1994, 
watered the Cadbury proposal down, and restricted itself to internal financial control 
with the required disclosures limited to the process for ensuring effectiveness rather 
than reporting on effectiveness itself (Rutteman Working Group, 1994). The Hampel 
61 The Yellow Book listed compliance rules for companies listed on the Stock Exchange. Listing rules 
are now the responsibility of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
62 The result of this was that all companies publicly quoted on the Stock Exchange had to state in their 
annual reports whether or not they have implemented the code in all respects. If they had not complied 
with the entire code, then they were compelled to make a clear statement of the reasons why, and the 
points with which they had not complied. This voluntary 'comply or explain' approach to corporate 
governance reform has been a feature of all the subsequent codes and recommendations issued in the 
UK. 
63 The Cadbury Report recommendations apply to all companies irrespective of their size. There has 
been much debate concerning the applicability and appropriateness of the Code to small companies 
(Mallin and Ow-Y ong, 1998). The Hampel Report included a discussion about the applicability of 
corporate governance standards for smaller companies, but concluded that no distinctions were 
necessary. GAAP concludes that each company should be able to determine its corporate governance 
procedures in the best interests of the company. Solomon et al. (2000a) in their survey of the views of 
institutional investors found that their respondents believed that high standards of corporate governance 
were as important for smaller companies as for larger companies. However, the respondents did 
acknowledge that corporate governance reforms were primarily driven by the motives of large 
companies. The DTI issued a report in 1999 entitled "Creating Quality Dialogue between Smaller 
Quoted Companies and Fund Managers" which focused attention on the transferability of standards for 
"good" corporate governance for smaller companies. Many authors have argued that different 
mechanisms of corporate governance are suited to specific types of economic activity and different 
stages of economic development (Forker and Green, 2000; O'Sullivan, 2000; Lewis, 2001). 
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Comnlittee, which was established to review the implementation of the Cadbury and 
Greenbury64 proposals, published its final report in January 1998, and subsequently 
undertook to produce a set of principles and a code on corporate governance aimed at 
consolidating Cadbury, Greenbury and the Committee's own work (Hampel 
Committee, 1998). The outcome of this process - The Combined Code of Best 
Practice - was issued in June 1998. The Combined Code contained a series of 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance. A detailed series of provisions followed, 
which demonstrated how the principles could be implemented and achieved. The 
Code required that directors review the effectiveness of all internal controls, not just 
internal financial controls. However, it dropped the Cadbury proposal that directors 
report on such effectiveness65 . The Turnbull report, published by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) in September 1999, aimed to 
make the internal control recommendations of the Combined Code more explicit. 
The Turnbull report recognised the importance of internal control and risk 
management; it did this by formalising an explicit framework for internal control in 
companies (ICAEW, 1999). The report argued that the maintenance of an effective 
system of financial controls (including the maintenance of proper accounting records) 
(i) helps to ensure that the company is not unnecessarily exposed to avoidable 
64 Directors' Remuneration: Report of a Study Group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury was issued in 
1995. The remit of the Committee was "to identify good practice in determining Directors' 
remuneration" (p. 9). 
65 The Combined Code states that: 
"The Board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders' investment 
and the company's assets ... The directors should at least annually, conduct a review of the 
effectiveness of the group's system of internal control and should report to shareholders that they have 
done so. The review should cover all controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls 
and risk management" (p. 22). 
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financial risks; and (ii) contributes to the safeguarding of assets, including the 
prevention and detection of fraud (ICAEW, 1999)66. 
Turnbull argued that the board was ultimately responsible for the system of internal 
control. The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA, 1993) defined 
the internal control system to include the whole gambit of controls, financial and 
otherwise, to ensure adherence to management policies, safeguard assets and secure 
the completeness and accuracy of the records. The system advocates familiar 
management control procedures, including the setting of objectives and plans, 
monitoring performance measures and taking appropriate action in changing 
circumstances. Boards will normally delegate to management the task of establishing, 
operating and monitoring the system. However, they cannot delegate their 
responsibility for it. The report advocates a top-down approach to the establishment of 
an integrated risk management policy. The system of control must include procedures 
for reporting immediately to appropriate levels of management any significant control 
failings or weaknesses that are identified, together with details of corrective action 
being undertaken. This requires that systems of control be embedded in the operations 
of the company and form part of its culture. "Good" corporate governance is seen to 
be more than simple box-ticking; it requires good risk management practices, based 
on the spirit, as well as the letter, of the Turnbull report (Copnell, 2002). 
A key recommendation of the Turnbull report concerned the essential role to be 
played by audit committees (ICAEW, 1999). The literature suggests that an effective 
66 The argument for an adequate financial reporting system was raised by Whittington (1993) who 
argued that improvements in financial reporting are a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
improving corporate governance. 
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audit con1mittee should not only play an important role in strengthening the financial 
controls of an entity (Collier, 1993; O'Sullivan, 2000) and provide a non-
confrontational reporting structure for insiders (Keasey and Wright, 1993), but should 
also render companies less susceptible to fraud (Abbott et aI., 2000). According to the 
Turnbull recommendations, audit committees are expected to evaluate, on a regular 
basis, internal control reports from management in order to: (i) assess the 
effectiveness of the control systems in place; (ii) take necessary action if weaknesses 
or failings are fotmd; and (iii) engage in more extensive monitoring of the internal 
control system if the need arises (lCAEW, 1999). Zaman (2001), however, urged 
caution about the increasing emphasis on the importance of audit committees in the 
corporate governance framework; he argued that over-reliance on these committees 
might lead to undue expectations as too much responsibility was delegated to the 
committee members. The Turnbull recommendations bring the UK more into line 
with international developments such as the recommendations of the Treadway 
Commission in the US (Aldridge and Colbert, 1994; Vanasco et aI., 1995)67. A recent 
survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers indicates that although a significant minority of 
listed companies try to hide their lack of compliance with the corporate governance 
codes for best practice overall, compliance with the Turnbull internal control 
disclosure recommendations is quite high (Hodge, 2002)68. 
67 Full details of US developments in internal control and corporate governance will be given in Section 
3.2.2. 
68 Several studies have looked at compliance with the various codes on corporate governance (Bostock, 
1995; Cadbury, 1995; Short, 1996; Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Doble, 1997; Dahya et aI., 2002). For 
example, Dahya et aI. (2002) documented: (i) a general increase in the size of corporate boards; (ii) an 
increase in the percentage of outside directors; and (iii) an increase in the number of fmns in which the 
positions of CEO and Chairperson were held by two individuals, following the publication of the 
Cadbury Committee's recommendations in December 1992. 
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Although the aforementioned reports arguably stimulated substantial improvements in 
the corporate governance practices of UK companies, certain areas have been 
highlighted for further attention. The collapse of Enron in the US, initiated a further 
examination of corporate governance procedures (Abdel-khalik, 2002; Benston and 
Hartgraves, 2002; Betit, 2002; Clark and Demirag, 2002; Cohan, 2002; Fearnley et 
aI., 2002; Gerde et aI., 2002; Lev, 2002; Puri and Borak, 2002; Revsine, 2002; 
Sullivan, 2002; Swift and Dando, 2002; Vinten, 2002; Zandstra, 2002; Blyth, 2003; 
Hunt, 2003). The Higgs Report was issued in January 2003. This report focuses on the 
role and effectiveness of non-executive directors; it recommends that at least half the 
board of listed companies should comprise non-executives. The report has been given 
a guarded welcome by both business leaders and the profession (Accountancy, 2003; 
Bittlestone, 2003; Moxey, 2003). The recommendations of the Higgs Report are to be 
incorporated into the Combined Code (Accountancy, 2003). The Smith Report, also 
issued in January 2003, was primarily concerned with the relationship between 
external auditors and the companies they audit, as well as the role and responsibilities 
of companies' audit committees. It recommended that audit committees should 
include at least three members, all of whom were independent non-executive 
directors, where at least one had significant financial knowledge and experience. 
3.2.2 US Developments in Corporate Governance and Internal Control 
In the United States, the Internal Control - Integrated Framework report was issued 
by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission 
in 1992. The report established for the first time a standard for evaluating the 
effectiveness of internal control systems (Steinberg and Tanki, 1992). This report 
indicated that an effective system of internal control comprises several elements. 
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First, a solid control environment is essential to lay the foundations for other aspects 
of internal control; this requires that sufficient attention is paid to control procedures 
at Board level. Second, risks and control objectives need to be identified and 
evaluated to detennine how such risks can be managed. The third element that is 
essential for internal control relates to the specific control activities necessary to 
ensure that management directives are carried out. Such activities typically include 
approvals, authorisations, verifications, reconciliations, perfonnance reviews and 
segregation of duties (Emmanuel et aI., 1992). The fourth component relates to 
infonnation and communication processes. Relevant infonnation must be identified, 
captured and communicated in a suitable fonnat as well as in a timely manner. 
Individual employees must understand their role in the control framework and have a 
means of communicating infonnation up the organisational hierarchy (Keasey and 
Wright, 1993). Finally, adequate processes must be in place to monitor the system of 
internal control; this may be achieved by means of ongoing monitoring activities and 
separate evaluations. Deficiencies or weaknesses in the internal control mechanisms 
should be reported up the management chain, with any serious matters reported to 
senior executives and the board. These five components also serve as criteria for 
internal control effectiveness, whereby achievement of internal control objectives can 
be facilitated (Kajuter, 2001). Rezaee et al. (2001) argued that a sufficient 
understanding of these five control components would assist auditors in deciding 
whether or not adequate control activities were built into the accounting system. 
In 1996, Deloitte & Touche, in association with the Treadway Commission, issued a 
document highlighting how the 1992 COSO framework could be applied to risk 
management activities involving the use of derivative products. This report 
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recommended that policies governIng derivative usage should be defined and 
communicated throughout the organisation. The risk management policy should be 
clearly set out and should include controls relating to the nature and extent of 
derivative activities, including limitations on their use, adequate reporting processes 
and operational controls. Mechanisms should be in place to obtain relevant and timely 
information covering derivative activities, and communicate this information to 
directors and senior management in order to enable them to monitor whether their 
objectives and strategies for using derivatives are being achieved. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) was signed into law by President Bush in July 2002. 
This Act is considered to be the most comprehensive corporate governance legislation 
to date and is expected to have significant implications for publicly traded companies, 
shareholders and those allied to corporations for years to come. This legislation 
dramatically increases corporate management's governance role and accountability 
relating to the reporting of financial results and maintenance of sound internal 
controls. It clearly defines a host of rigid responsibilities and requirements, as well as 
consequences for non-compliance. The SOA runs to 130 pages and includes 
provisions for: (i) the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB); (ii) guidelines to ensure auditor independence; (iii) increased 
requirements for corporate responsibility and accountability; (iv) enhanced accurate 
financial disclosures; and (v) clear definition of enhanced penalties for corporate 
fraud and white collar crime. The certification provisions of the Act are much more 
rigorous than that previously in existence. The CEO and CFO are required to 
acknowledge in each annual or quarterly report their responsibility for internal 
controls, and present their conclusions as to the effectiveness of those internal 
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controls. With respect to treasury operations the Act places emphasis on control 
maintenance and fraud/error detection. Gallanis (2003) identified four areas where the 
SOA afforded treasury departments opportunities for improvement: (i) the 
identification of key control points or issues, such as accounting, technology, risk 
management, transactions and so on; (ii) the establishment and improvement of 
treasury process controls by means of preventative controls such as the segregation of 
duties, transaction limits, and detective controls such as technology alerts and 
mandatory job rotation; (iii) the provision of validation support in the financial 
reporting process; and finally, (iv) the provision of 'global governance' to ensure 
decentralised organisations are kept informed by means of effective information 
reporting systems. 
3.2.3 Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 
The potential influence of groups of large shareholders on managerial activities was 
identified as early as the 1930s when Berle and Means (1932) highlighted the impact 
of the separation of ownership and control in corporations. Over seventy years later, 
institutional investors own large portions of equity in many companies across the 
world69, and playa key role in the corporate governance process (Short and Keasey, 
1997; Tricker, 1998; Mallin, 2001). Institutional investors are often accused of being 
transient owners who lack the incentives to monitor the firms they own (Porter, 1997). 
However, the potential importance of the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance and the links with financial reporting were identified by Whittington 
(1993); Whittington identified three systemic problems of corporate governance. The 
69 Gaved (1997) stated that institutional investors held more than three-quarters of the value of the 
shares on the London stock market. He added that the ten largest investors accounted for a quarter of 
the total market capitalisation. 
78 
first related to the supply of accounting information; he believed financial accounts 
form a crucial link between providers of finance and directors. Therefore 
imperfections in the financial reporting process might cause imperfections in the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance system. The second problem related to the 
demand for information; the cost of processing information was seen as a barrier to 
shareholders' involvement in the corporate governance process 70. The third problem 
related to monitoring costs; shareholders might incur very significant costs in 
exercising their monitoring function (Mallin, 1995). This problem could be overcome 
by large institutional shareholders combining and exercising block voting power 
(although this situation is rare in the UK)71 or through the use of the take-over 
mechanism \yhich allowed shareholders the opportunity to exercise their voting power 
in the decision as to whether to accept a hostile bid. Whittington concluded that some 
form of regulation would also be needed and added that enforcement powers would 
be necessary, in order to prevent free riders from exploiting the good reputation built 
up by those who conformed to the regulation. Baker and Wallage (2000) agreed that 
audited financial statements constituted an essential element of the financial reporting 
system that is required for effective corporate governance. They stated that the role of 
financial reporting should not be confined to the needs of investor decision-making, 
but should also be viewed in relation to the more general concerns of corporate 
governance. Gaved (1997) argued that the role of annual reports in communicating 
with institutional investors needed to be redefined and extended; he argued that 
70 This was traditionally 'solved' by the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
whereby small shareholders free rode on the sophisticated judgements of larger investors, but the EMH 
was not always believed to hold! 
71 However, in May 2003, shareholders at GlaxoSmithKline pIc voted against the boardroom pay 
policy that included a provision to offer a multi-million pound pay rise to its chief executive, Jean 
Pierre Garnier. At the marathon three-hour-Iong annual general meeting in London, shareholder after 
shareholder criticised the company's pay policy. 
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companies needed to keep shareholders and other investors well informed on a much 
more frequent basis than once a year72. 
The Cadbury Committee (1992) viewed institutional investors as having a special 
responsibility for ensuring that companies adopted its recommendations. The Report 
placed emphasis on a free Inarket solution rather than on external regulation to solve 
any corporate governance problems; it relied on institutional investors to shake off 
their traditional apathy (Mallin, 1995) and take a more active interest in the 
companies that they owned. In keeping with these sentiments, the Committee stated 
that "institutional shareholders in particular ... should use their influence as owners to 
ensure that the companies in which they have invested comply with the Code" (p. 54). 
A similar vie,,' was expressed in the Greenbury Report (1995) which stated that "the 
investor institutions should use their power and influence to ensure the 
implementation of best practice" (p. 19). Similarly, in the report of the Hampel 
Committee (1998), it is stated that "it is clear ... that a discussion of the role of 
shareholders in corporate governance will mainly concern the institutions" (p. 40). 
Therefore, the three most influential committees that have reported on corporate 
governance in the UK clearly emphasise the role of institutional investors 73. It is very 
obvious from the aforementioned reports that the potential of institutional investors to 
exert significant influence on companies has clear implications for corporate 
governance, especially in terms of the standards of corporate governance adopted and 
the extent to which issues are enforced (Short and Keasey, 1997). The significant 
proportion of shares held by institutional investors in the UK, where institutional 
72 The EU will require quarterly reporting from 2005. 
73 The Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) reports were brought together in (and 
superseded by) the Combined Code. 
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ownership is estimated at 75-80 per cent (Holland, 1998; Pike and Neale, 1999), 
means that the voice of the institutional investor cannot go unheard. 
In his seminal work, Hirschman (1970) identified the exercise of institutional power 
\Yithin an 'exit and voice' framework; he argued that dissatisfaction could be 
expressed directly to management, (the voice option), or by selling the shareholding, 
(the exit option). The latter choice is not viable for many institutional investors given 
the size of their holdings and their policy of maintaining diversified, balanced 
portfolios (Keasey and Wright, 1993; Short and Keasey, 1997)74. Meetings between 
institutional investors and companies are therefore extremely important as a means of 
communication between the two parties (Mallin, 1995; Holland, 1998; Solomon and 
Solomon, 1999). For example, Pye (2000; 2001) found that the amount of time the 
Chief Executive devoted to institutional investors doubled in the decade from 1989 to 
1999. 
Finns' boards of directors often have a close relationship with their major institutional 
investors (Holland, 1995; 1998; 1999; 2001) and will usually arrange to meet with 
their largest institutional investors on a one-to-one basis during the course of the year 
(Holland, 1999; Mallin, 1999). These meetings tend to involve key board members 
74In the Anglo-American system of corporate governance, individual shareholders generally have little 
incentive to exercise 'voice' concerning the fIrms' direction (Keasey and Wright, 1993). With freely 
tradable shares, corporate governance relies heavily on the effect of shareholders selling their shares 
('exit'). There are several reasons why institutional investors might be reluctant to express their 'voice' 
publicly. First, if they exercise the 'voice' option publicly, they are effectively drawing public attention 
to the diffIculties the company is facing, which could culminate in a falling share price, thus devaluing 
their investments (Short and Keasey, 1997). Second, effective monitoring of companies might be costly 
to fIrms with diverse portfolios (Short and Keasey, 1997). Further, selling large block of shares in a 
problem company is likely to be diffIcult, particularly as the potential buyer is likely to be an 
alternative institution with knowledge of the potential problems which exist in the company (Keasey 
and Wright, 1993). 
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such as the Chair, the Chief Executive Officer and the Finance Director Non-, 
executive directors are not usually present (Mallin, 1999). The discussions typically 
centred on the firm's overall strategy, with the aim of ensuring institutional investors' 
continuing support for management decisions (Holland, 1998; 1999; Mallin, 1999). In 
addition. individual key members of the board often meet once or twice a week to 
discuss corporate governance issues (Mallin, 1999). A board's 'target' institutional 
investor audience would normally include large shareholders (often the largest 30) 
and brokers' analysts (usually the top 10 for that sector), as well as any institutional 
investors who are underweight in its company's shares or are thinking of selling their 
holdings (Mallin, 1999). Typically the issues most frequently discussed at meetings 
between company executives and large institutional investors related to: (i) the firm's 
strategic positioning (Mallin, 1997; Holland, 1998; 1999); (ii) how the firm was 
planning to achieve its objectives (Mallin, 1997; Holland, 1998, 1999); (iii) whether 
these objectives were being met (Mallin, 1997; Holland, 1998, 1999); and (iv) the 
quality of the management (Mallin, 1997; Holland, 1998, 1999). Shareholder 
proposals or resolutions were another means of expressing discontent with board 
decisions. However, such proposals were rare in the UK (Mallin, 1999). 
Russell Reynolds Associates examined the preferences of institutional investors with 
respect to different corporate governance structures and procedures. They found that 
the quality of a company's board of directors was an important factor when making 
decisions; institutional investors expected boards to represent shareholder interests, 
particularly in the determination of management compensation. Institutional investors 
were found to marginally favour an organisational structure where the roles of the 
CEO and Chair were shared by two individuals. The splitting of the Chair/CEO role 
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was also emphasised in a study by Solomon et al. (2000a). This research provided 
strong support for the reforms initiated by the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees 75. 
Institutional investors were viewed as being an important part of the management 
process and their views might be fed back to the board in the planning process, and 
incorporated, as appropriate, in the annual strategy plan (Holland, 1998, 1999, 2001; 
Mallin, 1999). However, institutional investors were often viewed as having a 
collective influence, where management paid most attention to the commonality of 
institutional investors' views in meetings over time (Mallin, 1999). However, 
Sherman et al. (1998) found heterogeneity amongst institutional investors' views on 
several matters. In line with Sherman et al. (1998), it might be that institutional 
investors in UK firms are not a homogeneous group with respect to the views they 
express on corporate governance, financial reporting, and individual accounting 
standards such as FRS 13. 
The Myners Report (2001) recommended that fund managers should be more active, 
so that, for example, reservations about corporate strategy and performance should 
form the basis for greater intervention. This development would also almost certainly 
lead to more interaction and communication amongst the non-executive directors of 
the company. Further, following the recommendations of the Turnbull Report (1999) 
on the management of internal controls and risk, items of this nature should be 
included on the agenda of meetings between institutional investors and directors. 
However, institutional investors may, or may not, discuss the use of derivatives with 
75 Solomon et al. (2000a) found that institutional investors emphasised the appointment ofNEDs as the 
greatest improvement in corporate governance procedures. In~titutional i~vestors also. welcomed the 
establishment of remuneration and audit committees and the Increased dIsclosure of Internal control 
mechanisms that represented important improvements in corporate governance. 
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directors, despite the potential risk exposure consequences of inappropriate 
derivatiyes usage. 
In the post Enron/W orldcom environment, there is increasing pressure for more 
transparency and for directors, especially non-executive directors, to have access to 
more infonnation about the company (Abdel-khalik, 2002; Benston and Hartgraves, 
2002; Betit, 2002; Clark and Demirag, 2002; Cohan, 2002; Fearnley, et aI., 2002; 
Gerde et al., 2002; Lev, 2002; Puri and Borak, 2002; Revsine, 2002; Sullivan, 2002; 
Swift and Dando, 2002; Vinten, 2002; Zandstra, 2002). In the UK, bodies such as the 
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) are increasingly encouraging non-
executive directors to communicate directly with institutional investors. In a recently 
issued report (NAPF 2002), it is stated that "the NAPF encourages communication 
ben,"een IDs (independent directors) and investors, and not solely through the 
company's annual report" (p. 6). The recently issued Higgs review of the role of non-
executive directors, established by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the 
UK, addressed the relationship between non-executive directors and institutional 
. 76 Investors . 
3.2.4 A Role for Regulation? 
One of the major criticisms levelled at the various corporate governance codes around 
the world relates to their reliance on voluntary compliance (Short, 1996; Short et aI., 
1998; Dewing and Russell, 2000). The codes that have appeared worldwide, to date, 
have not relied on statutory backing, although the majority require companies to 
include a statement about compliance. The justifications offered, for a system that 
76 The Higgs Review recommends that at least half the board of listed companies should be comprised 
of non-execs. 
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essentially employs self-regulation within an overall statutory framework, typically 
reflect commercial concerns. Compliance with corporate governance best practice is 
seen to be in the best interests of the company in terms of attracting investors 
(Cadbury, 2000). The greater speed of response to international developments and 
increased flexibility are cited as added benefits in a self-regulatory environment 
(Dewing and Russell, 2000). Resistance to statutory regulation has focussed on the 
notion that legislation would impose only minimum requirements that could 
encourage compliance with the letter rather than the spirit of regulation (Keasey and 
Wright, 1993). Solomon et al. (2000a) found a strong indication from institutional 
investors that corporate governance should remain within a voluntary framework and 
an even stronger rejection of the suggestion that corporate governance reforms should 
be dealt with by means of government regulation. Holland (1998) claimed that the 
combination of informal links, boardroom, market and media control mechanisms 
were sufficient to reduce the need for extended legislation in the field of corporate 
governance. Cadbury (2000) believed that there was no need to produce European or 
international codes on corporate governance, as there were two forces driving 
governance standards internationally towards convergence. First, he highlighted the 
growing influence of institutional investors. If companies and countries wanted to 
avail themselves of increased institutional investment, they needed to meet the 
standards that these institutions demanded in terms of board effectiveness and 
disclosure (Cadbury, 2000). The second factor related to the capital markets of the 
world; expanding companies had to meet the requirements of international capital 
markets in respect of transparency and control (Cadbury, 2000). However, Cadbury 
conceded that benefits would be gained from an agreed set of international accounting 
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standards that would improve financial transparency and lead globally to a more 
efficient allocation of funds 77. In its report to the OECD, the Business Sector 
Advisory Group on Corporate Governance (1998) argued that although corporate 
governance should remain a private sector prerogative, they considered that there was 
a role for government in providing a regulatory framework that would allow investors 
and enterprises to adapt their corporate governance practices quickly in response to 
rapidly changing circumstances. 
However, the idea of self-regulation is not welcomed by all. For example, Mitchell 
and Sikka (1996) denounced the concept of self-regulation as "an abdication of 
responsibility" (p. 11). They argued that the aim of regulation was to protect the 
public interest, rather than the interests of corporate insiders. Lack of statutory 
backing was deemed to produce confusing, over-elaborate results from competing and 
overlapping bodies. They concluded that self-regulation "can't work, isn't working, 
and can't be made to work" (p. 11). Demirag et al. (2000) noted the ad hoc approach 
to the setting and monitoring of corporate governance codes, which they argued, 
occurred in response to public concerns over specific company behaviour. Corporate 
governance reform had been criticised for being piece-meal, whereby 
interrelationships had not been fully considered or integrated (MacDonald and 
Beattie, 1993). Dewing and Russell (2000) questioned whether corporate governance 
was currently 'regulated' in any meaningful sense. They argued, first, that there was 
no need to comply with the Code but only to disclose non-compliance; and second, 
that the disclosure of non-compliance appeared to be inadequately monitored by the 
77 Cadbury (2000) viewed the Codes as largely sharing two aims; to strengthen the position of investors 
and to encourage them to play their part in the governance of the companies in which they held shares; 
and to strengthen the influence of boards over the companies which they directed. He regarded 
disclosure as "the lifeblood of governance" (Cadbury, 2000, p. 9). 
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regulatory body assigned to undertake the task. To this end, they proposed three 
regulatory models and sought the opinions of stakeholder representatives78,79. The 
general view was that self-regulation overseen by an independent public body with 
statutory powers was appropriate for the private sector. 
Utilising a broader notion of corporate governance as advocated by Tricker (1984) the 
primary focus is on the legitimate demands for increased accountability. This notion 
of corporate governance owes much of its theoretical underpinning to the corporate 
social responsibility literature (Gray et aI., 1987; Gray et aI., 1996; Moir, 2001). 
Section 3.3 discusses the theory underpinning the notion of accountability, while 
Section 3.4 attempts to integrate broad definitions of corporate governance with 
accountability. 
3.3 The Concept of Accountability 
Many different views exist regarding the nature of, and the parties to, an 
accountability relationship. This section begins with an overview of some the many 
definitions of accountability discussed in the extant accounting literature80. Some of 
these differing perspectives that exist with respect to the concept of accountability are 
discussed. The use of accounting procedures and financial reporting mechanisms as 
78 Three alternatives were offered. First, an Auditing Council modelled on the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) and receiving statutory recognition from the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). 
Second, a Commission for Audit sponsored by the DTI. Finally, a UK version of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to assume responsibility for the overall regulation of audit and corporate 
governance (Dewing and Russell, 2000). 
79 Questionnaire respondents were divided into primary stakeholders (e.g. fund mangers), secondary 
stakeholders (e.g. banks) and other influential onlookers (e.g. individuals involved in regulatory 
regimes). 
80 The accountability literature encompasses a broad spectrum of views, definitions and categorisations 
spanning subjects as diverse as accounting and fmance, law, economics, sociology, psychology, and so 
on. It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to outline all these views, so key contributions in the 
accounting and fmance literature are noted. 
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means of discharging accountability is illustrated. Limitations of the accountability 
framework are presented. 
3.3.1 Giving an Account? 
Various definitions, and lengthy discussions, about the notion of accountability exist 
in the academic accounting literature (Garfinkel, 1967; Stewart, 1984; Gray, 1992; 
Arrington and Francis, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1996; Gray et aI., 
1996; Munro and Hatherly, 1993; Roberts, 1996; Willmott, 1996)81,82. For example, 
Gray (1992) states that accountability is "concerned with the right to receive 
information and the duty to supply it" (p. 413). The concept is further defined to 
involve "the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily afinancial account) 
or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible" (Gray et aI., 1996, p. 
38). Thus accountability involves two responsibilities or duties: the responsibility to 
undertake certain actions (or forbear from taking actions) and the responsibility to 
provide an account of those actions (Gray et aI., 1996). Roberts (1996) argues that 
accountability involves various social practices whereby we seek to remind each other 
of our reciprocal dependence; of the ways our actions unavoidably make a difference 
81 Accountability has been defined in several ways. Garfinkel (1967) defmed accountability as "the 
giving and demanding of reasons for conduct" (p. 64). Accountability is typically seen as "a chronic 
feature of daily conduct" (Giddens, 1979, p. 57). Munro and Hatherly (1993) defmed accountability as 
"a willingness and ability to explain and justify one's acts to self and others" (p. 369). Sinclair (1995) 
suggested that accountability involves a relationship "in which people are required to explain and take 
responsibility for their actions" (p. 221). Czamiawska-Joerges (1996) saw accountability as involving 
the "justification of deviations from the structure of normality and explanations of conformity to it" 
(pp. 307-308). Willmott (1996) viewed accountability as a "rendering intelligible of some aspect of our 
lives" (p. 23). 
82 Benston (1982b) argued that the concept of corporate accountability had several roots. Bloom and 
Heymann (1986) noted that the early Progressive reformers in the US emphasised "the importance of 
corporate and public accountability and the role of accounting in monitoring abuses of stewardship" (p. 
167). These reformers viewed the 'invisible hand' of the marketplace as inefficient and claimed that the 
government was necessary to mitigate the wastefulness. Coy and Pratt (1998) traced the origins of 
'accountability' to the writings of Aristotle two thousand years ago, via the writings of John Stewart 
Mill in the 19th century, to the more recent calls for increased accountability in business and political 
circles (Gray et aI., 1996). 
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to each other
s3
• Sinclair (1995) suggests that accountability could be understood in a 
variety of ways, ranging from a sense of personal obligation to a "price" that one pays 
for power or authority, to an incidental consequence of scrutiny (Sinclair, 1995, p. 
221). Anington and Francis (1993) observe that accountability requires the economic 
subject to be "'answerable"; this obligates the answerable subject to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of his/her actions to a community of others, thus embedding a degree 
of moral responsibility. Willmott (1996) was concerned with the universal aspect of 
accountability, which he considered involved "rendering intelligible some aspect of 
our lives or ourselves" (p. 23). He believed that accountability was a distinctive and 
peryasive feature of human existence - the continuous making and giving of accounts. 
He suggested that the giving of an account is a political act because it either confirms 
or unsettles whatever happens to be taken for granted as the world of normal 
appearances. In doing so, processes of accountability contribute to the continuation or 
disruption of the practices that they serve to sustain84 . 
Roberts (2001) argues that accountability should be viewed as a constraint upon the 
powerful and that it is a pervasive feature of organisational and social life. In the case 
of shareholder and a company, the directors of a company have a responsibility to 
manage the resources (financial and non-financial) entrusted to them by the 
shareholders and also have a responsibility to provide an account of this management. 
83 Such reciprocal dependence can be thought about in both instrumental and moral terms; we are 
bound up with each other not simply in narrow, calculable ways, but also more broadly in the way that 
intended and unintended actions (or inactions) have a myriad of consequences for others (Roberts, 
1996). 
84 He suggested that frameworks of accountability differentiate people in terms of their status, access to 
resources, responsibilities, etc. When coming within the orbit of the influence of particular frameworks 
of accountability, human beings find themselves constructed within, and accountable to, the disciplines 
that accompany these frameworks. The giving of accounts has consequences for how subjectivity is 
organised as well as influencing the way others perceive and relate to the person giving the account. 
Processes of accountability and their outcomes are invariably subject to interpretation and negotiation; 
they are never wholly pre-determined. 
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Thus the annual report can be seen as a means of discharging this accountability85. 
The requirement to report to shareholders (financial accounting), is one of the very 
few instances of explicit accountability established within the law itself (Gray et aI., 
1996). Cyert and Ijiri (1974) claim that: 
"at least one of the fundamental objectives of financial statements may be 
stated as the need to communicate information on the discharge of 
accountability of an entity to parties to whom the entity is accountable" (p. 32) 
Bloom and Heymann (1986) noted that the first F ASB Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts recognised the role of accountability: 
"To the extent that management offers securities of the enterprise to the 
public, it voluntarily accepts wider responsibilities for accountability to 
prospective investors and the public in general. Society may also impose broad 
or specific responsibilities on enterprises and their managements." (p. 25) 
The lAS framework recognIses the need for accountability with respect to the 
preparation of financial statements. It suggests two objectives for financial statements. 
The first objective is to provide information about the financial position and the 
results of an organisation's operations that will be useful and relevant to a wide range 
of users. The second recognises acceptance by management of their accountability for 
the resources entrusted to them as well as for the organisation's operating and other 
policies, which should all be reflected in the financial statements (Khoury, 2001). 
3.3.2 Systems of Accountability 
Several categorisations of accountability have been developed. The variety of 
classification schemes attests to the complexity of the subject. This section will 
review some of the classifications outlined in the accounting and finance literature. 
85 Accounting reports create a boundary to the organisation, influencing what is and what is not of 
significance in discussing organisations, their performance and their impact (Hines, 1991). 
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The nlost general framework of accountability in the accounting literature is based on 
the principal-agent model (Laughlin, 1990). This is a hierarchical model which 
assumes that some individual, small group or organisation, called the principal, has 
certain '"rights" to make demands on the conduct of a agent as well as to demand 
reasons for the conduct undertaken by that agent (Swift, 2001). These rights are 
assunled to derive from the fact that the principal transfers resources to the agent with 
an expectation as to how these resources are to be used (Laughlin, 1990). Under an 
accountability approach based upon principal-agent theory, where the rendering of 
account is regarded as imposing some costs on the conveyor of accounting 
information, it is recognised that agents have an incentive to enter into contracts 
involving the monitoring of the principal. Accounting practices and procedures 
facilitate this monitoring, which leads to a Pareto optimum position (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). 
The accountability model derived from principal-agent theory claims ideological 
strength and resilience; this strength and resilience purportedly lies in its ability to 
rationalise, normalise, and legitimise the relationships between management and 
shareholders (Chwastiak, 1999). Principal-agent theorists claim to objectively model 
the underlying economic conditions which give rise to the agency problem; they 
accomplish this by promoting a very limited perception of what it means to be human, 
(where, for example, self-realisation is equated with wealth accumulation) 
(Chwastiak, 1999). Within this framework, all human actions are guided by 
rationality. Such rationality, which by definition is devoid of more abstract notions of 
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epistenl010gy (such as enlotion or intuition), facilitates an abstract, cold, calculating 
and quantifying reasoning rooted in self-interest (Chwastiak, 1999). 
On the other hand, Roberts and Scapens (1985) claim that different forms of 
accountability emerge in different contexts. In a situation where regular personal 
contact is involved, explanations given or interpretations made can be challenged or 
negotiated86 . This delineation based on spatial proximity, was highlighted by Roberts 
(1991) when he referred to "hierarchical" and "socializing" forms of accountability. 
The hierarchical form of accountability, which is similar to the contractual context of 
accountability identified by Laughlin (1990), focuses on accounting as a reckoning 
function. It encompasses a much more formal set of accountability relationships 
where action expectations and information demand and supply are tightly defined and 
clearly specified (Laughlin, 1990). Viewing the individual as the economic unit leads 
to the construction of the calculating, isolated and compartmentalised self. By 
commodifying and enumerating an individual's talent and skill according to a 
mechanistic scheme of categorisation, Roberts argues that people are homogenised 
and become involved in hierarchical relationships with one another based on their 
86 Roberts and Scapens (1985) argue that the principal potential of accounting systems lies both in the 
way they reduce information to bridge physical distance by making what is physically remote from 
senior managers "visible" to them, and giving them a form of "presence" at lower levels in an 
organisation. This visibility and this presence, however, are only partial. Consequently, despite the 
ability of information to bridge physical distance, such distance has a decisive impact on the forms of 
accountability that emerge. The salient feature of accountability across distance is the relative absence 
of mutual knowledge. Where accountability is given in a different environment from where it is 
produced and where different interests operate, the significance attached to accounting information 
undergoes a series of subtle transformations. Knowledge of the possibility of such transformations, in 
tum, informs the practices of individuals and thereby shapes the forms of accountability that emerge 
across distance. For example, managers may invest heavily in accounting information systems in an 
attempt to meet their interests. The increased surveillance provided by a new accounting system may in 
fact allow them to exercise a greater degree of control over outcomes and may help them to enforce 
their expectations. 
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relative worth. This sets up an environment of continuous comparison, contrast and 
competition87,88. 
In contrast, the socializing form of accountability serves a narrative requirement 
rather than a calculative accounting function. This form of accountability is situated in 
the interactions between people who share a common context and have the ability to 
talk face-to-face to one another and is referred to by Laughlin (1990) as a 
"comnlunal" context of accountability. According to Roberts' (1991) definition of 
socializing accountability, spatial proximity is a necessary condition for the giving of 
an account. This is because the construction of self in dialogue with others ensures 
that the 'self is embedded in relationship with others. Thus, the communal context 
encompasses a less formal set of accountability relationships where action 
expectations and information demand and supply are less structured and defined. 
Munro (1996) identified two variants of accountability: First, he argued that company 
management tend to think of accountability in terms of "outcomes"; as something 
their company or institution needs to "get", rather than as something people already 
do. Here, much of the emphasis on accountability focuses on measurement of 
individual performance. Second, is the notion of accountability as the capacity to give 
87 In this regard one of the most unsettling aspects of management or company accounts is the complete 
absence of individuals from them; at best the self appears in peculiar agglomerations of selves, e.g., in 
terms of sales per employee or unit costs. 
88 Based on Foucault's (1979) analysis of the "individualising" effects of disciplinary power, Roberts 
(1996) suggested that the peculiar mirror of activity that accounting provides, causes the self, others, 
and even productive activity to be discovered merely as instruments to the monetary values accounting 
advertises. To secure 'self within the terms of such values, individuals must maintain a state of 
constant vigilance over their own activity and incessantly compare and differentiate 'self from others 
in these terms. It is within this self-disciplining regime that the individualised self is constituted; 
anxiously absorbed with superiors' views of their utility, indifferent to subordinates except in so far as 
their actions will reflect on the individual, and aware of colleagues only as potential competitors for 
recognition. 
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an account, explanation or reason. This is a process view - accountability is already 
endlessly going on: the giving of accounts is that in which everyday activities subsist. 
Munro (1996) believed that accountability involves the study of how accounts happen 
to line up - or indeed are n1ade to line up, that is, the ways in which accounts line up 
are "expressive" of a participant's position; they are thus open to processes of 
suryeillance and sanctioning. 
Altematiye dimensions of accountability were deployed by Boland and Schultze 
(1996), who argued that the addition of a narrative method of understanding to 
accountability's cognitive aspects might prove to be valuable. Willmott (1996) 
examined universal, historical, socially acceptable and unacceptable, hierarchical and 
lateral aspects of accountability. Sinclair (1995) presented a typology of 
accountability, based on five elements (political, managerial, public, professional and 
personal), which were crossed with two dimensions (structural and personal) of 
understanding89. Using this typology managerial or financial accountability was 
expressed in terms of the efficient and effective use of resources. Sinclair 
acknowledged that accountability is multidimensional and fragmented. An 
organisational control perspective argues that accountability is one of the mechanisms 
for striking a balance between organisational effectiveness and order (Birkett, 1988). 
89 By means of contrast to the typology offered by Sinclair, (1995), Stewart (1984) talks about bases of 
accountability in terms of a "ladder of accountability" (p.17). The fIrst rung of his ladder is "accounting 
for probity and legality" which reports that funds have been used in an appropriate and authorised 
manner. The second level is "process accountability" which accounts for the appropriateness of the 
action processes followed by the agent. Levels three and four relate to "performance accountability" 
and "programme accountability" which together are intended to provide an account of the total work 
performance of the agent in terms of the specifIc goals set by the principal. Finally, "policy 
accountability" relates to accountability relationships when undefmed and uncertain goals and 
processes exist. Each level is a tighter and more precise account of actions undertaken by the agent. 
However, each accountability relationship does not necessarily involve all levels of Stewart's ladder; 
many formal accountability relationships may reflect only one or two levels. Broadbent et al. (1996) 
claimed that although accounting could play a part at all levels of the "ladder", it was at the 
"performance" and "programme" levels that accounting could make the greatest contribution. 
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Accounting is but one of the means of controls in organisations (Otley, 1980; Ouchi, 
1980; Birkett, 1988). Accounting has the power to influence the behaviour of those 
subj ected to the accounting process because what is accounted for can shape 
participants' view of what is important, what to do and what not to do (Burchell et aI, 
1980~ Hopwood, 1983; Gallhofer and Haslam, 1993). For example, managers' 
decisions will be affected by the expected changes in performance measures as a 
result of changes in accounting policy and recognition with respect to derivative 
financial instruments by means of information inductance90 (Prakash and Rappaport, 
1977). 
3.3.3 Rights and Responsibilities 
Although several perspectives on accountability were offered in Section 3.3.2, the 
notion of accountability as the rendering of an account is the most intuitively 
appealing to the researcher and is therefore adopted. The Gray et ai. (1996) definition 
of accountability introduced in Section 3.3.1, highlights two central tenets of the 
accountability concept, namely rights and responsibilities. The most obvious rights 
and responsibilities are those established in law. The law lays down the minimum 
level of responsibilities and rights and thus the minimum level of legal accountability 
at any given time in any given country (Tinker et aI., 1991); "the minimum set of 
rules by which the game must be played" (Bebbington and Gray, 1993, p. 2). 
However, extant law cannot be taken as an absolute statement of society'S preferences 
90 Prakash and Rappaport (1977) stated that: "An individual's anticipating the consequences of his or 
her communication might lead him or her - before any information is communicated and, hence, even 
before any consequences arise - to choose to alter the information, or his or her behaviour, or even his 
or her objectives. This is the process of information inductance". 
95 
(Bebbington and Gray, 1993, p. 2)91. The requirement for minimum responsibility via 
compliance with the law brings a need for a secondary responsibility to account for 
the extent of that compliance - "this is the duty of accountability" (Bebbington and 
Gray, 1993, p. 2). There are various justifications put forward for this duty to render 
accounts, including the notion of a social contract (Gray, et aI., 1987; 1988). Most of 
the justifications are premised on the interdependencies between individuals and 
groups, whether this be through market exchanges or organisational arrangements or 
via the impact of organisational activities on society (Birkett, 1988; Gray et aI., 1987; 
Gray, 1992). Bebbington and Gray (1993) argue that current measures of 
accountability are skewed in favour of the limited financial accountability provided 
by management to shareholders. This allows the rights to information of financial 
participants to dominate those of all other stakeholders (Bebbington and Gray, 1993). 
The requirement to report to shareholders (financial accounting) is one of the very 
few instances of explicit accountability established within the law itself (Gray et aI., 
1996; Stanton, 1997). However, In order to be fully accountable, non-
legaVmoraVnatural rights also need to be considered. Ijiri (1975) asserted that 
accountability relationships might stem from "a constitution, a law, a contract, on 
organisational rule, a custom or even an informal moral obligation" (p. ix). Quasi-
legal rights and responsibilities are those enshrined in codes of conduct, statements 
from authoritative bodies to whom the organisations subscribe, or other 'semi-
binding' agreements (such as mISSIon statements). Philosophical rights and 
responsibilities (those responsibilities not enshrined in statute or other forms of 
agreement) may be absolute or relative, and their establishment can only be achieved 
91 For further discussion see Lindblom (1984); Gray et al. (1987; 1988; 1991); Bebbington and Gray 
(1993). 
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through debate, education and agreement (Gray et aI., 1996). But a business is 
accountable to all of its various constituents, not just shareholders, based on its 
relationships with them. Pallot (1992) explained that accountability is 'rights based' 
not utilitarian - that is, accountability is owed by organisations, to the public, 
irrespective of the use of the accountability infonnation. Ramanathan (1976) argued 
that the provision of relevant infonnation on the finn's objectives, policies and 
actions in the social arena was necessary in assessing the extent to which the 
corporation \vas effectuating its social contract. However, Stanton (1997) argued that 
non-investor users of accounting infonnation who claimed a right to accountability 
were asserting a moral rather than a legal right. 
Gray et aI. (1996) state that infonnation is a prerequisite of an active (participative) 
democracy; therefore, they argue, that accountability is a necessary condition for 
greater democracy. Also, an increase in organisational transparency through greater 
accountability may help to socially reconstruct the organisation by making 
organisational activity more visible (Burchell et aI., 1980; Chua, 1986; Hines, 1988; 
Gray, 1992; Gray et aI., 1996; Lehman, 2002)92. Coy and Pratt (1998) argue that 
public disclosure of infonnation is "fundamental to the workings of a pluralistic 
democratic system" (p. 544). They also suggest that the issuing of audited financial 
statements is designed to give "equitable access to infonnation for all interested 
parties" which in tum, "helps to maintain public confidence in the economic system" 
92 Chua (1986) argued that the act of communication inherent in accounting made it analogous to story 
telling because it gave visibility to a particular definition of reality. By highlighting economic 
constructs it reinforces the idea that such concepts are important; by not highlighting social or 
environmental concepts the accountant reinforces the idea that such concepts are not of great 
importance. Therefore the accountant through the presentation and re-presentation of perceived social 
reality, is involved in the organisation, reproduction and transformation of the social world (Hines, 
1988). 
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(p. 544). The transparency engendered by accountability can have the effect of 
bringing the organisation and the results of the organisation's actions closer together, 
that is, accountability is a result of responsibility and, in tum, increases responsibility 
(Gray et aI., 1996; Lehman, 2002). Bebbington and Gray (1993) argue that 
responsibility without accountability can become "largely meaningless" (Bebbington 
and Gray, 1993. p. 2) and that "the proper discharge of accountability can have the 
effect of opening - and developing - debate between the organisation and society 
about the appropriate types and levels of social responsibility" (Bebbington and Gray, 
1993. p. 2)93. 
3.3.4 Accounting as a Discharge of Accountability 
The conventional view of accounting sees it as a process of representing an objective 
financial and economic reality, exclusively in a numerically based, monetary manner 
(Laughlin, 1990; Gray et aI., 1996; Bailey et aI., 2000; Logsdon and Lewellyn, 2000; 
Klumpes, 2001). Bailey et ai. (2000) argue that the legal requirement that companies 
lodge infonnation with the Registrar of Companies, together with the wide 
dissemination of annual reports, affords a degree of public accountability in the UK. 
They further argue that "very little has changed this century regarding the nature of 
such financial accountability" (p. 207). They recognise that, although the volume of 
infonnation reported has grown, the basic system remains largely the same historic 
cost model of the last century. Bloom and Heymann (1986) noted that the 
conventional accounting system, based on the notion of free markets, defined 
accounting in tenns of providing relevant infonnation to individual decision makers 
93 Based on the writings of Foucault (1990), Coy and Pratt (1998) argue that "the effect ofaccountees' 
awareness of the possibility of surveillance through published annual reports can influence behaviour 
towards institutional as opposed to individual benefits" (p. 548). 
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(owners of the firm). who in tum used this information in accordance with their profit 
goals, thereby effecting an efficient allocation of resources94. They suggested that, in 
this framework, the role of the government was to "promote neutral rules that 
maintain a competitive environment and to otherwise refrain from interfering in the 
markets" (p. 168). Ijiri (1975) recognised the role of accounting in the accountability 
relationship when he maintained that: 
.. . .. accounting is a system designed to facilitate the smooth functioning of 
accountability relationships among interested parties." (p. ix) 
However, Benston (1982a; 1982b) suggested that the only mandatory form of 
corporate accountability necessary in a free market system is financial accountability. 
He identified three possible groups to whom corporations could be held accountable: 
shareholders, stakeholders (whom he defined to include employees, customers, 
creditors and others with direct contractual or transactional relations with the 
corporation) and the general pUblic. Benston believed that the aim of corporate 
accountability was to assure shareholders and stakeholders that their interests were 
served by the functioning of a free market system in conjunction with internal and 
external monitoring systems. However, he argued that the market for managerial 
services (whereby managerial staff were appointed and re-appointed on the basis of 
performance) was presumed to provide sufficient assurance that shareholders' 
interests would be safeguarded95 . Creditors were protected by market forces, since the 
financial markets worked to assure them that poor credit performance would increase 
borrowing costs. Employees' interests were seen to be met because they would vary 
94 The free market forces will, under the direction of Adam Smith's invisible hand, provide for Pareto 
optimal social welfare. 
95 Coy and Pratt (1998) noted that "(t)he collection and public reporting of new information may 
influence managerial behaviour if there is the possibility of gaining reward or avoiding sanction" (p. 
545). 
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their work effort with respect to their total compensation. Finally, the interests of 
consumers were seen to be protected by the workings of the market for consumer 
goods and services. Therefore, he concluded, that if concern for shareholders was the 
motivating factor behind financial accountability, there was no need to require 
inclusion of information relating to financial accountability in corporate reports. He 
argued that the inclusion of accountability information imposed costs on shareholders 
for the benefits of others. He did see one possible use for wider information as an 
internal managen1ent tool for use in evaluating activities. He suggested that "required 
reporting in annual financial reports of data that purport to measure the benefits or 
costs of social responsibility issues have little chance of being other than public 
relations or other self-serving exercises" (Benston, 1982b, p. 100). 
In the conventional accounting system, external auditors and published financial 
statements were seen as vital in monitoring and controlling the actions of 
management. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) agreed with Benston on the important 
role played by the external audit in this process; they suggested that market forces 
could be relied on to ensure that external auditors would report discovered 
improprieties and to generate generally accepted accounting principles, thus ensuring 
adequate financial accountability. 
This form of financial accounting, however, was but one form of accounting that 
might be considered when accountability is thought of in a broad sense. From this 
perspective, accounting based purely on financial objectives was perceived to be 
"significantly and artificially constrained" (Gray et aI., 1996, p. 11). Shearer (2002) 
demonstrated that the reliance of extant accounting theory and practice on the 
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theoretical constructs and behavioural assumptions of neo-classical economICS 
resulted in ethically deficient accounting reports. Shearer (2002) argued that 
Benston's analysis was premised on the unarticulated presupposition that the 
collective good was defined and achieved by the pursuit of private interest. From a 
neo-classical economics perspective, accounting was viewed as limiting the concept 
of gain and loss to the financial wealth created or depleted by corporate actions, 
\"hich in tum helped to perpetuate the myth that human happiness lay in acquiring 
material possessions (Chwastiak, 1999). Thus, accounting was seen to produce a 
delusion that the economic consequences of an action were all that mattered (Tinker 
et aI., 1991; Chwastiak, 1999). 
Tinker and Neimark (1987) argued that accounting reports played an important part in 
forming world views, or social ideology, by allowing management to present its view 
of the world, and, where appropriate, choosing what to comment on and what to 
ignore. Therefore, non-disclosure might be seen as "a means of protecting business 
self-interest" (Bailey et aI., 2000, p. 210). Roberts (1991) suggested that the ability of 
accounting to render things invisible lay in its capacity to present information as if it 
were objective fact; the detail could be questioned but not its basic capacity to reflect 
the truth. Presently, accounting information is presented as somehow independent of 
the interests of those who produce and use it. Coy and Pratt (1998) note that over the 
past decade or so critical accounting scholars have rejected the notion of accounting 
as a neutral objective system, which simply reports an independent social reality. 
Proponents of this viewpoint believe that the accounting process itself contributes to 
society's beliefs about social reality and through this influence, accounting 
contributes to creating the reality it reports (Hines, 1988; 1989). 
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It has been noted that accounting has potential as a broader human practice which 
may involve more meaningful conceptions of the world to be accounted for 
(Arrington and Francis, 1993). The social accountability literature would seek to 
extend accountability well beyond the narrow principal-agent relationship and would 
require disclosure of a broad array of economic and social information to society at 
large, and the environment, that extend beyond traditional contractual relationships. 
Cooper and Sherer (1984), Tinker et aI. (1991), Hooper and Pratt (1995) and Coy and 
Pratt (1998) argue that accountants are not objective benign actors in a capitalist 
society, but participate in the creation of social reality through the selected disclosure 
and aggregation of financial events. 
Camaghan et aI., (1996) presented an analysis of financial disclosure as one 
managerial device for satisfying accountability pressures. Accountability pressures 
from stakeholders, who may be either individuals or groups, drive company managers 
into manoeuvres that highlight features of the company and actions that they have 
undertaken to meet at least the most important accountability pressures that they have 
experienced. The central argument is that disclosure does not just appear, unaided. 
Rather, disclosure, together with the procedures by which it is aimed at its targets, is 
the product of an extensive set of managerial activities. Financial disclosures are 
shown to be the result of managerial activities, which create a particular depiction of 
the firm; through deliberate choices of content, wording, timing, media, and other 
disclosure dimensions. Within the limits and opportunities provided by disclosure 
laws and regulations, these disclosures are highly suggestive about what management 
believe is appropriate about the company (Camaghan et aI., 1996). Therefore, 
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stakeholders receive a portrayal of a firn1's activities and perfom1ance coloured by 
management's perceptions about stakeholders' priorities and interests - albeit 
lnediated by existing regulation, the managers' own attitudes and reputation and 
internal accountability relationships (Tinker and Neimark, 1987; Tinker et aI., 1991; 
Camaghan et aI., 1996; Chwastiak, 1999). 
Roberts and Scapens (1985) argued that accounting practices involve more than the 
production and reproduction of meaning; systems of accountability are seen to 
embody a moral order comprising a complex system of reciprocal rights and 
obligations. The practice of accounting institutiona1ises the notion of accountability; it 
institutionalises the rights of some people to hold others to account for their actions 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985). Thus, the practice of accounting can be seen to involve 
the communication of a set of values, of ideals about expected behaviour, of what is 
approved and disapproved (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). They further argue that 
accounting practices can thus be seen to involve the operation of relations of power. 
This power could take two fOm1s. First, it can take on the mantle of what Giddens 
calls the "transfom1ative capacity of human action", that is, the power of human 
action to transfom1 the social and material world; accounting is seen as providing a 
common language thus serving as a means of directing and organising (Roberts and 
Scapens, 1985). Second, the notion of 'power over' is discussed; that is, power as the 
domination of some individuals by others. They state that the real power of 
accounting lies in the way in which, as a structure of meaning, it comes to define what 
shall and shall not count as significant within the organisation. 
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3.3.5 Criticisms of Accountability 
One of the most frequently cited criticisms of the accountability concept is that the 
process of 'being held to account' determines, reflects, reifies, strengthens and 
solidifies power relationships between the accountee and accountor (Robert and 
Scapens, 1985 ~ Arrington, 1990; Roberts, 1991; Gray, 1992). For example, Roberts 
and Scapens (1985) argue that the practice of accountability (conducted by means of 
accounting) institutionalises the rights of some people to hold others to account for 
their actions. This process, they argue, reinforces power relationships and attempts to 
communicate "notions of what should happen" in order to make sense of "what has 
happened" (p. 448, emphasis in original). 
Another criticism of the accountability framework, as articulated by Tricker (1983), 
suggests that accountability only exists when the right to account is enforceable. 
Burritt and Welch (1997) emphasise this point when they argued that: 
"The giving of an account is not enough for an accountability relationship to 
exist; there has also to be a process for holding the accountor to account for 
actions taken and consequences incurred. Hence, enforcement mechanisms are 
crucial to accountability" (p. 533). 
However, Gray (1992) argued that neither criticism is necessarily insurmountable. He 
stated that the criticism offered by Roberts and Scapens (1985) and others 
presupposed that the world was antagonistic and manipulative, whereas he viewed the 
accountability process as "social and liberating, a means of defining and re-defining 
community" (p. 413). Gray (1992) suggested that the argument proposed by Tricker 
(1983) was primarily of differing terminology and thus easily resolved. 
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The accountability framework is essentially non-radical and grouped in the current 
status quo (Gray, 1994). The accountability model has been criticised in respect of its 
implicit political quietism by Tinker et aI. (1991) when they argued that the status quo 
was a constantly changing notion. However, such a non-radical base has been deemed 
to be desirable by many (Puxty, 1986; 1991; Gray et aI., 1991). The concept of 
accountability reflects notions of fairness and justice (Gray, 1994) and is seen as 
essential in terms of the re-introduction of an ethical basis to accounting (Gray, 1994). 
3.4 The Relationship between Corporate Governance and 
Accountability 
This section explores the relationship between accountability and corporate 
governance. As noted previously, the corporate governance debate has been marked 
by a discussion about the rights of shareholders versus the rights of stakeholders, with 
the proponents of the former arguing that a company is responsible only to its legal 
owners (Gamble and Kelly, 2001). Proponents of the stakeholder orientation argue 
that other constituencies, such as employees, or local communities may have a 
legitimate right to demand accountability from the firm. However, although the 
contemporary debate continues to attribute some degree of importance to the issue of 
accountability, the outcome of the debate increasingly focuses on what systems of 
governance best promote economic efficiency and generate "shareholder value" or 
returns for owners (Gamble and Kelly, 2001). In the area of corporate accountability 
to a broad range of stakeholders, there is a significant change in focus between the 
Cadbury Report and the Hampel Report. The Hampel Report clearly considered the 
need to redress the balance between shareholders and stakeholders and made strong 
statements on these issues. For example, the Hampel Committee stated that: 
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"The inlportance of corporate governance lies in its contribution both to 
business prosperity and to accountability. In the UK the latter has preoccupied 
much public debate over the past few years. We would wish to see the balance 
corrected. Public companies are now among the most accountable 
organisations in society ... We strongly endorse this accountability and we 
recognise the contribution made by the Cadbury and Greenbury committees. 
But the emphasis on accountability has tended to obscure a board's first 
responsibility - to enhance the prosperity of the business over time" 
The Hampel Report, 1998, p. 7, par. 1.1 
Formally, the UK's system of corporate governance provides for a chain of 
accountability whereby executives are accountable to the board of directors, who are 
in tum accountable to the shareholders (Forbes and Watson, 1993). However, in 
practice the distinction between managers (accountable to the board) and directors 
(accountable to the shareholders) is less than obvious because the boards of most 
large publicly quoted firms are dominated by executive directors (Forbes and Watson, 
1993). 
At a basic level, boardroom accountability is the key to the legitimacy of the 
corporate system. Corporations are seen to have power and their use of that power is 
only legitimised through being exercised within a recognised framework. The 
commonly held view is that companies are answerable to the law, regulations, their 
shareholders and to public opinion. However, increasingly, major long-term investors, 
such as pension funds, have come to understand that better run companies will strive 
to meet the legitimate interests of a wider group of stakeholders. 
The preceding discussion has highlighted the central tenets of the corporate 
governance and accountability frameworks to be utilised for the purpose of the current 
research. Several similarities can be identified between the definitions utilised within 
both the narrow notions of corporate governance and the agency-driven varieties of 
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accountability. Similar overlap may also be found within the wider more socially 
responsible driven notions of corporate governance and corporate accountability. 
Table 3.1 captures some of the fundamental distinctions between these two corporate 
worldviews. 
Table 3.1: Narrow versus Broad Notions of Corporate Governance and 
Accountability 
Narrow View Broad View 
Perceptions 
Nature 
of Human Utilitarianism and 
Indi vidualism 
Humanistic, Holistic 
Definition of the Firm 
Manager's Role or Duty 
Decision Norms 
Role of Internal Control 
Role of Regulation 
An economic organisation A social, political, 
defined as an aggregation historical and economic 
of individuals entity 
To maximise shareholders To attempt to 
wealth accommodate the needs of 
all stakeholders 
Freedom Responsibility 
The pricing of contractual To maintain trust amongst 
exchanges those in stakeholder 
relationships 
To promote ex ante 
contractual freedom 
To promote ex post 
distributive fairness 
As Table 3.1 shows, the agency framework that characterises the narrow definition of 
corporate governance and accountability is built upon the well-established principles 
of neo-classical economics (Bushman and Smith, 2001; 2003). This viewpoint 
emphasises the contractual nature of a firm's operations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The maximisation of shareholder wealth and the maintenance of individual liberties 
are the cornerstones of this framework. Thus, proponents argue that unfettered by 
regulation, corporations can write and enforce mutually beneficial contracts, which 
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maxinlise individual freedoms, as well as promoting economic efficiency (Friedman, 
The broad notion of corporate governance and accountability is rooted in humanism. 
Tricker (1984) suggests that broader notions of governance identify rights and 
responsibilities - this notion is widely recognised in the accountability literature (for 
example, Gray et aI., 1996). Such a framework views the firm not as an economic 
aggregation of individuals, but rather as an entity, connected in some organic way 
with the social and political world97 . Proponents argue that the focus of management 
in the achievement of corporate aims is based around the notion of responsibility, 
where economic entities are responsive to all stakeholders. Involvement is stressed 
rather than control; trust is more important than control (Burton, 2000). Regulation is 
seen as a vehicle to promote distributive justice and equality. 
In summary, both the narrow and broad notions of corporate governance and 
accountability believe that firms can and should be a source of wealth and wellbeing 
for society. The differences arise over how firms should fulfil this purpose. 
96 According to Friedman (1970) the only social responsibility of a business was to increase its profits 
'within the rules of the game', that is, engaging in open and free competition without deception or 
fraud. The system of rules in which business is to pursue its profit is, in Friedman's view, one that is 
conducive to the laissez-faire operation of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'. By allowing the market to 
operate with only the minimal restrictions necessary to prevent fraud and force, society will maximise 
its overall economic wellbeing. Anything that inhibits this incentive, or its operation, will weaken the 
ability of the market to deliver the economic goods. By means of contrast, the opposing view to that of 
Friedman, is that business has other obligations in addition to pursuing profits. Such obligations are 
argued to exist with respect to consumers, employees and society at large. One proposition is that social 
responsibility arises from the social power that modem corporations enjoy in areas such as 
environmental pollution. If business has power, then a just relationship demands that business also 
bears responsibility for its actions in these areas. Social responsibility arises from concern about the 
consequences of business' actions as they affect the interests of others. Business decisions do have 
social consequences. Hence, business cannot make solely economic decisions because they are 
interrelated with the whole social system (Gray et aI., 1996). 
97 In providing limited liability to corporations, society accords entities status in the eyes of the law. 
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3A.l Internal Control as a Nucleus? 
Many links have been established in the literature between corporate governance and 
accountability. Keasey and Wright (1993) regard accountability as a "sub-set of 
governance" (p. 291). One of the categorisations of accountability is based on the 
notion of the control of an organisation's activities. Hopwood (1976) points out two 
ways in which accounting systems serve accountability goals. First, accounting 
systems aid in the recognition and definition of problem areas. Second, accounting 
plays a role in the analysis and appraisal of alternative courses of action. Robinson 
(2003) suggests that accountability reports might playa useful role in the achievement 
of these goals simultaneously by reporting on both desirable and undesirable results of 
a change in activity, while concurrently inviting comment for further modification. 
Keasey and Wright (1993) highlight the notion of control in their definitions of both 
corporate governance and accountability. Corporate governance is defined to include 
"the structures and processes associated with production, decision-making, control 
and so on within an organisation", while accountability is defined as "a sub-set of 
governance" which "involves the monitoring, evaluation and control of organisational 
agents to ensure that they behave in the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders". Accountability issues are raised concerning the design of internal 
control systems that fully reflect events (Keasey and Wright, 1993). Such systems are 
necessary for the provision of information to ensure accountability (Keasey and 
Wright, 1993). The Cadbury Report in the UK focused attention on accountability and 
risk management aspects of corporate governance by highlighting notions of control. 
It had the objective of securing the "accountability" of the board of directors and the 
chief executive whilst ensuring that effective risk management and control systems of 
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companIes were developed and maintained In order to enact this accountability 
function (Cadbury, 1992). 
Banaga et al. (1995) argue that accountability is a critical factor and this is obtained 
through the interaction of three aspects of corporate governance: (i) external 
regulation; (ii) internal regulation; and (iii) the internal control system. They argue 
that such an interaction might be achieved through properly constituted boards of 
directors and audit committees, observed by responsible shareholders and regulatory 
bodies, supported by full and timely disclosure of information and effective reporting 
and auditing systems. The three elements interact as can be seen in Figure 3.1. For 
example, the Board, through the Audit Committee, will interact with the external 
auditor and the internal control reporting system. Such accountability is built into the 
Code of Best Practice, where for example, recommendations were made on behalf of 
the external regulatory system that affected the internal regulatory system, in areas 
such as board composition. 
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Figure 3.1: Corporate Governance: Conformance 
EXTERNAL REGULA TlON 
Shareholders 
Accounting Standards 
External Auditors 
Stock Exchange, ASIC 
Corporate Law 
Code of Best Practice 
INTERNAL CONTROL 
SYSTEM 
INTERNAL REGULA TlON 
Board of Directors 
Non-Executive Directors 
Audit Committee 
Internal Audit 
Reproduced from Banaga et al. (1995) 
HO""eyer, Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) argue that the aspiration for control within 
a principal-agent based accountability framework can be problematic. They point to 
the necessary distinction between 'managerial' and 'political/public' forms of 
accountability. They argue that political accountability is more open-ended and less 
detailed whilst managerial accountability is more closed and defined, which in tum 
implies that there are limitations on the controlling power of 'principals' in particular 
situations. 
3.5 Implications for Treasury Management 
The IASe mentions in its framework that the financial statements, besides providing 
information about the financial position, and performance and changes in the financial 
position, should also show the results of the stewardship of management, or 
accountability of management for the resources entrusted to it (Tornqvist, 1999). An 
integral part of this stewardship is the disclosure of information about exposure to 
risk. Information about company risk policies could be a way of informing 
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stakeholders about the company's objectives, attitudes towards risk, the measures to 
be undertaken and the delegation of responsibility (Tornqvist, 1999)98. 
In the treasury comluunity, the Association of Corporate Treasurers (ACT) via their 
Treasurer's Handbook (2001), highlighted the importance of internal control 
nlechanisnls in treasury operations. They summarised the main recommendations of 
the Turnbull Report, highlighting the importance of risk identification and 
management in a treasury setting. The handbook also provided a checklist for treasury 
departments to aid in their identification of risk. This advice seems timely as the 
pUblicity from high profile cases of financial distress from the usage of derivative 
products mounts up (Dunne and Helliar, 2002). Section 3.2 discussed the role played 
by the yarious corporate governance, and internal control, codes and initiatives and 
their implications for treasury management and derivatives usage. A strong financial 
risk management culture is a key component of good corporate governance (Michell, 
2001). However, the various corporate governance codes have faced criticism for 
failing to tackle the issue of risk management in an adequate manner (Accountancy, 
1998a; 1998b). 
The Higgs Report (2003) clearly specified the role of non-executive directors on risk 
issues by indicating that they should satisfy "themselves that financial information is 
accurate and that financial controls and systems of risk management are robust and 
defensible" (p. 26). Therefore, Buckley and Van Der Nat (2003) argued that non-
executive directors must possess sufficient knowledge to ensure that they exercise 
98 Tornqvist (1999) highlighted the importance of internal management control information when 
focusing on wider corporate accountability; the reflection of the 'internal' in the externally disclosed 
information is viewed as vital for a complete understanding of accountability. 
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good judgement on the appropriate use of derivatives for corporate risk management 
purposes, in order to avoid the use of such products for speculative purposes. 
Otherwise, they argue that "the uncritical, uncontrolled and unchallenged use of 
deriyatiye products is a financial time bomb ticking away in many corporate board 
rooms" (p. 11). 
Roberts and Scapens (1985) highlighted the importance of accounting standards; they 
claimed that the increased surveillance provided by new accounting systems might 
allo\\' a greater degree of control to be exercised over eventual outcomes. The 
increased surveillance provided by FRS 13 might allow the treasury and finance 
functions to exercise a greater degree of control over outcomes, thereby preventing 
recurrences of previous financial scandals. Roberts (1996) highlights the reciprocal 
dependence of individuals involved in accountability relationships - consequences 
(intended or unintended) of actions or inactions. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has documented some of the key issues in the corporate governance and 
corporate accountability literatures. An integration of some of the central tenets of 
these concepts has been attempted. The implications for treasury management have 
also been discussed. 
A number of authors have expressed concern for the future of corporate governance 
and accountability in an environment where the stewardship reports of management 
take second place to voluntary disclosures aimed at consumer engineering. For 
example, Short et al. (1998) claimed that the policy debate surrounding corporate 
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governance refonn focused too much on accountability to the possible detriment of 
enterprise. They suggest that there is a need to weigh the costs and benefits of efforts 
to enhance accountability in tenns of potential entrepreneurial actions foregone in 
order to achieve a greater balance in the approach to corporate governance. Forbes 
and Watson (1993) argue that the central issue of corporate governance is "how to 
ensure accountability of senior managers to their shareholders and other stakeholders 
whilst still providing executives with the autonomy and incentives to exploit wealth 
producing strategies". 
The present study will utilise elements from broad notions of corporate governance 
and accountability theories and frameworks to interpret the data provided by the 
content analysis of corporate annual reports, as well as insights gleaned from 
interviews with fund management and treasury department staff, in order to assess the 
impact and implications of an accounting standard such as FRS 13. Chapter 4 will 
outline the methodology and methods to be used for this analysis. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology and Methods 
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Chapter 4 - Research Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed in detail the main literature driving this research study, while 
Chapter 3 outlined the theoretical framework to be employed. This chapter considers 
the research methodology, and discusses the methods underpinning the analysis in this 
dissertation. Two methods are employed in order to examine whether FRS 13 was 
perceived to be useful from (i) the perspective of preparers and users of financial 
statements, and (ii) a study of how the contents of the annual reports of companies 
altered in response to the standard. 
Views· on the nature of reality and the contribution of knowledge have direct 
implications for methodology choices (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The researcher's 
assumptions about the world are likely to implicitly or explicitly influence the 
research questions asked, the data sought and the interpretation of findings. The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss the various methodological frameworks in the 
extant literature in order to document the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions that characterise the choice of methods utilised in the 
present study. Section 4.2 outlines core philosophical assumptions that guide any 
academic research project. The ontological and epistemological assumptions of the 
researcher support the choice of a primarily qualitative, interpretive methodological 
approach to the research. Section 4.3 discusses the research objectives of the study 
and the choice of appropriate methods of analysis. Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 outline 
the two qualitative research methods chosen for the study, namely content analysis 
and interview techniques. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Philosophical Assumptions and Research Methodology 
This section outlines the various philosophical assumptions that underpin any research 
study. Much of this discussion is based on the framework articulated by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979). 
4.2.1 Assumptions regarding the Nature of Social Science 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four factors, assumptions about which 
determine our position in research: (i) ontology; (ii) epistemology; (iii) human nature; 
and (iv) methodology. The schematic diagram presented by Burrell and Morgan to 
illustrate these four factors and associated assumptions has been reproduced in Figure 
4.1. Each of these factors is now discussed. 
Figure 4.1: Burrell and Morgan's (1979) Scheme for Analysing Assumptions 
about the Nature of Social Science 
The Subjective-Objective Dimension 
The Subjectivist 
Approach to Social 
Science 
~IN __ om __ in_a_h_'s_m ______ ~~~r------- Ontology 
~I An __ t_i-_P_o_s_it_iv_is_m ____ ~~~r------ Epistemology 
The Objectivist 
Approach to Social 
Science 
---------i~~ I Realism 
------1~p I Positivism 
~IV __ ol_u_n_ta_r_is_m ______ ~~~r----- Human Nature ---.......,~p I Determinism 
I Ideographic l~fIIII--- Methodology 
~~~~-----~ 
-----~pl Nomothetic 
Reproduced from: Burrell arid Morgan (1979) 
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Ontological assumptions consider the nature of reality (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Nominalism assumes that social reality is relative and that 
the world has no real structure (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The 'reality' of the social 
world is deemed to be the product of an individual's consciousness and is not external 
to the individual. On the other hand, a realist views the world as comprising hard, 
tangible and relatively immutable structures, which exist independently of perception 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 'Reality' is deemed to be objective in nature and viewed 
as external to individual consciousness. With respect to accounting, the philosophy of 
realism arises from the assumption that objective economic reality can be observed, 
measured and communicated (Godfrey et aI., 2000). Morgan (1988) offered a six-way 
classification of the nature of the social world. This classification is reproduced in 
Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Morgan's (1988) Six Basic Ontological Assumption Sets 
Category Assumption 
-- ----..:::::..::~-~~---------------=-=:..::....:::...~~----------
1 Reality as a concrete structure 
2 Reality as a concrete process 
3 Reality as a contextual field of information 
4 Reality as symbolic discourse 
5 Reality as social construction 
6 Reality as projection of human imagination 
Reproduced from: Morgan (1988) 
Categories 1-6 are alternative ways of looking at the world. Category 1 is a strict 
objectivist viewpoint of the world, while category 6 represents a subjectivist ontology. 
As one moves from category 1 to category 6 assumptions about the 'concreteness' of 
the world become more relaxed (Morgan, 1988). The ontological assumptions made 
imply different epistemological approaches and particular research methodologies and 
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methods, which in tum influence the types of research problems analysed and the 
hypotheses which are tested (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan, 1988; Godfrey et 
aI., 2000). 
Epistemological assumptions consider the nature of knowledge; the relationship 
between the researcher and that being investigated is considered (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Creswell, 1998). Positivism argues that knowledge 
can only be based on observation, while anti-positivism seeks 'understanding', rejects 
objectiyity and the need for independence of the observer (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Positivists believe that what happens in the social world can be explained and 
predicted by means of the development and testing of hypotheses (Godfrey et aI., 
2000). Knowledge is seen to be a cumulative process. The epistemology of positivism 
encourages a concern for "an 'objective' form of knowledge that specifies the precise 
nature of laws, regularities and relationships among phenomena measured in terms of 
'social facts'" (Morgan and Smirich, 1980, p. 493). Anti-positivism views knowledge 
as something that has to be personally experienced. This perspective rejects the notion 
that social science can create true objective knowledge of any kind (Morgan and 
Smirich, 1980, p. 493). 
Assumptions about human nature are concerned with the relationships between 
humans and their environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Determinism assumes that 
human beings, and their activities, are products of the environment and the situation 
in which they are located. Voluntarism assumes that man is 'free', autonomous and 
free-willed and thus governs his/her own actions and is thus responsible for them 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). These ontological and epistemological assumptions 
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taken in conjunction with views on the human nature have direct implications for 
methodological choices (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Methodology concerns the study of how we acquire knowledge about the world; it 
considers how the entire research process is conceptualised (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Creswell, 1998). It provides the reasons and 
justification for the choice of methods through which we investigate and obtain 
knowledge about the world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Ideographic methodologies 
argue that understanding can only be achieved by obtaining first hand knowledge, by 
getting inside situations and learning the complexities of particular issues99 (Burrell 
and Morgan. 1979). An ideographic approach "stresses the importance of letting one's 
subject unfold its nature and characteristics during the process of investigation" 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 6). 
On the other hand, nomothetic methodologies employ quantitative analysis protocols 
and techniques that search for answers (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Such an approach 
uses methods of the natural sciences by focusing on the formulation of scientific tests 
and the use of quantitative and experimental methods in order to test hypotheses 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Patton, 1990). Tomkins and Groves (1983) cited an 
extensive range of studies that questioned the validity of scientific modes of research 
in the social sciences 100. Peasnell (1978) discredited accounting as a pure science; he 
therefore claimed that the application of scientific methods to its study was 
misleading. Burrell and Morgan (1979) stress that nomothetic and ideographic 
99 Examples of this type of enquiry include interviews, case studies and ethnomethodology. 
100 Berger and Luckman (1966), Garfmkel (1967) and Tomkins and Groves (1983) challenge the use of 
the scientific method in social science research. However, all of these writers worked in the philosophy 
and social psychology arenas, therefore their findings may not be applicable to research in accounting. 
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approaches do not represent strict dichotomies, merely two different ways of 
influencing research methodology. To this end, Tomkins and Groves (1983) suggest 
identifying hypotheses using a naturalistic approach and then utilising a scientific 
approach for testing each one tOt • 
4.2.2 Assumptions about the Structure of Society 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) considered two alternative approaches adopted in research 
about the way society is structured. Two theories concerning the structure of society 
were advanced: order and conflict. The 'order' or 'integrationist' view of society 
emphasises stability, integration, functional co-ordination and consensus (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Meanwhile, the 'conflict' or 'coercion' view of society emphasises 
change, conflict, disintegration and coercion (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) translate these theories about the nature of society into a debate 
concerning regulation versus social change. It is argued that regulation is concerned 
with unity and cohesiveness by consensus, whereas, the sociology of radical change is 
principally concerned with seeking emancipation from the structures which limit or 
stunt the potential for development (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
4.2.3 The Burrell and Morgan Classification Framework 
The Burrell and Morgan (1979) analysis provides a useful framework to examine how 
the ontological assumptions about the world we live in, shape the epistemological 
notions concerning the nature of knowledge, which in tum influence the research 
10\ Tomkins and Groves (1983) use the term 'naturalistic' in the manner of Abdel-khalik, that is, as a 
reference to the styles of research which owe their heritage to phenomenology, hermeneutics and 
pragmatism. However, Godfrey et al. (2000) argue that naturalistic research commences from specific 
real-world situations, and that it does not provide generalisable conditions for wide segments of 
society. 
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questions asked and the interpretation of resultant findings. Their analysis is based on 
a two-by-two matrix, reproduced here in Figure 4.2. The two dimensions of the matrix 
are based on the approaches to social science and the structure of society outlined in 
Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2 respectively. This results in (i) the subjectivist-
objectivist dimension (represented by the horizontal axis); and (ii) the assumptions 
about the nature of society dimension (represented by the vertical axis). These two 
sets of assumption yield four mutually exclusive paradigms offering four alternative 
views of social reality, namely: functionalist, interpretive, radical structuralist and 
radical humanist. 
Figure 4.2: Burrell and Morgan's (1979) Matrix for the Analysis of Social 
Theory 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
Radical Radical 
Humanist Structuralist 
SUBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE 
Interpretive Functionalist 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
Reproduced from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22) 
The functionalist paradigm assumes a realist ontology, with a positivist epistemology, 
a deterministic view of human nature and a nomothetic methodology. It seeks to 
provide rational explanations of human affairs. It is pragmatic and deeply rooted in 
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sociological positivism; relationships are concrete and can be identified, studied and 
measured using scientific techniques. This approach has tended to be the dominant 
paradigm for much accounting and finance research since the 1970s. The interpretive 
paradigm is underpinned by a nominalist ontology, with an anti-positivist 
epistemology, a voluntarist view of human nature, and an ideographic methodology. 
Researchers in this paradigm try to observe on-going processes in order to understand 
individual behaviour better. Both the functionalist and the interpretive paradigms are 
underpinned by a societal assumption based on the sociology of regulation. The 
radical structuralist paradigm shares its assumptions about the nature of science with 
the functionalist paradigm, while the radical humanist paradigm is underpinned by the 
same assumptions concerning the nature of science as the interpretive paradigm. 
However, both the radical structuralist and the radical humanist paradigms are 
underpinned by a societal assumption based on the sociology of radical change, with 
its associated commitment to emancipation and significant change. Theorists in the 
radical structuralist paradigm see inherent conflicts within society that generate 
constant change through political and economic crises. This has been the fundamental 
paradigm of theorists such as Marx, Engles and Lenin. Theorists in the radical 
humanist paradigm are mainly concerned with releasing social constraints that limit 
human potential. They see the current dominant ideologies as separating people from 
their true selves. This paradigm is used in the justification of revolutionary change. 
Burrell and Morgan argue that one cannot operate in more than one paradigm at any 
given point in time, because in order to adhere to the assumptions of one paradigm, 
one is deemed to have defied the assumptions of all of the other paradigms. 
123 
.. t2.4 An Alternative to the Burrell and Morgan Framework 
Although widely recognised in the literature, the Burrell and Morgan framework is 
not without criticism (Chua, 1986; Rosengren, 1993· Laughlin 1995· Deetz 1996· 
, " , , 
Clair, 1999). For example, Clair (1999) argued that the Burrell and Morgan 
framework ignored both postmodernist and feminist perspectives, while the analysis 
offered by the functionalist paradigm assumed the absence of a psychological 
perspective. Chua (1986) offered an alternative classification of the philosophical 
assumptions underpinning accounting research. Chua (1986) identified two main 
problems with the Burrell and Morgan framework. First, she disagreed with the notion 
that all the assumptions were presented as strict dichotomies, which meant that a 
researcher either assumed that individuals were determined by their societal 
environment or they were completely autonomous and free-willed. Second, she 
argued that the framework embraced a strongly relativistic notion of scientific truth 
and reason. Chua argued that the Burrell and Morgan implication that the choice and 
evaluation of paradigms could not be justified on rational scientific grounds was a 
misrepresentation of Kuhn who argued that traditional notions of what constituted 
rational scientific choice were inadequate. 
Chua (1986) developed her own classification of the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning accounting research. This classification comprised three sets of beliefs: 
(i) beliefs about knowledge; (ii) beliefs about physical and social reality; and (iii) 
beliefs concerning the relationship between theory and practice. This classification is 
reproduced in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Chua's (1986) Classification of Philosophical Assumptions 
A. Beliefs About Knowledge 
Epistemological 
Methodological 
B. Beliefs About Physical and Social Reality 
Ontological 
Hunlan Intention and Rationality 
Social Order / Conflict 
c. Relationship Between Theory and Practice 
Reproduced from Chua (1986, p. 605) 
Beliefs about the conception of knowledge were divided into two sets of 
epistemological and methodological assumptions. Beliefs concerning the nature of 
physical and social reality were based on assumptions about ontology, human 
intention and rationality, and social relations. One of the key differences that Chua 
highlighted was that her framework was intended to be used to evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of different perspectives in accounting, whereas the Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) framework was non-evaluatory. Further, Chua did not claim that her 
framework encompassed all social perspectives into a permanent classification; she 
merely attempted to identify current perspectives. 
Tomkins and Groves (1983) maintained that conventional accounting researchers 
have tended to adopt and maintain a single research style drawn from the natural 
sciences to the exclusion of more interpretive research methods such as case studies. 
They added that accounting research failed to question the fundamental assumptions 
underlying the work and the relevance of these assumptions to the proposed area of 
research. Tomkins and Groves (1983) also claimed that academics interested in 
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studying accounting behaviour and the value of different approaches needed to place 
less emphasis on Inathematical analyses and modelling, statistical analysis and so on. 
They suggested that academics should instead concentrate their efforts on more 
detailed fieldwork as well as the study of the perceptions and concerns of accounting 
practitioners. 
4.3 Research Objectives and the Choice of Research Methods 
This study has as its core objective an examination of the impact of FRS 13 on 
corporate reporting practices and accountability relationships. This is achieved by an 
examination of corporate annual reports before and after the implementation of the 
deriyatives accounting standard. Preparer and user perspectives regarding the 
implementation of the standard are then sought in order to provide a comprehensive 
basis which will facilitate a better understanding of the issues associated with the 
introduction of an accounting standard, and the associated impact on accountability 
relationships. It is recognised that there may be a number of motivations for the 
disclosure of derivatives related information, however, this study is primarily focused 
on the effects of these disclosures for accountability relationships. 
The philosophical viewpoint of the researcher is outlined in light of the research 
objectives mentioned above. The researcher does not assume that there is a concrete 
reality out there and thus veers toward the nominalist end of the ontology spectrum. . 
Social science is viewed as a subjective rather than an objective exercise w'th 
knowledge not being independent of particular contexts. In this study, knowledge 
emanates from two principal sources. First, knowledge is gleaned from the content 
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analysis of FRS 13 disclosures provided in corporate financial statements. The 
subsequent translation of the data collected for this analysis into meaningful findings 
is facilitated by means of subjective interpretation. Second, knowledge emanates from 
individual perspectives on the implications of FRS 13 for both the preparers of 
financial statements and the institutional users of these documents. In line with Chua 
(1986), the researcher takes an intermediate standpoint on the question of assumptions 
concerning human nature. While humans might not be solely determined by their 
environment, and some degree of free will is exercisable, neither are humans 
completely free-willed and autonomous. The substantive environment does have the 
ability to exert some impact over humans. Thus, the researcher falls between the two 
camps of voluntarism and determinism. This is particularly important for the 
interview strands of the research, where it is recognised that corporate representatives, 
although they have the ability to make some decisions, are constrained by 
organisational structures and business norms. With respect to the assumptions 
concerning the underlying nature of society, again some degree of compromise within 
the Burrell and Morgan framework is needed to facilitate the researcher's own 
predilections. Society is perceived as being capable of social change, but the status 
quo needs to be thoroughly investigated in order to identify where such change, if 
necessary, should be focused. 
As previously mentioned, the present study is exploratory in nature and no attempt is 
made to focus on the setting up of detailed hypotheses for subsequent testing. The aim 
is to provide a descriptive account of derivatives-related disclosures, and the 
perspectives of treasurers as preparers of the information, and the perspectives of fund 
managers as potential users of the information provided by FRS 13. The philosophical 
I 
i 
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assumptions of the author as previously outlined point towards the use of ideographic 
methodologies, which would seek exploration and description of the perceived reality 
of the interviewees and annual report preparers. The combination of a nominalist 
ontology, an anti-positivist epistemology, an intermediate position on the assumptions 
concerning human nature, and the use of ideographic methodologies locate the 
researcher within the interpretive paradigm as identified by Burrell and Morgan 
(1979). The location of the research within an interpretive paradigm in addition to the 
use of ideographic methodologies tends to lead to the use of qualitative research 
methods, such as those employed in the current study. 
4.4 Research Methods 
4.4.1 Qualitative Research Methods 
Qualitative methodology is based on the ideographic approach to social SCIence 
research. Creswell (1998) argued that qualitative research is based on an inquiry 
--
process "that explores a social or human problem". It is concerned with meanings, 
patterns of behaviour and the way people understand things (Patton, 1990; 
Denscombe, 1998). Creswell added that the researcher "builds a complex, holistic 
picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study 
in a natural setting" (p. 255). In other words, qualitative methods are ways of finding 
out what pe~ple do, how they think, feel and acquire knowledge, by means of 
observation, interviews and the analysis of documents (Patton, 1990). The choice of 
----
qualitative methods such as content analysis and interview techniques sati~es the 
criteria for ideographic methodologies. 
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The establishment of validity and reliability are crucial elements in qualitative 
research (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Creswell, 1998; Denscombe, 1998; Bums, 2000; 
Stenbacka, 2001). In order to demonstrate validity, the propositions under 
investigation must match the causal conditions which exist in human life (Bums, 
2000). The researcher has to be recognised as an influence in the research process but 
L , 
not a cause of biased or one-sided reporting (Denscombe, 1998). The subjects for 
investigation have to be chosen on explicit or reasonable grounds in terms of the 
research aims and objectives (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Denscombe, 1998). The 
main thrust of methodological development in qualitative research during the last 
century has been toward greater validity (Kirk and Miller, 1986). Reliability needs to 
be established in two ways. First, the study must be capable of replication. Utilising 
the same categories as those used in the original study, following the same 
procedures, employing the same criteria of correctness and originating from the same 
perspectives, other researchers must be able to replicate the steps of the original 
research (Bums, 2000). Second, two or more people must be capable of similar 
interpretations based on the use of defined categories and procedures. In order to 
place an observation in perspective, within a theoretical context, the reader needs to 
be aware of the cognitive idiosyncrasies and theoretical standpoint of the researcher 
(Kirk and Miller, 1986). Issues relating to the validity and reliability of each of the 
chosen methods in this study will be highlighted in the description of content analysis 
and interviews in Section 4.4.2 and Section 4.4.3 respectively. 
~a~ative ~a!x~!s __ has many~~Y~Eta~~~:,.~_pa.t!icl!I~~ strengt,h associated with 
qualitative research is that the descriptions and theories that such research generates 
are grounded in reality (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Denscombe, 1998). Miles and 
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Huberman (1994) argued that the focus on "naturally occurring, ordinary events in 
natural setting" resulted in the researcher gaining "a strong handle on what 'real life ' 
is like" (p. 10). There is a richness and detail to the data (Denscombe, 1998). To the 
extent that social existence involves uncertainty, accounts of that existence need to be 
able to tolerate ambiguities and contradictions; qualitative research is better suited to 
this (Denscombe, 1998). 
However, qualitative research does have its disadvantages. The data may be less 
representative, thus limiting its generalisability (Denscombe, 1998). However, 
provided sufficient detail is provided about the circumstances of the research it may 
be possible to gauge how far the findings relate to other instances (Denscombe, 1998). 
There is a possibility of decontextualising the meaning whereby the meaning of the 
data is lost or transformed by taking it from its current location (Denscombe, 1998). 
f Given the underlying philosophical assumptions of the researcher (as outlined in 
Section 4.3) and the broad objectives of the research, qualitative research methods 
were deemed to be most appropriate. This research study employs two methods of 
qualitative data collection in order to satisfy the objectives of the study: (i) the content 
! 
i analysis of corporate annual reports; and (ii) interviews with treasury disclosure 
~ preparers and institutional users of corporate financial statements. 
4.4.2 Content Analysis 
The first research method employed in this study is a form of content analysis. This 
method is used in order to collect data on the disclosures relating to derivatives usage 
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provided in UK corporate annual reports 1 02. More details on the specific application 
of the technique in the present study are provided in Chapter 5. However, this section 
provides a broad outline of the content analysis method and its appropriateness in the 
present study. 
A number of definitions of content analysis have been articulated in the substantive 
social science literature. For example, Abbott and Monsen (1979) defined it as: 
, .... a technique for gathering data that consists of codifying qualitative 
information in anecdotal and literary form into categories in order to derive 
quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity" (p. 504). 
Mean\vhile, Krippendorff(1980) characterised content analysis as: 
" ... a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data 
according to their context" (p. 21). 
The basic premise behind the technique is that verbal behaviour, as communicated 
through written text, can help explain human behaviour; the communication process is 
an aspect of the total historical process - with both a meaning and the ability to be 
quantified (Lindenmann, 1983; Merten, 1996). Thus, content analysis is a method of 
codifying the text (or content) of a piece of writing into various groups (or categories) 
depending on selected criteria (Weber, 1985). Content analysis has the potential to 
disclose many "hidden" aspects of what is being communicated through the written 
text (Denscombe, 1998, p. 168). 
102 Content analysis is just one of several established research techniques which may be used in the 
analysis of text (Silverman, 1993). Other techniques used to examine text include: (i) semiotics, which 
involves an in-depth analysis of the construction and structure of texts, and the relationships between 
different words within each text; and (ii) ethnography and linguistic methodology, which examine the 
behaviour of people interacting and reacting to text. Because of the in-depth nature of these techniques 
they are not appropriate for the analysis of large volumes of text, such as that envisaged by the current 
study. 
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Denscombe (1998) highlighted some of the key attributes of content analysis; Table 
4.3 is adapted from his analysis. 
Table 4.3: Denscombe's (1998) Key Attributes of Content Analysis 
Content analysis 
... reveals 
1. What the text establishes as relevant 
J The priorities portrayed through the 
text 
3. The values conveyed in the text 
4. How ideas are related 
... by measuring 
What is contained (e.g. particular words, 
ideas) 
How frequently it occurs; in what order it 
occurs 
Positive and negative views on things 
Proximity of ideas within the text, logical 
association 
Reproduced from Denscombe (1998, p. 169). 
The main strength of content analysis is that it provides a means for quantifying the 
contents of a text, and it does so by using a method that is clear and, in principle, 
repeatable by other researchers (Denscombe, 1998). Further, the method is 
"unobtrusive" (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 29), because documents can be evaluated 
without the knowledge of the communicator (Jones and Shoemaker, 1994; Breton and 
Taffler, 2001). 
According to Krippendorff (1980), the first well-documented case of quantitative 
analysis of printed material occurred in eighteenth-century Sweden. Content analysis 
was originally devised for purposes of literary detection; for example, it was used in 
cases of disputed authorship (Carney, 1971). With the development of mass media, 
the technique grew in popularity, as newspaper articles were considered to be very 
amenable to this form of analysis. It was used widely during World War Two for the 
study of propaganda (Carney, 1971; Lindenmann, 1983). In 1952, Berelson produced 
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a text in which he offered a rigorous quantitative approach to the content analysis of 
media messages. This work was immediately challenged by Kracauer (1953), who 
called for qualitative content analysis techniques, drawing on hermeneutical and 
textual procedures (Merten, 1996). During the 1960s, advances in computer 
technology led to the process becoming more automated, which added a new level of 
complexity to the analysis being undertaken (Stone et aI., 1966; Krippendorff, 1980; 
Manning and Cullum-Swan, 1994)103,104. This technology led to the development of 
'critical' content analysis, which attempted to penetrate the surface and 
superficialities of communication (Carney, 1971; Krippendorff, 1980). 
4.4.2.1 Stages in the Content Analysis Process 
There are several stages in the content analysis process (Carney, 1971; Kassarjian, 
1977; Krippendorff, 1980; Lindenmann, 1983; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The 
research method "involves establishing categories and then counting the number of 
instances when those categories are used in a particular item of text" (Silverman, 
1993, p. 29). This process can be broken down into stages as follows. First, a suitable 
representative sample is needed (Carney, 1971; Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 
1980). The sample needs to be manageable (Kassarjian, 1977). In addition to a sample 
population, a sampling unit also needs to be chosen (Krippendorff, 1980). Potential 
accounting sampling units include annual reports, accounting standards or exposure 
drafts, letters to shareholders, and so on. The corporate annual report is the most 
popular sampling unit in accounting content analysis studies (Neimark, 1992; Jones 
103 Stone et al. developed the 'General Inquirer' computerised system of content analysis at Harvard 
University in 1966. This system is still the most sophisticated, fully automated, computerised system of 
content analysis available. 
104 NUD*IST was developed by QSR to assist computerised content analysis. It aids in the coding of 
data, searching text and identifying coding patterns. NUD*IST (now called NVivo) launched its sixth 
version (N6) in 2002. 
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and Shoemaker, 1994; Gray et aI., 1995a; 1995b; 1996; Adams and Harte, 1998; 
Unerman, 2000)105. 
Second, the unit of measurement or coding unit needs to be determined (Kassarjian, 
1977; Krippendorff, 1980). Examples of coding units include word, theme, character, 
item, and space and time measures such as inches of text, line, paragraph, and so on. 
Debate rages in the content analysis literature on the most suitable unit of analysis 
(Gray et aI., 1995b). Hackston and Milne (1996) suggested that measurement error 
between various quantification techniques was likely to be negligible. In their study 
they illustrated how counting sentence data, in terms of the number of sentences or 
proportions of pages to the nearest hundredth, made little difference to the subsequent 
analysis performed on the coded data. 
Third, a sui tab Ie categorisation needs to be developed (Kassarj ian, 1977; 
Krippendorff, 1980). A suitable theoretical framework is necessary in order to 
prevent inadvertent bias and to filter out the researcher's own idiosyncrasies (Carney, 
1971). The element of SUbjectivity is difficult to control and impossible to eliminate 
entirely, but the presence of accurately defined categories, established at the outset 
105 A number of reasons have been suggested for the exclusive focus of accounting content analysis 
studies on the annual report and accounts as the primary sampling unit. According to Bowman and 
Haire (1976) annual reports contain much written material that permits the researcher to perform 
content analysis. Many others argue that the annual report is the main form of corporate 
communication (Gray et aI., 1995a; 1995b; Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; Adams and Harte, 1998). 
Neimark (1992) argues that the annual report presents "the world of corporate concerns in microcosm" 
and is both "comprehensive and compact" (p. 100). Further, it is considered to be virtually impossible 
to identify all sources of corporate communication which makes it difficult to be sure how complete 
non-annual report data are, and therefore how consistent the results of the content analysis will be 
(Gray et aI., 1995a; 1995b). However, there is some recognition in the literature that this exclusive 
focus on the annual report might result in "an incomplete picture of disclosure practices" (Roberts, 
1991, p. 63) and some studies have examined documents other than the annual report (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989; Harte and Owen, 1991). 
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help to facilitate the correct classification of instances of disclosure (Kassarjian, 1977; 
Krippendorff. 1980). 
Fourth, a pilot study or pre-test is necessary in order to examine the robustness of the 
decision rules and research instrument (Carney, 1971). Adjustments to the decision 
rules may be needed in the light of this pre-testing. Several coders should retest a 
sample of the material to ensure consistency in terms of decision rule application 
(Krippendorff, 1980; Andren, 1981). 
Fifth, data coding and recording enables specific instances of defined disclosure to be 
classified according to the pre-determined decision rules. Potter and Levine-
Donnerstein (1999) claim that the coding task changes with different types of content. 
Much of the content is coded by means of clerical recording or counting; when a 
particular issue is covered either a check is made, or a number added to the count, or a 
measurement is made of the amount of text devoted to the subject. For some less 
straightforward content, the coding task focuses primarily on constructing judgements 
from one's own schema based on the detailed decision rules. Krippendorff (1980) 
identified several essential elements for reliable recording of data in content analysis. 
The researchers must have experience of the type of data to be analysed; decision 
rules should also be set out in basic terms to avoid ambiguities. Each researcher must 
undergo some form of specific training to ensure all researchers engaged in a 
particular content analysis project are consistent in their classification of data into 
categories. 
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Finally, the data should be transferred to a computerised database to facilitate 
subsequent statistical or numerical analysis. Thus, the technique imposes a structure 
suitable for statistical analysis on essentially unstructured documents (such as annual 
reports) by means of reasonably well defined and consistent measurement categories 
which can be used to compare the content of each document analysed (Unerman, 
2000). Having summarised the numerical data, the next step is to use the data to draw 
inferences by analysing it in relation to its wider context. 
4.4.2.2 Reliability and Validity 
To act as an effective research tool, content analysis must encompass certain key 
characteristics: the process must be reliable and valid (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 
1980; Andren, 1981; Weber, 1985; McTavish and Pirro, 1990)106. Reliability or 
reproducibility is one of the distinguishing characteristics of content analysis, In 
contrast to other techniques that are often used when describing the content of 
communication (Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980). Krippendorff (1980) 
identified three types of reliability for content analysis: stability, reproducibility and 
accuracy107. Stability refers to the ability of a judge to code data the same way over 
time (Krippendorff, 1980; Milne and Adler, 1999). The aim of reproducibility is to 
measure the extent to which coding is the same when multiple coders are involved 
(Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1985; Milne and Adler, 1996). 
Intercoder reliability is the percentage of agreement between several judges 
processIng the same conlmunications material (Holsti, 1969; Andren, 1981; 
106 Computer approaches to content analysis (available since the 1960s) permit more systematic and 
reliable coding of themes and meanings in text but these have not been widely adopted in social science 
research; computer content analysis procedures process a given text file reliably, in accordance with 
instructions in a specific program (Roberts, 1989; McTavish and Pirro, 1990). 
107 In order to measure the reliability of content analysis, several calculations can be undertaken. For 
example, Scott's (1955) pi, Cohen's (1960) kappa and Krippendorffs (1980) ex have all been used. 
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Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980; Milne and Adler, 1996)108. The accuracy 
measure of reliability involves assessing coding performance against a pre-determined 
standard, or against previous studies. There is a need for explicitly formulated rules 
and procedures to minimise the possibility that findings reflect the analyst's 
SUbjective predispositions rather than the content of the documents under analysis 
(Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980)109. Validity relates to how well the results of a 
study mirror reality (Jones and Shoemaker, 1994). To improve validity one needs to 
develop a coding scheme that guides coders in the analysis of content (Krippendorff, 
1980; Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). The coding scheme is an effort to make 
the coding process uniform across all coders so that the coding can be regarded as 
systematic (Krippendorff, 1980; Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). This process 
helps to eliminate partial or biased analysis, ensures that data relevant to a problem or 
hypothesis is secured and that the findings have theoretical relevance and are 
generalisable (Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980). To be characterised as content 
analysis, the data collated must be quantitative and thus amenable to statistical 
methods for summary purposes, as well as for interpretation and inference 
(Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980). Methodology reporting IS critical for 
discerning the quality and usefulness of content analysis studies as well as for 
allowing replication. Researchers should emphasise objectivity and reliability issues 
in discussions outlining research findings (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). 
108 To address issues associated with reliability, Andren (1981) recommends that another person re-
code a random sample of the investigated material. Disagreements should be identified and analysed to 
determine if the disagreement is due to an error by the original coder or an error by the test-coder. In 
order to demonstrate objectivity, the categories of analysis must be defmed so precisely such that 
different analysts could apply them to the same body of content and secure the same results 
(Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980; Milne and Adler, 1996). 
109 To ensure that the technique is employed in a systematic and valid fashion, the inclusion/exclusion 
of communications content or analysis categories must be done according to consistently applied rules 
(Kassarjian, 1977). 
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4.4.2.3 Use of the Content Analysis Method in Accounting and Finance 
Content analysis has been widely used in many areas of accounting and finance 
research. However, the subject area where the content analysis technique has been 
utilised most frequently is in the area of social and environmental reporting (Bowman 
and Haire, 1976; Ernst and Ernst, 1978; Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Ingram and 
Frazier. 1980; Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Neimark, 1983; Frazier et aI., 1984; 
Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Cowen et aI., 1987; Tinker and Neimark, 1987; 
Freedman and Jaggi, 1988; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990; 
Roberts, 1991; Patten, 1992; Adams et aI., 1995; Grayet aI., 1995a; 1995b; Hackston 
and Milne, 1996; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Thomas and Kenny, 1996; Buhr, 1998; Neu et aI., 1998; Milne and 
Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000). Content analysis has frequently been employed in 
research into the accounting standard setting process (Kelly-Newton, 1980; 
Buckmaster and Hall, 1990; McKee et aI., 1991; Guenther and Hussein, 1995). The 
methodology has also been used to investigate financial analyst recommendations and 
reports (Govindarajan, 1980; Previts et aI., 1994; Rogers and Grant, 1997; Breton and 
Taffler, 2001) and to analyse narrative disclosures regarding bankruptcy (Tennyson et 
aI., 1990). 
Kohut and Segars (1992) focused on one part of the annual report, by examining the 
content of a sample of presidents' letters in high and low performing companies, in an 
effort to discover patterns in communication strategy. The contexts of financial 
accounting narrative have been studied on several occasions (Neimark, 1983; Jones 
and Shoemaker, 1994; Sydserff and Weetman, 1999; Smith and Taffler, 2000; Aerts, 
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2001 ~ Beattie et aI., 2001; Beattie et aI., 2002), while other studies have looked at the 
readability of annual reports (Sydserff and Weetman, 1999; 2002; Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2001). Stone (2001) employed content analysis to formulate a portfolio-
screening model for socially responsible mutual funds, while Gaumnitz and Lere 
(2002) analysed the contents of the codes of ethics of 15 US organisations. The 
technique has been used in accounting education studies (Beattie and Collins, 2000; 
Ferguson, 2002). Recently, the content analysis technique has been employed to 
investigate the content of corporate web sites (Perry and Bodkin, 2000). 
4.4.2.4 Limitations of the Content Analysis Method 
Whatever the setting, what emerges from analysis of these different studies is (i) the 
growth in the usage of this technique over time, and (ii) the breadth in the range of 
issues addressed using this method. A further conclusion is that this technique is 
increasingly employed in many different countries that have varying regulatory 
regimes for controlling financial information disclosures. However, it is recognised 
that content analysis is subject to a number of limitations. There is a substantial 
element of subjectivity involved with the use of the content analysis technique. 
Difficulties associated with content analysis are frequently based on the questions 
asked and source materials available (Carney, 1971). Choice of categories is often a 
tricky business in content analysis (Carney, 1971). The technique has an in-built 
tendency to dislocate the units and their meaning from the context in which they were 
made, and even the intentions of the writer (Denscombe, 1998). Qualitative 
assessment is always somewhat subjective, but the reporting of both category and 
intercoder reliability should provide some measure of comfort to the reader. Content 
analysis is frequently accused of being quite susceptible to the effects of researcher 
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biases, which in tum, can affect decisions made in the collection, analysis and 
interpretation of data (Jones and Shoemaker, 1994); the existence of these biases can 
affect a study's contribution to knowledge (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). The presence of 
appropriate, reliable, valid and accurate coding scheme that guides coders through the 
analysis of content and the use of multiple coders helped to reduce this bias. Another 
crucial assumption of content analysis is that frequency of occurrence directly reflects 
the degree of emphasis accorded a theme (Kelly-Newton, 1980; Krippendorff, 1980; 
Gray et aI, 1995b; Unerman, 2000). 
4.4.2.5 Use of Content Analysis in the Current Study 
Within the present study content analysis is viewed primarily as a qualitative research 
method. However, the quantitative nature of the data collected in the process is 
recognised. It should be noted, that despite content analysis's claims to objectivity, 
some subjectivity is involved in the choice of disclosure classification. However, the 
level of SUbjectivity is minimised through the development and pre-analysis of a 
rigorous set of decision rules. This subjectivity is in line with the philosophical 
assumptions of interpretive research. 
The present content analysis initially reqUIres the selection of companies to be 
included in the investigation. The next stage involves the development of an 
appropriate coding structure. The central part of the research involves analysing 
company annual reports and deriving thematic variables. Statistical analysis will be 
used to enable some explanation of the dataset. More details on the specific 
application of the technique in the present study are provided in Chapter 5. 
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4.4.3 Interviews 
The second research method employed in this study involves semi-structured 
interviews. This method is used in order to collect data on the perspectives of 
preparers and users of financial statements concerning disclosures relating to 
derivatives usage provided in UK corporate annual reports in response to FRS 13. 
More details on the specific application of the technique in the present study are 
provided in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. However, this section provides a broad outline 
of the interview method and its appropriateness in the present study. 
Interviewing is one of the most common forms of data collection and comes in a 
variety of forms (Fontana and Frey, 1994; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). Many 
reasons are given for the need for interviews. However, qualitative interviewing 
begins with the assumption that the perspective of others is meaningful, knowable, 
and able to be made explicit (Patton, 1990; Easterby-Smith et aI., 1991). Indeed, in 
discussing the use of interviews in management research, Macdonald and Hellgren 
(1998) point out that interviewing top managers is often seen to add credibility to 
scientific inquiry. Whatever the motivation for the interview, the task for the 
interviewer is to make it possible for the person being interviewed to bring the 
interviewer into his or her world (Patton, 1990). The interviewer should set the 
guidelines in order for the interviewees to tell their stories (Osteraker, 2001). The 
interviewees should be allowed to talk within those guidelines, without interruption, 
interference or influence (Patton, 1990; Smith, 1995; Osteraker, 2001; Rapley, 2001). 
However, the quality of the information obtained during an interview is largely 
dependent on the skills of the interviewer (Patton, 1990; Rapley, 2001). 
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The use of semi-structured interviews allows the researcher to have a clear list of 
issues to be addressed and questions to be answered (Denscombe, 1998; Keats, 2000). 
However, flexibility is assured in terms of the order in which the topics are 
considered, and with respect to time allowed in order to enable the interviewee to 
speak more widely on the issues raised in the interview (Denscombe, 1998). Thus, 
answers are open-ended, and there is more emphasis on the interviewee elaborating 
on particular points of interest (Patton, 1990; Denscombe, 1998). 
As with all forms of research, the twin cornerstones of validity and reliability need to 
be adequately demonstrated with respect of interview techniques (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997; Creswell, 1998; Denscombe, 1998; Bums, 2000; Stenbacka, 2001). Stenbacka 
(2001) argued that because the purpose of qualitative interviewing is to generate 
knowledge of the phenomenon based on the understanding of another person's reality 
concerning a specified problem area, the question of validity is easily addressed. She 
argues that validity is achieved if the interviewee is immersed in the problem area 
under investigation, and is afforded the opportunity to speak freely. One method of 
reducing bias and thereby increasing reliability is to ask the same question several 
times in an interview. However, it is acknowledged that such an approach may 
antagonise the interviewee, who may think that the interviewer is incompetent or not 
listening (Vinten, 1995) 
The use of tape-recorders in research interviews provides a permanent, more accurate 
rendition of events (Yin, 1994; Patton, 1990; Denscombe, 1998). However, tape-
recorders only capture speech; they miss non-verbal communication as well as other 
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contextual factors (Patton, 1990; Denscombe, 1998). The use of the tape-recorder 
does not eliminate the need for taking notes (Patton, 1990). Taking notes facilitates 
later analysis, as well as providing a backup data source if the tape fails. Full 
transcriptions are expensive and time consuming (Patton, 1990), and are not always 
necessary. Thus, the interviewer can work back and forth between interview notes and 
sections of the tape; only those quotations that are particularly important for data 
analysis and reporting need to be transcribed (Patton, 1990). 
The are several advantages of using interviews. First, interviews are particularly good 
at producing data which deal with topics in depth, and in detail (Denscombe, 1998). 
Subjects can be probed, issues pursued and lines of investigation followed over a 
relatively lengthy period. Second, valuable insight can be gained into the topic under 
investigation based on the different perspectives offered by the interviewees 
(Easterby-Smith et aI., 1991; Denscombe, 1998). Third, interviews are a good method 
for producing data based on informants' priorities, opinions and ideas (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984; Easterby-Smith et aI., 1991; Denscombe, 1998). With semi-structured 
interviews, the interviewees have the opportunity to expand on their ideas, explain 
their views and identify what they regard as the crucial factors (Denscombe, 1998). 
Fourth, interviews are very flexible. Adjustments to the lines of enquiry can be made 
during the interview itself (Denscombe, 1998). Fifth, direct contact at the point of the 
interview means that data can be checked for accuracy and relevance as they are 
collected (Patton, 1990; Denscombe, 1998). Some of the interview data may 
corroborate with the use of information available in the annual reports of interviewee 
companies (Yin, 1994). 
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The use of interviews in order to obtain sUbjective accounts and expenences In 
relation to the introduction of FRS 13 is in line with the underlying philosophical 
assumptions underpinning this study. The method facilitates the collation of various 
individual perspectives on the effects of the introduction of a derivatives accounting 
standard, and the exploration of issues raised by interviewees with respect to likely 
implications of the accounting standard for corporate accountability and corporate 
governance. Therefore, interviews with preparers and users of financial statements 
facilitate a flexible and wide-ranging exploration of the issues associated with the 
introduction of a derivatives accounting standard, which provides a useful and 
informative accompaniment to the analysis of the changes the standard has visited on 
corporate financial statements. 
4.4.3.1 Limitations of the Interview Method 
One limitation of the interview as a research method is that it relies heavily on 
interviewees' recollections of events (Yin, 1994). A second limitation is one that 
applies to most interview-based studies, namely that it does not permit any systematic 
generalisations. The interview method tends to produce non-standard responses 
(Denscombe, 1998). The impact of the interviewer and of the context means that 
consistency and objectivity are hard to achieve. The data collected are, to an extent, 
unique owing to the specific context and the specific individuals involved. This has an 
adverse effect on reliability (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Denscombe, 1998). There are 
also problems of bias (Yin, 1994), whereby the data is based on what people say they 
do, rather than on what they do (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Denscombe, 1998), as 
well as the difficulties posed by poor or inaccurate articulation (Yin, 1994). 
Interviewees may not want to appear lacking in knowledge or awareness and thus 
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may elaborate on perspectives which they believe the researcher might perceive they 
might have which could lead to self-serving responses. However, the technical nature 
of the present interviews and the choice of interviewees for the current study make 
that less likely in the present research. Finally, analysis of interview data can be 
difficult and time consun1ing. The transcribing of interview data is a major task that 
occurs after the data have been collected (Patton, 1990; Denscombe, 1998). Further 
details of the use of interviews in the current study will be outlined in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7. Many of the specific limitations and their avoidance will be illustrated in 
those chapters. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the philosophical assumptions, the research methodology 
and the methods underpinning the present research. General core philosophical 
assumptions were outlined employing the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework. The 
research obj ectives of the present study were identified and the researchers 
philosophical assumptions were stated. This led to a discussion of appropriate 
qualitative research methods. The content analysis and interview research techniques 
were outlined. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will outline the empirical stands of the research. 
The methods outlined in this chapter will be considered in greater detail and 
limitations in light of the particular issues under investigation in the current research 
will be discussed. 
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A Content Analysis of FRS 13 Disclosures 
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Chapter 5 - A Content Analysis of FRS 13 Disclosures 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 detailed the extant literature relating to the usage of derivative financial 
instruments and the role for accounting standards in the regulation of these products. 
Chapter 3 presented the theoretical underpinning of the present study, namely the role 
of corporate governance and accountability. Chapter 4 outlined the methodology and 
methods to be used in the present analysis. This chapter examines the impact of FRS 
13 on the financial statements of UK quoted companies. In particular content analysis 
is used to investigate: (i) UK companies' reporting on derivatives in their annual 
financial statements prior to the introduction of FRS 13; and (ii) changes in UK 
companies' reporting practices for derivative instruments since the standard was 
mandated. The study conducts this analysis for the total level of disclosure, as well as 
for different categories of disclosure. In addition, the analysis is performed for a wide 
variety of firms, such that the findings should not be specific to anyone type of 
company. 
The chapter therefore assesses whether the introduction of FRS 13 has had a material 
effect on the quantity of information about derivative usage included in financial 
statements; such an assessment is important as the main aim of the standard was 
disclosure. In addition, the present analysis helps to see where companies have 
responded to the standard in terms of the category of information for which disclosure 
has increased. Also, the results of this chapter should supply a picture about which 
companies have increased their disclosure most in response to the standard being 
adopted. 
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the data and 
method of analysis utilised in the present study. Section 5.3 reports the findings of the 
content analysis survey. Finally, some conclusions are offered in Section 5.4. 
5.2 Data and Analysis 
Content analysis has been used in numerous accounting and finance research studies 
(see Section 4.4.2.3). Many of these studies have investigated instances of social and 
environnlental related disclosures. The present analysis draws on this work; it is based 
on the instrument developed by Gray et al. (1995b) to examine Corporate Social 
Reporting (CSR) practices in UK companies. Whatever the subject of the 
investigation, there are a number of essential stages in any content analysis (Section 
4.4.2.1). Choices have to be made and the next few sub-sections outline the reasoning 
behind the decisions taken when employing content analysis in this thesis. 
5.2.1 Sample Choice and Sampling Unit 
Financial companies were excluded from the analysis, as FRS 13 has a separate 
application for these companies II 0. The annual reports of the remaining 78 FTSE 100 
companies were therefore chosen to represent the largest non-financial companies in 
the UK 111. Five of these large companies had to be excluded from the analysis 
because of difficulties in obtaining their annual reports, resulting in a final sample of 
110 The disclosures required by FRS 13 depend on the type of reporting entity involved. The FRS 
distinguishes three types of reporting entity: Part A deals with reporting entities other than financial 
institutions, while Part B is applicable to banks and similar institutions. Part C is suitable for other 
financial institutions. Insurance companies are excluded from the scope of FRS 13. This was to allow 
the ASB to consider the disclosures to be provided by insurance companies in the context of 
developments in insurance company accounting generally. 
J J I The sample is based on the FT ranking available online at www.ft.com.This listing is based on the 
market capitalisation of companies. 
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73 FTSE 100 companies. One hundred randomly chosen FTSE Other112 non-financial 
conlpanies were selected to represent a sample of UK medium-sized companies l13 . In 
addition, 37 randomly chosen non-financial Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
listed companies' annual reports were scrutinised in order to provide some indication 
about reporting by smaller companies l14 . This process resulted in a final sample of 
'10 . 11" 
_ companIes -. 
Pre-samples are employed in content analysis to develop the set of categories to be 
used in the analysis of the main sample (Krippendorff, 1980). These samples should 
ideally come from the same popUlation as the main sample. However, as all the FTSE 
100 non-financial companies' whose annual reports were available were included in 
the study, it was necessary to look to the companies just outside the FTSE 100, but 
not included in the random FTSE Other sample, as well as an additional sample of 
FTSE Other and AIM companies. This pre-sample was used to develop the 
categorisation to be used in the content analysis. 
In any content analysis, decisions have to be made regarding the units of analysis to 
be used for the observation and collection of the data (Krippendorff, 1980; Gray et aI., 
1995b; Unerman, 2000). The annual report was used as the sampling unit for the 
present content analysis, primarily because FRS 13 is aimed at disclosures in the 
financial statements (ASB, 1998). Further, the annual report is viewed as the main 
form of corporate communication (Gray et aI., 1995a; 1995b; Adams and Harte, 
1998). Therefore, these documents may have a strong influence on perceptions of the 
112 The FTSE Other companies refer to a sample of all companies listed on the main market but not 
included in the FTSE 100 list. 
113 These companies were chosen by means of a random number sequence generated from Excel. 
114 Again, these companies were chosen by means of a random number sequence generated from Excel. 
115 Further details for the 210 sample companies are provided in Appendix 5.1 
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organisation (Hines, 1991). Tilt (1994) claimed that corporate annual reports afforded 
a high degree of credibility to the information reported within them. Therefore, the 
first annual report produced after the introduction of the standard, plus the last report 
issued before the standard, for each company, were used for the analysis 11 6, 117. The 
proportion of a page devoted to FRS 13 disclosure was used as the unit of analysis. 
However, as the total number of pages of the annual report were also noted, the 
percentage of the total annual report was also calculated. A clear standard A4 acetate 
grid 118, divided into one hundred boxes, was placed over the text to be analysed and 
the number of boxes containing FRS 13-related text was recorded manually on the 
record sheet. 
5.2.2 Proportion of a Page as Coding Unit 
The coding unit (also called the enumeration unit) determines how content is 
measured or defined (Kassarjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980; Unerman, 2000); in other 
words how the data is to be captured and measured. A number of different coding 
units have been used in previous investigations that have employed content analysis: 
number of words (Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990; Deegan and Gordon, 1996), number of 
sentences (Guthrie, 1982), proportion of a page (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, 1990; 
Gray et aI., 1995a, 1995b), percentage of a document (Gray et aI., 1995a, 1995b). 
Gray et aI. (l995b) and Milne and Adler (1999) summarised the debate concerning 
1\6 This allowed me to compare the reports pre- and post-FRS 13 adoption, to evaluate the magnitude 
and order of the differences in company reporting following the introduction of the standard. It is 
recognised that the use of the year leading up to and the year immediately following the introduction of 
FRS 13 does not take into account early adopters of the standard. This is a limitation of the current 
analysis. The present work could be extended by looking at early adopters of the standard for a few 
years prior to the implementation of the standard. 
117 UK annual reports were used in the analysis. Companies with an additional US listing were included 
in the analysis if their financial statements were in compliance with UK GAAP. These companies 
typically produced a reconciliation statement with US GAAP. Further, the US Standard (FAS 133) did 
not become mandatory until June 2000, which was after the time period covered in the present analysis. 
118 A standard A4 margin was used in the template. 
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the most suitable coding unit for content analysis; they concluded that the proportion 
of a page devoted to a particular topic was the preferred coding unit, as this 
measurement reflected the amount of space given to the issue and, by inference, the 
importance of that issue to the preparer of the document. This coding unit was 
therefore employed in the current dissertationl19 . It is recognised that there are 
difficulties associated with the use of proportion of a page as the coding unit: font 
size, margins, the use of graphics and partially blank pages (Tilt, 1997). However, the 
use of this measure takes into account information presented in tabular and graphic 
formats, which accounts for much of the FRS 13 information; it would be difficult to 
take account of such information if one chose to adopt words or sentences as potential 
coding units. Further, if the volume of disclosures is deemed to be an indication of the 
importance of a particular subject (Krippendorff, 1980; Gray et aI., 1995b; Unerman, 
2000), then it would seem inappropriate to exclude information presented in a form 
other than words and numbers. 
5.2.3 Categories of Disclosure 
In any content analysis, a precise classification and definition of disclosure categories 
is required (KassaIjian, 1977; Krippendorff, 1980). The development of explicit 
decision rules relating to each category is necessary in order to ensure mutually 
exclusive, exhaustive and independent categorisation of all derivatives related 
disclosures (Krippendorff, 1980; Gray et aI., 1995a; 1995b; Unerman, 2000). The 
categorisations need to possess "shared meanings" (Gray et aI., 1995b, p. 85) and the 
data collection and analysis must be capable of replication, in order to satisfy 
119 Information relating to the number of pages in each annual report was also noted. This information 
enabled a relative measure - the percentage of the annual report devoted to FRS 13 disclosure - to be 
used also. 
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Krippendorffs criterion for reliability. For these reasons, the definitions utilised with 
the FRS 13 accounting standard were employed. FRS 13 classifies the required 
disclosures into 11 categorisations. These categories were chosen as the basic 
structure for the content analysis, because it was thought that companies would be 
most likely to use this structure for their reporting practice. In addition, the categories 
were 'externally determined' by the ASB and should thus provide an objective basis 
for the analysis. One categorisation used in the standard "Disclosures about financial 
assets and financial liabilities held or issued for trading" was excluded from the 
content analysis, because this categorisation was more likely to be relevant for 
financial companies that had been omitted from the present study. This selection 
procedure resulted in 10 categories: Objectives, Policies & Strategies; Interest Rate 
Risk; Currency Risk; Liquidity Risk; Fair Values; Financial Instruments for which 
Hedge Accounting is Used; Certain Commodity Contracts; Market Price Risk; 
Accounting Policies; and General Other. Further breakdown of the items to be 
included under the 10 broad category headings mentioned in the standard was 
determined partly by the classifications included within the standard and partly 
through an iterative process facilitated by the pilot analysis. The resulting detailed 
decision rules are presented in Appendix 5.2. Examples of typical disclosures 
provided under FRS 13 are provided in Appendix 5.3. 
A further classification was undertaken based on the type of disclosure provided by 
the companies. The first additional classification concerned the nature of such 
disclosures - narrative or numerical - as this division was employed in the standard. 
The second concerned whether the disclosures were 'auditable'; if given access to the 
organisation, would it be possible for an external party to confirm the statements. This 
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classification had been used in previous content analysis studies (Gray et ai., 1995a; 
1995b). Third, a 'news' categorisation was initially used to classify the reported 
information into 'good' 'bad' and 'neutral' data types. However, as the vast majority 
of the information reported was in compliance with the standard and fairly uniform in 
terms of its content, the 'auditable' and 'news' categorisations were considered less 
relevant and were thus excluded from the subsequent analysis. Fourth, the location of 
the disclosure within the annual report was noted 120. A memo field was included to 
note any additional information or to documents any disclosures of particular note. 
5.2.4 FRS 13 Data Coding 
During the pre-analysis stage the student and her two supervIsors coded the pre-
analysis sample of annual reports and differences were noted and reconciled. Some 
refinement of the decision rules was necessary in light of the disclosures by 
companies in the pre-analysis sample. Such adjustments were needed to categorise 
disclosures where an overlap of categories was found, or to clarify coders' decisions. 
When agreement between coders was above 90 per cent, the main content analysis 
beganI21 ,122. 
All of the 420 (210 pre- and post-FRS 13) annual reports were then coded according 
to the detailed decision rules devised in the pre-analysis stage. A clear acetate 
template divided into one hundredths of a page (25 rows of equal height and 4 
120 For the purposed of determining location, the following categorisations were used: Chairman's 
Statement (CS), the Operating and Financial Review or equivalent (OFR), the Corporate Governance 
statements (CG), the Directors Report (DR), the Financial Statements (FS), Notes to the Accounts 
(NAC) and Other (0). This information was not utilised within the present study because no significant 
differences arose from the analysis. 
121 This agreement was calculated on the basis of agreement across the 70 or so categories identified in 
the decision rules presented in Appendix 5.2. 
122 Kassarjian (1977) advocated that intercoder reliability of less than 80 per cent should be treated with 
suspicion. 
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colunlns of equal width) was used to measure disclosure amounts (Appendix 5.4). The 
volume was recorded as the number of cells on the grid taken up by the relevant 
disclosure with any blank sections of a page being counted as part of the 
. t· 123 F h I h . communlca Ion . or eac annua report, t e amount of dIsclosure devoted to all 
categories detailed in the decision rules was noted on the specially-designed record 
sheet (Appendix 5.5). The contents of the record sheets were then transferred to an 
Excel spreadsheet in order to permit subsequent analysis and to facilitate statistical 
manipUlation. This statistical analysis was conducted using Minitab and SPSS. Some 
background data concerning market listing and industry sectors on all the companies 
included in the content analysis was collected in order to test for relationships 
between this information and the amount of FRS 13 related disclosures l24. 
5.3 Results 
This section reports on the results of the content analysis of FRS 13 related 
disclosures contained in corporate annual reports. Results for the entire sample are 
reported, followed by a breakdown of the results based on market type and industry 
sector. Finally, the results of an Analysis of Variance which was conducted in order to 
determine which factors might explain the increase in derivatives disclosure post-FRS 
13 implementation are reported. 
5.3.1 Results for the Total Sample 
123 This was in accordance with Gray et al. (l995b) who argued that blank parts of a page were chosen 
as part of design layout and were thus part of the communicative process. Further, additional nOD-
related information could have been included in the blank space, but such choices were not exercised. 
124 This information was collected from FTSE and Datastream sources. 
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Table 5.1: Total Sample - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure 
Panel A - Means and Standard Deviations 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives. Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Mean 
0.4530 
0.2584 
0.0955 
0.3358 
0.1120 
0.0549 
0.0176 
0.0180 
0.1209 
0.0047 
1.4710 
SD 
0.5975 
0.4563 
0.1987 
0.3305 
0.2465 
0.1110 
0.1114 
0.1184 
0.2337 
0.0385 
1.7080 
Mean 
0.7870 
0.6182 
0.2466 
0.5093 
0.2911 
0.2071 
0.0176 
0.0210 
0.2576 
0.0118 
2.9700 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.2200 0.6600 
0.0800 0.5200 
0.0000 0.1800 
0.2400 0.4400 
0.0000 0.2400 
0.0400 0.0400 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0400 0.1700 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.7600 2.5600 
SD 
0.6546 
0.5511 
0.2741 
0.3951 
0.3082 
0.2836 
0.1114 
0.1314 
0.3666 
0.0887 
2.1680 
in Means 
0.3340 
0.3598 
0.1510 
0.1735 
0.1791 
0.1523 
0.0000 
0.0030 
0.1367 
0.0071 
1.4990 
Difference 
0.4400 
0.4400 
0.1800 
0.2000 
0.2400 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1300 
0.0000 
1.8000 
Table 5.2: Total Sample - Percentage of Annual Report 
Panel A - Means and Standard Deviations 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 (%) Post FRS 13 (%) Difference 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Mean 
0.6110 
0.3631 
0.1241 
0.5962 
0.1293 
0.0846 
0.0222 
0.0180 
0.1703 
0.0052 
2.1240 
SD 
0.6945 
0.5616 
0.2483 
0.5645 
0.2701 
0.1564 
0.1403 
0.1068 
0.2590 
0.0428 
1.8440 
Mean 
1.1930 
0.9193 
0.3902 
0.8470 
0.4157 
0.2825 
0.0232 
0.0199 
0.3698 
0.0143 
4.4790 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.4316 1.1528 
0.1524 0.8904 
0.0000 0.2500 
0.4795 0.7071 
0.0000 0.3636 
0.0571 0.1250 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1081 0.3092 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.6182 4.5670 
SD 
0.7834 
0.7166 
0.4462 
0.6396 
0.4372 
0.3506 
0.1533 
0.1047 
0.3685 
0.1018 
2.2790 
in Means 
0.5821 
0.5562 
0.2661 
0.2509 
0.2864 
0.1979 
0.0010 
0.0019 
0.1994 
0.0091 
2.3550 
Difference 
0.7212 
0.7380 
0.2500 
0.2276 
0.3636 
0.0679 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2011 
0.0000 
2.4628 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.4780 
0.0000 
0.1520 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.9305 
0.0000 
0.5573 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.5190 
0.6940 
0.0000 
0.1150 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.9305 
0.0000 
0.5549 
0.0000 
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Figure 5.1: Total Sample - Mean Number of pages of FRS 13 Disclosure 
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Figure 5.2: Total Sample - Mean Percentage of Annual Report 
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Columns two and four of Table 5.1 and columns two and three of Table 5.2 show the 
mean disclosure for 10 different categories both before and after the introduction of 
FRS 13. Columns three and five of Table 5.1 present the standard deviations from 
these nleans for the ten categories of disclosure. The final two columns of both tables 
display the difference in the quantity of disclosure and the p-value, which tests the 
null hypothesis that the average difference in disclosure is zero. Each table has two 
panels where the first shows the mean values, while the second displays the median 
figures 125. Disclosure was measured in two different ways: the number of pages were 
counted and reported in Table 5.1, while the percentage of the annual report was 
employed in Table 5.2; the disclosure numbers in Table 5.2 were expressed relative to 
the overall size of the annual report. Further, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 display the 
mean pre and post FRS 13 disclosure levels by means of the number of pages and the 
relative proportion of the annual report concerned with this information respectively. 
A number of points emerge from a visual inspection of Tables 5.1 and 5.2. First, the 
actual volume of disclosure on the usage of derivatives in financial statements is 
relatively small. The mean (median) number of pages was only 1.4710 (0.7600) in 
1998, before the standard became mandatory. In addition, the mean (median) 
percentage of the annual report devoted to this topic was 2.1240 per cent (1.6182 per 
cent) in the same year. Second, the introduction of FRS 13 was associated with an 
125 The median figures were calculated in addition to the means because of evidence of non-normality 
in the disclosure data. Specifically, Anderson-Darling statistics of 14.310, 6.370, 3.395 and 0.751 were 
obtained when testing the normality of pre-disclosure number of pages, pre-disclosure percentage of 
annual report, post-disclosure number of pages and post-disclosure percentage of annual report 
respectively. In each case the null hypothesis of a normal distribution was rejected at the 5% level. 
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increase in the total disclosure of risk-related information 126, 127. The total number of 
pages devoted to such information doubled from a mean of 1.4710 to a mean of 
2.9700. The average difference of 1.4990 was significant at the 5 per cent level since 
the p-value was less than 0.05. Thus, one of the aims of the standard setters seems to 
have been achieved as users of annual reports were supplied with more information 
about companies usage of derivative products. 
Third, this increase in the total disclosure was spread across all ten sub-categories. 
However, the size of the increase varied from one category to another. The increase 
was largest for the 'Objectives, Policies & Strategies' and 'Interest Rate Risk' 
categories (0.3340 and 0.3598 respectively) and smallest for the 'Certain Commodity 
Contracts' and the 'Market Price Risk' categories (0.0000 and 0.0030 respectively). 
Fourth, for seven of the ten sub-categories the level of disclosure was greatly 
enhanced after the standard became mandatory; these seven sub-categories have 
differences in the mean number of pages of disclosures with p-values of less than 
0.05. The exceptions to this generalisation are 'Certain Commodity Contracts', 
'Market Price Risk' and 'General Other', where the null hypothesis that the mean 
difference was equal to zero could not be rejected at the 5 per cent level. Interestingly, 
these three categories have the lowest levels of disclosure across the different 
groupings. This trend is easily identifiable in Figure 5.1 and in Figure 5.2. 
126 This was also true at the individual company level where only 20 of the sample companies 
experienced a decrease in absolute disclosure following the introduction of FRS 13. The average 
reduction in FRS 13 disclosure for these 20 companies was found to be 0.40 of a page (Appendix 5.6). 
The company with the biggest reduction in derivatives related disclosure was Cadbury Schweppes who 
devoted 11.08 pages to the topic in their 1998 annual report, while in 1999 this disclosure was reduced 
to 8.80 pages. From Appendix 5.7, we can see that 1.30 of this reduction was attributable to a decrease 
in the amount of space devoted to Interest Rate Risk information, while 0.50 related to a reduction in 
the amount of Currency Risk information provided. 
127 Disclosure was also divided into narrative and numerical information as per the FRS 13 standard. 
This breakdown is provided for all companies post FRS 13 implementation in Appendix 5.8. 
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Fifth, the median results in Panel B of Table 5.1 confirm the mean findings of Panel 
A. Although, the median total disclosure before FRS 13 was only about 50 per cent of 
the mean figure, the post-FRS 13 numbers were more similar128• Again, the p-values 
for the Mann-Whitney test that the median differences were zero could be rejected for 
seven of the ten sub-categories. This finding suggests that there was a good deal of 
variability in disclosure across companies before the standard, with the mean value 
being pulled up by a few companies which published relatively large quantities of 
information about derivatives usage. For example, before the standard, some 
companies were big disclosers (Cadbury Schweppes with 11.08 pages and ICI with 
7.62 pages)129. In fact these two companies accounted for 6 per cent of all derivatives-
related information published for the sample firms prior to the introduction of FRS 13. 
After the standard, this variability in disclosure may have been reduced since the 
mean and median figures are fairly similar. For example, the two companies with the 
largest mean number of pages, following the introduction of the standard, were 
EMAP and BHP Billiton, who had 9.68 and 9.30 pages devoted to FRS 13 related 
disclosure respectively. Sixth, the analysis in Table 5.2 supports the investigation 
findings in Table 5.1. Therefore, irrespective of whether disclosure is measured in 
128 This result suggests that the level of disclosure before FRS 13 was skewed because of a small 
number of high disclosers, resulting in a sizeable gap between the mean and median figures. After the 
adoption of FRS 13 however, publication of information about derivatives seems to have been more 
unifonn with the two summary measures yielding similar numbers. 
129 See Appendix 5.9 for details of the total disclosure for all sample companies before and after the 
introduction of FRS 13. 
160 
absolute terms (using the number of pages) or in relative terms (as a percentage of the 
annual report) the impact of FRS 13 was both sizeable and statistically significant. 
5.3.2 Analysis by Market Type 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
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Table 5.3: Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure - Analysis by Market Type 
Panel A - Means 
FTSE 100 FTSE Other 
Pre Post Difference P-Value Pre Post Difference P-Value Pre 
FRS 13 FRS 13 FRS 13 FRS 13 FRS 13 
0.9958 1.3411 0.3453 0.0000 0.2187 0.5874 0.3687 0.0000 0.0151 
0.5559 1.0392 0.4833 0.0000 0.1226 0.4518 0.3292 0.0000 0.0384 
0.2052 0.3334 0.1282 0.0000 0.0506 0.2356 0.1850 0.0000 0.0005 
0.4688 0.7181 0.2493 0.0000 0.2834 0.4320 0.1486 0.0000 0.2151 
0.2833 0.5510 0.2677 0.0000 0.0284 0.1874 0.1590 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0975 0.4099 0.3124 0.0000 0.0396 0.1286 0.0890 0.0000 0.0119 
0.0507 0.0605 0.0098 0.4510 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
0.0479 0.0542 0.0063 0.6080 0.0028 0.0046 0.0018 0.2090 0.0000 
0.2581 0.4805 0.2224 0.0000 0.0528 0.1595 0.1067 0.0000 0.0341 
0.0137 0.0301 0.0164 0.2430 0.0000 0.0028 0.0028 0.0700 0.0000 
2.9770 5.0160 2.0390 0.0000 0.7990 2.1900 1.3910 0.0000 0.3150 
Panel B - Medians 
FTSE 100 FTSE Other 
Pre Post Difference P-Value Pre Post Difference P-Value Pre 
FRS 13 FRS 13 FRS 13 FRS 13 FRS 13 
0.8400 1.1400 0.3000 0.0004 0.0800 0.5000 0.4200 0.0000 0.0000 
0.4400 1.0000 0.5600 0.0000 0.0400 0.4000 0.3600 0.0000 0.0400 
0.1200 0.2800 0.1600 0.0013 0.0000 0.2000 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.4000 0.7000 0.3000 0.0001 0.2400 0.3600 0.1200 0.0005 0.1200 
0.2000 0.5200 0.3200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0800 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0400 0.3200 0.2800 0.0000 0.0400 0.0400 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7692 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8152 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4225 0.0000 
0.1600 0.4000 0.2400 0.0000 0.0400 0.1200 0.0800 0.0000 0.0400 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3834 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
2.6400 4.7800 2.0400 0.0000 0.4800 1.9700 1.4900 0.0000 0.2000 
- ---
AIM 
Post Difference P-Value 
FRS 13 
0.2330 0.2179 0.0000 
0.2373 0.1989 0.0000 
0.1049 0.1044 0.0008 
0.3065 0.0914 0.0110 
0.0589 0.0589 0.0020 
0.0194 0.0075 0.2550 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
0.0827 0.0486 0.0010 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
1.0430 0.7280 0.0000 
--- -
AIM 
Post Difference P-Value 
FRS 13 
0.1600 0.1600 0.0000 
0.0800 0.0400 0.0016 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 
0.1600 0.0400 0.1781 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.7520 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
0.0400 0.0000 0.0115 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
0.7600 0.5600 0.0000 
Note: This table presents the disclosures in a1110 disclosure categories for the FTSE 100, FTSE Other and AIM companies respectively, before and after the introduction of 
FRS 13. 
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The sample was divided by market listing to discover whether there was any pattern 
in terms of the amount of disclosure in particular markets. Table 5.3 shows the 
disclosures in all 10 categories for the FTSE 100, FTSE Other and AIM companies 
respectively, before and after the introduction of FRS 13. Columns two and three 
within each box again provide the disclosure pre- and post-FRS 13 implementation. 
The fourth column for each box shows the difference in the quantity of disclosure, 
while the final column highlights the p-value, which tests the null hypothesis that the 
average difference in disclosure is zero. As with Tables 5.1 and 5.2, this table has two 
panels, where Panel A displays the mean values, while Panel B shows the median 
figures. Disclosure as measured by the number of pages is included here130. 
First, it seems that the introduction of FRS 13 was associated with an increase in the 
volume of derivatives-related disclosure across all markets. The number of pages 
devoted to FRS 13 related information rose from a mean (median) of 2.9770 (2.6400) 
to 5.0160 (4.7800) for FTSE 100 listed companies. For FTSE Other companies the 
number of pages increased from a mean (median) of 0.79990 (0.4800) to 2.1900 
(1.9700). This same pattern was noticeable for AIM listed companies where the mean 
(median) rose from 0.3150 (0.2000) to 1.0430 (0.7600). Second, the total mean and 
median disclosure pre- and post- the implementation of FRS 13 was larger for FTSE 
100 companies than for either FTSE Other or AIM listed companies. This is not 
surprising as the extant literature indicates that larger companies are more inclined to 
use complex derivatives, which would require additional disclosure (Berkman and 
Bradbury, 1996; Dunne et al., forthcoming). 
130 Disclosure as measured by the percentage of the total annual report is available in Appendix 5.10. 
An analysis of the data in this appendix revealed no differences with the information contained in Table 
5.3. 
163 
Third, in line with the results presented for the total sample, the increase in disclosure 
for the different markets was spread across all ten sub-categories. This increase was 
most pronounced for the 'Objectives, Policies & Strategies', 'Interest Rate Risk' 
'Hedge Accounting Used' sub-categories for FTSE 100 companies. For FTSE Other 
and AIM companies again the 'Objectives, Policies & Strategies' and the 'Interest 
Rate Risk' reflected the largest increases in disclosure pre- and post-FRS 13 
implementation, while the 'Hedge Accounting Used' subcategory reflected a much 
less pronounced increase in disclosure. Fourth, the mean and median results reported 
in Panels A and B respectively both offer similar results which indicate that the 
average findings for the data are not unduly influenced by a sizeable disclosure for 
anyone company. Finally, a similar breakdown by market type was conducted using 
the percentage of annual report devoted to FRS 13 disclosures (Appendix 5.9). This 
analysis confirms that irrespective of whether disclosure is measured in absolute 
terms (using the number of pages) or in relative terms (as a percentage of the total 
annual report), the impact of FRS 13 appears to be pronounced. 
5.3.3 Analysis by Sector 
A sectoral analysis was conducted to ascertain if there was a preponderance of large 
(or small) disclosers in particular sectors. The analysis by industries also facilitated a 
test of whether disclosure changes were more pronounced in some sectors rather than 
others. 
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Table 5.4: Total Disclosure by Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure 
Panel A - Means 
Sector Number of Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Companies 
Basic Industries 20 1.8580 2.7870 0.9290 0.0010 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 11 0.6000 2.4220 1.8220 0.0001 
Cyclical Services 80 1.1990 2.6840 1.4850 0.0000 
General Industrials 21 1.2900 2.9020 1.6120 0.0000 
Information Technology 18 0.4930 1.4840 0.9920 0.0000 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 25 2.4880 3.7390 1.2510 0.0000 
Non-Cyclical Services 10 2.2540 4.6580 2.4040 0.0010 
Resources 12 1.9460 3.8020 1.8560 0.0120 
Utilities 13 1.9340 4.1010 2.1670 0.0000 
Panel B - Medians 
Sector Number of Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Companies 
Basic Industries 20 1.0200 2.5100 1.4900 0.0961 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 11 0.4400 2.1200 1.6800 0.0006 
Cyclical Services 80 0.5600 2.4100 1.8500 0.0000 
General Industrials 21 0.7000 2.8600 2.1600 0.0011 
Information Technology 18 0.4200 1.5200 1.1000 0.0010 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 25 1.6400 3.3200 1.6800 0.0388 
Non-Cyclical Services 10 2.2800 4.7100 2.1000 0.0091 
Resources 12 0.7000 2.6500 1.9500 0.2364 
Utilities 13 1.7600 4.2600 2.5000 0.0003 
Note: This table shows the total disclosure for companies in the nine FTSE sector classification before 
and after the introduction of FRS 13. 
Table 5.4 displays the total disclosure for companies in nine FTSE 'economic groups' 
before and after the introduction of FRS 13 131 . Column two indicates the number of 
companies from each sector included in the content analysis sample. Columns three 
and four again provide the disclosure pre- and post-FRS 13 's implementation. The 
fifth column shows the difference in the quantity of disclosure, while the final column 
131 There are 10 'economic groups' in the FTSE Global Classification System. They comprise: (i) 
Resources (including Mining, Oil and Gas companies); (ii) Basic Industries (including Chemicals, 
Construction and Building Materials, Forestry and Paper, Steel and Other Materials companies); (iii) 
General Industrials (including Aerospace and Defence, Diversified Industrials, Electronic and 
Electrical Equipment, Engineering and Machinery companies); (iv) Cyclical Consumer Goods 
(including Automobiles and Parts, Household Goods and Textiles companies); (v) Non-Cyclical 
Consumer Goods (including Beverages, Food Producers and Processors, Health, Personal Care and 
Household Products, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Tobacco companies); (vi) Cyclical Services 
(including General Retailers, Leisure, Entertainment and Hotels, Media and Photography, Support 
Services and Transport companies); (vii) Non-Cyclical Services (including Food and Drug Retailers, 
Telecommunication Services); (viii) Utilities (including Electricity, Gas Distribution and Water 
companies); (ix) Financials (including Banks, Insurance, Life Assurance, Investment Companies, Real 
Estate, Speciality and Other Finance companies); and (x) Information Technology (including 
Information Technology Hardware, Software and Computer Services). Companies from the ninth 
category, Financials, were excluded from this analysis because of the differing requirements of FRS 13 
for these companies. 
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highlights the p-value, which tests the null hypothesis that the average difference in 
disclosure is zero. This table has two panels, where Panel A displays the mean values, 
while Panel B shows the median figures 132. 
A visual inspection of Table 5.4 reveals that the introduction of FRS 13 was 
associated with an increase in the volume of FRS 13-related disclosure across all 
sectors. The number of pages devoted to FRS 13 related information rose from a 
mean (median) of 2.2540 (2.2800) to 4.6580 (4.7100) for companies in the Non-
Cyclical Services sector (which includes Food and Drug retailers such as Tesco pIc 
and Telecommunication Services such as Vodafone Group pIc and so on). A similar 
pattern was noticeable for General Industrial companies (which comprises companies 
such as BAE Systems pIc and Associated Engineering pIc) and Utility firms (such as 
Scottish Power pIc and Thames Water pIc) where the mean (median) difference was 
1.612 (2.160) and 2.167 (2.500) respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, 
companies from the Basic Industries sector (which comprises Chemical companies 
such as leI pIc, and Steel companies such as Corus Group pIc) had the smallest 
increase in total disclosure in absolute terms, as measured by the mean pre- and post-
FRS 13 implementation, only rising by 0.9290. 
A study of the mean differences indicates that all were significant since the p-values 
were less than 0.0500 in each instance. An analysis of the median figures however, 
suggests that the changes for the Resources sector (which includes Mining companies 
such as Lonmin pIc and Oil and Gas companies such as BG Group pIc) and Basic 
Industries sectors may not have been significant. With both of these sectors, the 
132 Disclosure as measured by the number of pages is included here, while disclosure as measured by 
the percentage of the total annual report can be found in Appendix 5.11. 
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typical company would have been using large quantities of derivatives before the 
introduction of the standard and publishing information about this usage in advance of 
such disclosures becoming nlandatory. While, the mean difference may have been 
influenced by a small number of firms changing their disclosure patterns, the median 
figures are not affected by such 'outlier' observations. Finally, a similar breakdown 
by sector was conducted using the percentage of annual report devoted to FRS 13 
disclosures (Appendix 5.11). This analysis confirms that irrespective of whether 
disclosure is measured in absolute terms (using the number of pages) or in relative 
terms (as a percentage of the total annual report), the impact of FRS 13 appears to be 
pronounced. 
5.3.4 ANOV A Results 
An Analysis of Variance was conducted in order to determine which factors might 
explain the increase in derivatives disclosure post-FRS 13 implementation. 
Differenceijk = Uijk + ~ij (SECTORij) + {)ik (MARKETik) [5.1] 
where Differenceijk is the difference in the number of pages of disclosure on 
derivatives usage for company i in sector j (SECTORj) whose shares are traded on 
market k (MARKETk). The results of this exercise are presented in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Analysis of Variance Results 
Dependent Variable 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policy 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Sector 
F -Ratio P-Value 
1.48 0.165 
0.63 0.750 
2.67 0.008 
0.86 0.552 
1.75 0.088 
1.07 0.385 
2.36 0.019 
1.32 0.233 
1.40 0.199 
1.67 0.108 
1.41 0.192 
Market Type 
F-Ratio P-Value 
2.00 0.138 
4.58 0.011 
2.04 0.132 
2.68 0.071 
8.15 0.000 
21.34 0.000 
0.07 0.928 
0.07 0.932 
7.93 0.000 
0.49 0.612 
9.79 0.000 
R-Sq 
0.069 
0.074 
0.112 
0.076 
0.146 
0.229 
0.091 
0.052 
0.147 
0.072 
0.153 
Table 5.5 displays results of the analysis of variance technique. This technique 
attempts to explain the differences in disclosure pre and post FRS 13 implementation 
by means of sector or market type. Columns two and four indicate the F-Ratio. 
Columns three and five highlight the p-value, which tests the null hypothesis that the 
average difference in disclosure explained by each factor is zero. The final column 
documents the R-Squared, which measures the goodness of fit of the model. 
A number of points emerge from a visual examination of Table 5.5. First, the model 
explains 15.3 per cent of variability in the difference of total disclosure before and 
after the introduction of FRS 13. However, market type is shown to be the only 
significant factor with a p-value of 0.000. Second, the R-Squared statistics for the 
individual categories of disclosure display substantial variability, ranging from 5.2 per 
cent (for disclosures relating to Market Price Risk) to 22.9 per cent (for disclosures 
relating to the use of Hedge Accounting techniques). For differences in disclosures 
about the use of Hedge Accounting techniques therefore, the two variables can 
explain just under a quarter of the variations in the amount of information published. 
Third, the sector in which a firm operates is found to be significant in explaining the 
differences in disclosure for two categories of information (Currency Risk and Certain 
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Comillodity Contracts), whereas market type is significant on four occaSIons 
(disclosures relating to Interest Rate Risk, Fair Values, the use of Hedge Accounting 
and Accounting Policies). One feature of these results is therefore, that sector and 
market type, successfully explain the variability in mutually exclusive sets of 
disclosure categories. Finally, total assets, total sales and market capitalisation were 
also used as explanatory variables in the development of the model, but were 
excluded as these were found to give similar results to those produced using market 
type 133 . One implication of this tendency is that market type may act as a proxy for 
firm size; this in turn may explain why, for example, Interest Rate Risk and the use of 
Hedge Accounting are strongly influenced by market type. 
5.4 Discussion and Limitations 
This chapter has examined the FRS 13-related disclosures made by 210 companies 
before and after the implementation of FRS 13 in March 1999. The results indicate 
that the implementation of FRS 13 was associated with a relatively large increase in 
derivatives-related information available in corporate annual reports. This association 
appears to hold irrespective of whether the actual number of pages of FRS 13-related 
information disclosed, or the relative measure of the percentage of the annual report 
containing FRS 13 information are used. The doubling of derivatives related 
information reported in this study probably understates the true rise in disclosure as 
several firms increased their derivative information content in the run-up to the 
implementation of FRS 13. This understatement is recognised as a limitation of the 
133 Specifically, a Principal Components Analysis was applied to the lagged values of the three 
variables of market value, total assets and total sales for all the companies in the sample and one 
component with an eigenvalue of 2.8346 explained 94.5 per cent of the variations in the three 
measures. When this principal component was introduced as a covariate into the General Linear Model 
outlined in equation [5.1] multicollinearity arose with the parameters for SIZE and MARKET being 
poorly determined with bigger standard errors leading to large p-values. 
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present analysis. Not surprisingly, the largest disclosers are FTSE 100 listed 
companies. The industry grouping with the biggest average disclosure comprised 
companies from the Non-Cyclical Services. Thus, the implementation of FRS 13 has 
had a significant impact on the content of annual reports, although the scale of its 
impact has varied across companies. This additional disclosure may have provided 
stakeholders with useful information about these companies. If one accepts the 
argument that the amounts of space devoted to a particular issue was indicative of 
importance to management (Krippendorff, 1980; Gray et aI., 1995b; Milne and Adler, 
1999), then the increased disclosures provided by FRS 13 could be viewed as a 
welcome improvement in the discharging of corporate accountability. The increased 
financial transparency afforded by the disclosures should advance the cause of overall 
accountability. 
However, it should be noted that the use of content analysis does have some 
disadvantages. Difficulties associated with content analysis are frequently based on 
the questions asked and source materials available (Carney, 1971). However, the 
choice of the annual report as the medium of analysis, adds a degree of comparability 
across companies, because of the similar layout, design and content of these 
documents. Choice of categories is often a tricky business in content analysis (Carney, 
1971). However, in the present case, this was less of a problem, because the standard 
was explicit in terms of the categories of disclosure required, and this structure was 
adopted for the content analysis. It is acknowledged that qualitative assessment is 
always somewhat subjective, but the reporting of both category and intercoder 
reliability should provide some measure of comfort to the reader. 
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Content analysis is frequently accused of being quite susceptible to the effects of 
researcher biases, which in tum, can affect decisions made in the collection, analysis 
and interpretation of data; the existence of these biases can affect a study's 
contribution to knowledge (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). The presence of appropriate, 
reliable, valid and accurate coding scheme that guides coders through the analysis of 
content and the use of multiple coders helped to reduce this bias. In addition, the 
usage of external categories, which were identified in FRS 13, possibly reduced the 
impact of this linlitation. Therefore, the confidence in the findings that FRS 13 
achieved its aim about increasing disclosure of derivative related information is high. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the derivatives-related disclosures made by 210 companies 
before and after the implementation of FRS 13 in March 1999. The results indicate 
that the implementation of FRS 13 had a significant impact on the content of annual 
reports, with a doubling of derivatives-related information provided in corporate 
annual reports following the implementation of the standard. This finding probably 
understates the true rise in disclosure as several firms increased their derivative 
information content prior to the introduction of FRS 13. The scale of the impact of the 
disclosure standard varied across companies, however, larger companies were found 
to be greater disclosers of derivatives-related information. The increase in financial 
transparency provided by the FRS 13 disclosures should enhance overall corporate 
governance and accountability. 
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Chapter 6 will examine the application of FRS 13 from the perspective of those 
required to prepare the information necessary under the standard. The attitudes of UK 
treasury department staff towards the introduction of FRS 13, as well as the impact of 
the standard on corporate treasury operations will be examined. Chapter 7 will 
examine the impact of FRS 13 on the users of corporate financial statements. This 
will be facilitated by means of a series on interviews with large institutional investors 
in order to ascertain their general attitudes towards treasury management and 
derivatives usage since the introduction of FRS 13. The implications for corporate 
governance practices and procedures following the introduction of FRS 13 will also 
be examined. 
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Chapter 6 
FRS 13: A Treasury Perspective 
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CHAPTER 6 - FRS 13: A Treasury Perspective 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact that the implementation of FRS 13 has had on the 
preparers of annual reports, both in terms of obtaining and formatting data for the 
Financial Statements, as well as reviewing, in general, the changes that have been 
required to daily treasury management practices and procedures. In particular an 
intervie\\' survey is used to investigate: (i) the attitudes of UK treasury department 
staff to\vards the introduction of FRS 13; (ii) whether the introduction of FRS 13 has 
had any implications for hedging activities; and (iii) the impact that other accounting 
standards may have on corporate treasury operations. 
6.2 Interview Survey Method 
This section outlines the use of in-depth interviews as the second research method 
employed in this study. In order to assess the impact of FRS 13 on treasury practice, 
15 semi-structured interviews were conducted with treasury department staff in large 
UK companies over a three-month period from May 2001 to July 2001. All of these 
interviewees were heavily involved in the treasury functions within their respective 
firms. Two further semi-structured interviews were conducted with company 
advisors. The decision to interview treasury personnel rather than other company 
representatives was based on the researcher's perception that these individuals were 
most affected by the standard. The vast majority of the commentary reported at the 
time of the standard reflected the fact that treasury personnel were likely to have been 
most affected by the standard and its implications. They were considered to most 
likely to have been preparing the information for disclosure. It is acknowledged that 
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differing perspectives on the implementation of FRS 13 may have been gained by 
interviewing other corporate representatives. For example, a more strategic overview 
on the implementation of the standard from a corporate viewpoint may have been 
gained from interviewing Financial Directors or Chief Executives. 
The use of a semi-structured interview technique imposed some formality on the 
interview proceedings in terms of providing a list of topics to be discussed at all of the 
interviews in order to ensure consistency and to allow for cross-interview 
comparisons. The use of the semi-structured technique also provided flexibility in 
terms of allowing the interviewees to elaborate on points of particular interest. 
The interviews generally lasted for between one hour and one hour and thirty minutes. 
The nature of the research project was outlined at the commencement of the interview 
and confidentiality was guaranteed. A request to tape the interview in order to 
enhance the accuracy of the recording of the conversation was made and all but one 
individual agreed to this. Detailed notes were also taken to provide additional backup 
to the taped conversations and to note key points and issues which the researcher 
wished to return to at a later stage (Patton, 1990). These notes were written up 
immediately together with the researcher's general observations regarding the 
interview. The 16 tape-recorded interviews were subsequently transcribed 134. A grid 
was created in Microsoft Excel to aid in the analysis of the interviews. The question 
numbers were noted in different columns while the interviewees were listed in 
different rows. The distilled answer to each question was noted in all the cells for 
every interviewee. This process facilitated an aggregation of answers in order to 
134 The 1 i h interview was not recorded so transcribing was not necessary. 
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assess overall reactions to particular issues. Representative quotations were noted and 
reported in Section 6.3 135 . 
The questions used concerned the impact of FRS 13 on treasury department activities 
both in terms of collating the information necessary to make the required disclosures 
and the impact on firms' hedging activities. The issues included in the interview were 
partially shaped by a review of the literature relating to derivatives usage and 
reporting practices (Chapter 2). Detailed discussions with supervisors and research 
colleagues also influenced the questions to be asked. The interview itself was divided 
up into sections covering the following broad themes: data collection, the reporting 
standard, the impact on treasury practice, FAS 133/138 and lAS 39, and finally the 
impact of FRS 13 on corporate governance and accountability issues136. 
135 Reported quotations came from taped interviews. Although quotations from non-taped interviews 
were not reported, distilled answers these interviews were also included in the an.alysis. . . 
136 Appendix 6.1 provides a list of the questions asked to the preparers of financla~ statements .. This .hst 
is by no means exhaustive, but provided a basis for discussions. The use of a semI-structured mtervlew 
technique allowed follow-up questions to be asked and areas of particular interest to be explored. 
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Table 6.1: Profile of the Treasury Interviewees 
Treasurer Location Sector Market Listing Job Description 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
N 
a 
Advisor 
P 
Q 
London 
London 
London 
London 
Scotland 
Midlands 
London 
Scotland 
Scotland 
London 
London 
South East 
London 
London 
Midlands 
Real Estate 
Media & Photography 
Health 
Support Services 
Transport 
Food Producers & Processors 
Leisure, Entertainment & 
Hotels 
Beverages 
Electricity 
Health 
Media & Photography 
Tobacco 
Tobacco 
Chemicals 
Construction & Building 
Materials 
Organisation 
Accounting Firm 
Industry Body 
FTSE Other 
FTSE Other 
FTSE Other 
FTSE Other 
FTSE 100 
FTSE Other 
FTSE 100 
FTSE 100 
FTSE 100 
FTSE Other 
FTSE 100 
FTSE Other 
FTSE 100 
FTSE 100 
FTSE Other 
Finance Director 
Group Treasurer 
Group Treasurer 
Treasurer 
Group Treasurer 
Group Treasurer 
Director of Treasury 
Deputy Group 
Treasurer 
Group Treasurer 
Finance Manager 
Group Treasurer 
Group Treasurer 
Group Treasurer 
Group Risk Manager 
Group Treasurer 
Notes: Sectors are based on FTSE categories. Market listing refers to the fIrm's listing at the time of 
the introduction of FRS 13. 
6.3 Interview Survey Results 
This section reports on the results of 17 interviews with treasury department staff and 
advisors (Table 6.1). These interviewees were drawn from a wide number of sectors 
and worked in a good geographical spread of firms. The companies varied in size 
although their job descriptions were relatively uniform. It was hoped that this mix of 
interviewees would provide a broad cross-section of views on the issues raised. The 
results are divided into the following broad themes: data collection, the reporting 
standard, the impact on treasury practice, FAS 133/138 and IAS 39, and finally the 
impact of FRS 13 for corporate governance and accountability. 
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6.3.1 Data Collection 
The first part of the interview covered the processes and procedures involved in 
collating the information required by FRS 13. Three-quarters of the interviewees 
indicated that they waited until FRS 13 became mandatory in March 1999 to adopt the 
standard. Nevertheless, many pointed out that some procedures and mechanisms had 
been put in place prior to this date. The early adopters indicated that they regarded the 
early adoption as a 'trial run', allowing them to iron out potential difficulties in their 
information processes and reporting operations. 
All of the companies in the sample stated that the treasury department staff had been 
responsible for collating the data, while 11 indicated that finance/financial accounts 
departments were also involved in the process. Most of the interviewees explained 
that one particular individual had been assigned to collect the information (typically 
the treasurer) although some indicated involvement from other functional areas (e.g. 
the financial controller). Thirteen of the interviewees stated that the information 
tended to be collected at a single point in time (typically the year-end) rather than on a 
rolling basis throughout the year. 
Twelve of the treasury department staff interviewed indicated that the information 
required was not new and it frequently formed part of the internal reporting practices 
of the firms. These firms suggested that the data typically required reformatting or re-
analysing in order to meet reporting requirements. Two treasurers pointed out that the 
fair value information required by the standard was new. When asked whether the 
additional data was used for other purposes, 11 of the interviewees indicated that the 
information was there purely to meet FRS 13 requirements; however, Treasurer A 
178 
indicated that "nothing is ever purely there to meet the standard". Treasurer D 
indicated that the additional disclosures required by FRS 13 afforded them the 
opportunity to collect data that was not previously collated, resulting in the creation of 
a database of subsidiaries' banks, which they considered to be potentially useful. 
However, Interviewee H stated that his company's treasury decision making was "not 
driven by this reporting". and claimed that his firm did not "use any of this 
information". Treasurer N noted that they did not use the information provided by the 
FRS 13 disclosures for other purposes at present. He claimed that although the 
company had plenty of expertise to use the information, their treasury systems were 
not adequate at present to allow greater use of the information. He stated that he was 
"itching" to get his hands on the system and that the extra information would help his 
department "to understand what is happening with regard to our book of debt and 
derivatives". 
Thirteen of the interviewees indicated that it was very straightforward to obtain the 
additional data required by FRS 13. However, Treasurer N highlighted that ensuring 
all the information was correct was a "lengthy" and "frustrating process". Treasurer F 
stated that his organisation had difficulty obtaining bank information: 
"The hassle seems to relate to the banks being really reluctant to provide the 
information ... one of them required an indemnity ... the other has qualified 
the information ... and another ... (required) a formal request in writing." 
Two of the interviewees envisaged that the gathering of the information would 
become more onerous in future years, particularly with the introduction of FAS 133 
and lAS 39. None of the interviewees indicated that they had needed to build or 
acquire new systems in order to comply with FRS 13, and most stated that the 
creation of a new spreadsheet was all that had been required. Most of the treasurers 
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claimed that they had not been charged for the fair value information from their 
banks, and as most had business information systems such as Reuters and Bloomberg 
already in place, they did not incur any additional related costs. One significant 
expense was the Inanagement tinle involved in collecting the data. Although, this was 
minimal for some companies, it was more time-consuming for others, with Treasurer 
L describing the process as "like I was being sent to jail for a week; it was like a 
penance. " 
Another cost mentioned by interviewees related increased audit fees. Treasurer K 
indicated that "there must be some element of cost reflected in the audit fee". 
Treasurer E claimed that the additional disclosure increased the profile of the treasury 
department. He added that the auditors "are probably making lots of money out of it". 
6.3.2 The Reporting Standard 
This section of the interview concerned the interviewees' perception of FRS 13. 
Views were again mixed amongst the interviewees when asked about the clarity of 
FRS 13. Treasurer B was particularly vociferous claiming that the lack of clarity in 
FRS 13 was "the nub of the problem". He claimed that as FRS 13 did not make it 
clear how to account for derivatives, detailed reporting of such instruments would not 
help improve financial accountability. Treasurer I indicated that he "got the 
impression that the standard setters weren't fully clear what they were asking (for)". 
Other interviewees, although less vocal, did have some initial confusion at the level of 
detail required. The most common problem identified by the interviewees was with 
respect to the table of unrecognised gains and losses - one of the numerical 
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disclosures, required by FRS 13. Treasurer L described this table as "the biggest load 
of codswallop I have ever seen." He added that 
"The entire table is difficult ... we invented our own table in the end because 
we couldn't agree with the table ... it just doesn't work ... I spent ages 
looking at it, trying to work out how should I do this, and in the end you corne 
up with a fudge, which sort of gives you what you think they are trying to get 
at ... it was a nightmare, an absolute nightmare." 
Treasurer L stated that the appendices to FRS 13 were "not worth the paper they are 
written on". However, two companies had made use of the examples included in the 
appendix to the standard and found that this had aided their interpretation. 
Half of the interviewees sought some outside assistance on the interpretation of FRS 
13. This assistance typically carne from the organisations' auditors, usually in the 
form of a disclosure checklist and involved "ratification from the auditors that they 
were happy with it" (Treasurer G). Several companies presented their auditors with 
the planned disclosures and asked for opinions on inclusions and formatting. Those 
who did not engage external assistance tended to consult other annual reports and 
look for best practice. Treasurer E noted that "you will find some very cornmon 
wording in the FRS 13 (disclosures)". Treasurer L saw "no point in asking anybody 
else - I was the so-called expert!" 
6.3.3 The Impact on Treasury Practice 
The next part of the interview dealt with the implications of FRS 13 for treasury 
practice. Thirteen of the interviewees indicated that they had not altered their hedging 
practices in any way following the adoption of FRS 13, with only two indicating some 
changes. Treasurer K claimed that he "took a pragmatic view" and that he had closed 
some contracts out as a result of having to prepare information for disclosure under 
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the standard. Treasurer L stated that his company was "less aggressIve now". 
Treasurer L indicated that his company had set up a Treasury Committee as a direct 
result of FRS 13; their auditors thought it would be a "good idea to have one". When 
questioned on the use of specific financial instruments such as options, caps, collars 
or floors, the interviewees who admitted usage, claimed that FRS 13 would not stop 
thenl, or make them think about, the use of such instruments. Treasurer J stated "the 
commercial requirements are over-riding", while Treasurer 0 claimed that "if you 
need to use derivatives to hedge a position, then the way you account for them 
wouldn't impact." 
The interviewees appeared to be divided with respect to their opinions on whether the 
information mandated under the standard allows them some degree of control over 
treasury activities. For example, Treasurer A indicated that: 
"If we didn't have to do it for FRS 13, we would probably still do it anyway, 
because it is useful to have; it is part of the whole monitoring process." 
Treasurer E, who felt that such information should have been within the remit of 
treasury departments anyway, reinforced this point; he claimed that such information 
"puts in place a discipline" and "focuses our minds a little bit". Treasurer L indicated 
that the information required under FRS 13 opened up the possibility for greater 
control, but "whether that control is exercised or not is probably a moot point". He 
added that "the control is (probably) not implemented" claiming that: 
"The interest from senior management and the board, to treasury's mark-to-
market valuation is typically very low." 
However, Treasurer B put forward a different view. He claimed that "the board 
generally have the solid ability to ask the right questions." Treasurer K also indicated 
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that his department "always disclosed treasury activity internally quite extensively" 
which meant "the directors and the non-executives and our reporting accountants are 
fully briefed on treasury activities, so they understand what is going on." Treasurer I 
stated that the board got: 
"a bit of a fright the first year, when we came up with a £81m unrecognised 
loss. but we were able to explain that it (the loss) is what you get when you fix 
your interest rates to make sure your interest charge is certain." 
When asked about the potential consequences of the new information that is now 
provided to users of the financial statements, the responses were again mixed. 
Treasurer A claimed that the information: 
"Provides people with the information to make an informed decision about 
what the real net asset value of the company is." 
Treasurer G indicated that bad decisions could potentially be highlighted but added: 
"I think there is some good information in the disclosures." 
Two of the interviewees expressed some mild concern about the impact of the 
standard on strategy and operations, citing Issues such as confidentiality and 
commercial sensitivity as potential consequences of the increased amount of 
information placed in the public domain. However, as Treasurer 0 highlighted 
"everybody is going to be in the same boat". Treasurer I stated that he had some 
initial reservations about the potential use of the information by counter-party banks. 
He had concerns that the banks would be able to glean information about what their 
competitor banks were doing from the company accounts. However, the treasury 
department came to the decision that due to the large numbers of contracts undertaken 
by this particular company, counter-parties would have difficulty splitting deals up. 
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The potential consequences of the fair value and hedge accounting information were a 
cause for concern. Treasurer E argued that this information was not understandable 
and "pretty meaningless". This point was also mentioned by Treasurer J who 
indicated that: 
"I don't think it is all that useful to both competitors or to investors ... I'm not 
sure to what extent they will use it frankly." 
Treasurer L indicated that: 
"Even though there is this much disclosure, it still can be quite hard to know 
exactly what is going on." 
Mixed reactions were again received when the interviewees were asked for their 
overall impressions of FRS 13. Treasurer A indicated that "it was fine '" it is 
information that ought to be readily available, if you are managing your business you 
ought to know it." Treasurer G was in agreement and stated: 
"I actually quite like it ... I can understand the information that is being 
disclosed. There is some good information in there." 
Treasurer J was a little more unsure but could see some merit in the standard: 
"I think there are bits of it that are very useful. I think its objective is very 
good ... but I think there is quite a lot of room for interpretation ... I think it is 
far more useful for a financial institution than it is for a company whose 
primary objective is not lending or other financial activities." 
Other positive benefits of FRS 13 mentioned by the interviewees included the 
provision of a more formal framework and the concentration of thoughts. Treasurer K 
stated that "something needed to be done on treasury disclosure and treasury 
accounting" but FRS 13 was "about as far as it should go". Treasurer I indicated that 
the disclosure was useful internally within the treasury department; he added that it 
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"concentrates your thoughts" and provides a "framework that is more formal". 
Treasurer N noted that the disclosure provided a welcome focus for discussion with 
company management, he claimed that: 
HIt is much easier to have that discussion with them, than have some esoteric 
conversation about risk management" 
Several of the interviewees highlighted the positive benefits of the narrative 
disclosures, while condemning the numerical sections. Treasurer E stated that while 
"'the principle of the narrative section is very valid", he did not find "any value" in the 
numerical disclosures. The other main criticisms of FRS 13 related to its ease of 
understanding. The information provided under the standard was felt to be too 
complex for the average user of financial accounts. For example, Treasurer F felt that: 
"F or most corporates all it will do is muddy the waters ... the only people who 
would benefit from it is the sensible credit analyst in a bank possibly, and 
other treasurers ... for the average person, and I suspect an awful lot of 
shareholders, it is completely meaningless." 
Treasurer L agreed with this view stating that he could not imagine that the extra 
information would "make a difference to the investment decision." Further, Treasurer 
E commented that the standard afforded corporates the flexibility to be "very vague" 
about their derivatives' usage. 
6.3.4 FAS 133/138 and lAS 39 
Eleven of the companies interviewed were also subject to US reporting requirements, 
and all the companies would be subject to lAS 39 in 2005. Of those that complied 
with US regulations, many had the procedures in place to document their use of 
derivatives. Treasurer I indicated that F AS 133 had affected the derivatives looked at 
by his company: 
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"We haven't looked really at any complicated structures because of the 
problems for putting them through our primary statements, because the rules 
on hedge accounting are so strict. Any complicated structure is just a no-no as 
far as reporting is concerned. Economically, it might be the best thing since 
sliced-bread, but, the reporting constraints have stopped us doing quite a bit." 
F AS 133 was viewed by Treasurer C as being "off the wall" while Treasurer L 
claimed: 
"We just laugh at the US GAAP adjustment in the accounts ... we just put a 
number in, but we don't care if it is plus twenty or minus twenty, we just 
ignore it, it is a joke." 
Treasurer E claimed that "because it is not our primary reporting, we don't really 
care", \yhile Treasurer 0 described the standard as "terrifying" and Treasurer N stated 
that "it was an absolute and utter nightmare". He added that the problem would be 
highlighted only if a number of large US companies got into financial difficulties or 
reported huge losses because of the effects ofFAS 133. 
Treasurer F indicated that he was "not impressed" with IAS 39 claiming it would 
offer "an arbitrary valuation on an arbitrary date". Treasurer H suggested that IAS 39 
would result in companies making decisions about hedging based on the accounting 
implications rather than on economic reasoning. He added that in his opinion 
"common sense seems to have gone out the window". Treasurer J claimed "our time 
horizons are not that far ahead" when questioned on the proposed mandatory adoption 
ofIAS 39 by 2005. 
Treasurer I was in the minority, in preferring IAS 39 to FAS 133. He claimed that for 
his company, the main difference between the two standards was that IAS 39 
recognised foreign currency swaps as a hedging instrument, whereas FAS 133 did not. 
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This, he claimed, was because F AS 133 "was written by Americans for Americans, 
and they don't have foreign currency debt." 
When questioned on the adoption of hedge accounting there was agaIn a mixed 
response. Treasurer F stated that his firm was not planning any changes while 
Treasurer G claimed his company would adopt hedge accounting when they could. 
Meanwhile, Treasurer K took the view that his company was not going to use hedge 
accounting whatsoever, claiming they would "take it on the nose". Treasurer J agreed, 
stating that "I can't really see a point in time where we will adopt hedge accounting." 
Treasurer L indicated that the "allocation and matching of hedges" requirement would 
cause "great difficulty" and claimed that: 
"We have almost circumvented it in a way ... we haven't formally matched 
and we don't intend to for the time being." 
Treasurer L went on to describe the Joint Working Group proposals as "a bit of a 
nonsense" and claimed that: 
"It makes a nonsense of hedging in the first place, and if you are effectively 
putting the mark-to-market through (the Profit and Loss Account) as well ... 
the net effect may not be as large as if you had stayed variable ... it doesn't 
strike me as being particularly sensible." 
Treasurer D also criticised the JWG proposals. He claimed that putting everything 
through the Profit and Loss account would impact not only the Earnings Per Share, 
but would also have a negative effect on tax charges. Treasurer I was the only 
interviewee in favour of the JWG proposals. He claimed that the JWG proposal to 
abolish hedge accounting, so that "all financial instruments are carried at fair value" 
which he said was "arguably better" than the current situation. 
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6.3.5 The Impact of FRS 13 on Corporate Governance and Accountability 
Arguably, one of the main purposes of financial reporting standards is to provide 
information to stakeholders in a company, to improve governance processes and 
satisfy accountability requirements. The final section of the interviews therefore 
sought to illicit the views of treasury department staff on their potential role in 
corporate accountability and governance, and to ascertain whether or not FRS 13 was 
seen as an integral element of the corporate accountability process. Suggestions for 
possible improvements to future accounting standards as well as overall impressions 
of the standard were also ascertained. 
When questioned on the "usefulness" of the information required under FRS 13, the 
responses were very mixed. Treasurer A indicated that the fair value information 
provided by FRS 13 disclosures was an essential part of the investment decision-
making process. Treasurer L thought the FRS 13 disclosures were useful and that it 
was "nice to know what other people are doing". Treasurer C concluded that the 
point-in-time information provided by the standard was not useful to decision-makers 
and further added that accounting standards should not drive commercial 
requirements. Some interviewees thought that the narrative disclosures could provide 
potentially important information, but that the numerical disclosures were too 
complex to be of much use to all but the more sophisticated users. Treasurer E 
advocated the narrative section, but noted that although the numerical disclosures 
ought to be of interest to investors and analysts, they were probably not, due to their 
complexity. Treasurer N thought that the standard could be useful to "investors who 
understand it, because it gives them an idea about what financial risks the company is 
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incurring". Others felt that the information provided was only of use to banks and 
other financial institutions. 
Only three of the treasurers stated that they had been asked for further information 
about their FRS 13 disclosures. Treasurer A had discussed their disclosures with some 
banks and rating agencies. Treasurer K revealed that some banks had required further 
information on the interest rate position of the company since disclosing it in the 
annual report. Treasurer I indicated that his organisation had received a letter from an 
individual shareholder seeking clarification on some of the FRS 13 disclosures. Other 
interviewees indicated that they had expected further questioning of their disclosures 
by analysts and institutional investors, but that this had never happened. 
All of the interviewees indicated that they viewed accountability and governance, to 
some extent at least, as being their responsibility. For most, this accountability was 
assumed to be to the board, who in tum were seen as accountable to the providers of 
finance. As indicated by Treasurer F: 
"My accountability is to the board, I suppose ultimately it IS to the 
shareholders. " 
Treasurer A stated that: 
"Do I think we have huge accountability to Joe Public ifhe isn't a shareholder, 
probably not, because I don't think he is hugely relevant." 
For interviewee E, accountability was viewed as being purely a financial concept, and 
was defined only in terms of treasury management: 
"I am purely accountable for the financial impact of whatever treasury is 
doing, and treasury has the function of liquidity management, risk 
management and overall compliance." 
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However, another treasurer assumed that a wider notion of responsibility was 
necessary, if only for commercial reasons. Other interviewees took this wider notion 
of accountability and governance, for both treasury departments and the companies 
they represent, to mean the community as a whole. Treasurer H indicated that: 
"Accountability goes much beyond shareholders ... it goes to all the people 
who have an interface with the company." 
The interviewees were asked to define accountability. Again the responses were 
somewhat varied, although most chose to define accountability in purely financial 
tenns. Treasurer A defined his accountability as follows: 
"Our accountability to our shareholders is that they have entrusted us with 
their money, to actually make them money." 
However Treasurer A did acknowledge a wider responsibility to employees: 
"In terms of employees it is much more difficult because you have two sides 
to that, one, the issue of security and those sorts of issues, you have also got 
the good employment and providing good training, whether with us or 
someone else." 
Treasurer F viewed his responsibility as: 
"To manage the treasury function, to advise the board through the Financial 
Director or through the treasury committee on financial risk management, 
reducing the risks to the company ... and for ensuring the company has 
adequate liquidity." 
Treasurer G highlighted the public responsibility aspects of accountability: 
"As a company we have to be responsible for what we put into the public 
domain ... we do have to be accountable for what we do." 
The interviewees were asked if they perceived FRS 13 as having had any 
unanticipated consequences. For the vast majority of the interviewees the answer was 
"no". Treasurer F noted that the difficulties associated with the forecasting of likely 
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gains and losses had not been anticipated by him, while Treasurer I stated that he had 
not foreseen the time taken to prepare the information required by the standard. Many 
of the interviewees noted that FRS 13 had increased awareness of treasury issues 
within the overall finance function, with Treasurer L noting that "it has made the 
treasury audit much more grotesque, much more difficult". 
There were several potential benefits of FRS 13 outlined by the interviewees. 
Treasurer E indicated that the presence of FRS 13 added an extra level of governance. 
He noted that as the information was included in the statutory audit, the disclosures 
acted as an "added control mechanism". Treasurer F noted the benefits of FRS 13 
disclosures for internal company operations: 
"Internally ... it will improve our reporting and possibly our awareness of 
measuring the results of historic actions during a period, rather than 
necessarily just at the end." 
Treasurer I noted that FRS 13 helped to "concentrate minds" and provide more focus 
at both treasury and board level. The issue of greater awareness of financial 
instruments and indeed the role of the treasury function in general was cited as a 
possible benefit of FRS 13 by many of the interviewees. "Comparability" was another 
possible benefit of the standard noted by Treasurer L. Treasurer K stated that 
"something definitely needed to be done and I think disclosure was the right way". He 
added that: 
"People should not be frightened to disclose out in the open how they manage 
their risks and the sort of contracts they enter into". 
Interviewee N, who noted that the additional disclosure "increased the visibility of 
risks that the company was incurring", reiterated this point. However, Treasurer D 
failed to see any benefit to the standard. He noted that "it hasn't stopped what it was 
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intended to stop". He added, that in his opinion it added to the problems, due to its 
complexity. 
When questioned on possible amendments to the standard, two of the interviewees 
suggested that the standard should not have been written at all. Treasurer I noted that 
there was too much information for users of accounts and he remarked that it was 
"getting harder to hide things from auditors!" Treasurer 0 felt that a small and 
medium company exemption would have been appropriate. Treasurer B suggested 
that the standard needed a clearer definition of its area of concern. The issue of clarity 
was also raised by Treasurer E. He thought that the hedge accounting disclosures were 
not sufficiently clear and quite narrowly defined. Treasurer F again raised the issue of 
clarity, and also pointed to the need for more consistency particularly with respect to 
the different approach to quoted and unquoted fixed rate debt. Treasurer L took the 
opportunity to again mention his displeasure at the derivatives maturity table. 
Interviewee N expressed his dissatisfaction with accounting standards in general. He 
indicated that: 
"The more standards that are imposed upon business that they have to comply 
with, the more difficult it is going to become for investors to actually see the 
wheat from the chaff." 
6.3.6 The View of the Advisors 
Interviewee P was a representative from a large accountancy firm, who was 
frequently consulted by many clients for assistance on applying FRS 13. He provided 
details of his experience in this capacity, as well as some personal observations about 
accounting for derivatives and other financial instruments. 
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In Advisor P's experience, most companies waited until FRS 13 became mandatory to 
apply the standard. He indicated that treasury departments compiled most of the 
information required, particularly with respect to the narrative information. Advisor P 
indicated that the ease with which companies collated the necessary data required for 
compliance with FRS 13 varied enormously. Those companies that had a centralised 
treasury function, with adequate treasury policies and had an efficient mark-to-market 
system in place found the process to be relatively straightforward. In his experience, 
companies did not build or buy expensive new systems to deal with FRS 13 
compliance. Most made do with extra spreadsheets and some tailoring of existing 
systems. Some help was sought from financial accounting departments on the 
numerical disclosures. He stated that the "better companies" had done "dry runs" of 
the information needed for the standard before it became mandatory. Some of the 
companies found the additional information useful for other purposes, however the 
tables tended to be produced for purely compliance reasons. Advisor P thought that 
the extra information necessary under the standard facilitated an improvement in 
overall financial risk management in certain corporations. 
Advisor P provided some clients with advice and expertise in implementing the 
standard. He ran several seminars to keep clients abreast of all pertinent details on 
implementation. He acknowledged that the standard was "hard to understand". The 
two biggest difficulties that companies had were (i) the table of unrecognised gains 
and losses; and (ii) the net monetary assets table, both of which he described as 
"meaningless" . 
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Overall. he felt that the narrative disclosures provided as a result of the standard were 
"very very weak and boilerplate". He added that "everyone says the same thing." He 
indicated that although weak, the narrative could provide some potentially useful 
information to investors. He added that in his opinion, the numerical information 
would be less useful, because of its complexity. Advisor P argued that "for your 
average good corporate" FRS 13 would have little impact on hedging practices. He 
claimed that FRS 13 had little impact on the perception of using derivatives. He could 
not envisage any unanticipated consequences of FRS 13, either from the company 
point of view, or from the standard-setters viewpoint. 
Advisor P conducted a survey of clients' views about FRS 13. He indicated that his 
client companies were mostly concerned about issues relating to confidentiality and 
the potential difficulties associated with a non-centralised structure. However, some 
positive reactions were gleaned. The standard was viewed as forcing companies to 
clarify their derivative holdings and improve their decision-making and corporate 
governance practices and procedures. 
However, it was a different story for FAS 133 and lAS 39. Advisor P called FAS 133 
"the big one". He claimed that it had changed US corporate behaviour 
"tremendously" already. He added that to start changing the financial statements "that 
is when people step up and take notice". He noted that the reaction to date to lAS 39 
was less pronounced, but added that "when those kick in, that is when the big change 
will occur in the UK". He described the JWG project as being "counter-intuitive". 
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Advisor Q was an advisor in an industry body. She summarised the response of the 
industry association to accounting standards in general, and to the derivative 
accounting standards in particular, as her organisation had made representations to the 
ASB about FRS 13. Representations were traditionally made via letter or email, at the 
discussion paper stage in the standard setting process and the ASB normally did not 
respond to individual representations, except to acknowledge receipt. The industry 
body had not made representations to the FASB about FAS 133, or to the IASB about 
IAS 39, but Advisor Q indicated an on-going involvement with the JWG proposals. 
Advisor Q was generally in favour of FRS 13. She indicated that "transparency and 
the provision of information is something that we always support". However, she 
added that she felt that it was more appropriate to confine this information to the notes 
section of the accounts. She stated that a couple of technical enquiries about FRS 13 
implementation had been received from members. 
Advisor Q described IAS 39 as a "highly deficient standard". She was not aware of 
any company in the UK that had applied the standard, but added that the new 
standards were making extra work for accounting firms, and they therefore, were 
unlikely to object to them. 
Advisor Q considered the traditional purposes of accounting standards as "to keep the 
score". However, she argued that the recent attempts to tum accounts into what she 
termed "statements of value", was "misguided". She added that this was "an 
impossible objective" and that accounts would never be able to provide such 
information, because of the presence of so many "intangibles". She stated that FRS 13 
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was a perfect example of this change; people had little understanding of what the 
infonnation produced, or what the standard was about. She remarked that accounting 
standards were written for accountants by "accountants cum academics who have a 
very ivory-tower view of the world" 
6.4 Discussion 
The treasury department staff interviewed in this study indicated that most of the 
infonnation required by FRS 13 was already being produced internally as part of the 
management reporting process. Frequently, a re-analysis or refonnatting of the data 
was all that was needed for compliance with the standard. The collection of additional 
data was found, on the whole, to be a straightforward process. The companies 
interviewed were large multinationals and they were willing to acknowledge that the 
collating of the necessary infonnation was likely to be a more difficult process for 
smaller finns who perhaps did not produce such detailed infonnation as a matter of 
course. This may be especially so, as previous research indicates that larger finns use 
more derivative products (Bodnar et aI., 1995; 1996; 1998; Berkman and Bradbury, 
1996; Helliar, 1997; Dunne et aI., forthcoming). The interviewees indicated that 
although the infonnation produced for FRS 13 compliance was rarely used for other 
purposes now, it was found to be of value in tenns of providing a focus for treasury 
activities. It was also noted that FRS 13 provided a much-needed fonnal framework 
for treasury accounting and disclosures. 
One of the interviewees' main criticisms of FRS 13 was with respect to the clarity of 
the standard and the infonnation required for compliance; this finding is consistent 
with the analysis of Bircher (1999) who also points to a lack of clarity on the part of 
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FRS 13. Views on the lack of clarity were particularly pronounced with respect to the 
table showing unrecognised gains and losses, which was considered by the 
interviewees to be unclear and lacking purpose. The narrative and notes were found to 
be of more use, and the treasurers appeared generally comfortable with these 
disclosures. The interviewees indicated a great deal more concern with the potential 
impact ofFAS 133 and lAS 39, particularly with respect to fair value accounting. The 
fact that adjustments were made through the financial statements was highlighted as a 
potential difficulty. Treasurers' operational practices were considered to be more 
likely to change as a result of the international disclosure developments (De Marzo 
and Duffie, 1995; Di Paola and Cattoor, 2000). 
Another finding of note is that the presence of FRS 13 does not appear to have 
improved the firms' overall accountability or corporate governance. The views 
expressed with respect to accountability indicate that treasury departments appear to 
be concerned solely with the narrow financial aspects of accountability. The main 
focus was on satisfying the requests of board members with respect to the perceived 
needs of the providers of finance (Bebbington and Gray, 1993; Forbes and Watson, 
1993; Gamble and Kelly, 2001). The maximisation of shareholder wealth was of 
paramount importance (Friedman, 1970). Several interviewees viewed accountability 
as a limitation on their activities, in line with the Roberts (2001) notion of 
accountability as a constraint on the powerful. They only appeared to accept their 
responsibility to manage the financial resources entrusted to them by the shareholders 
and the need to account for their management of these resources (Tornqvist, 1999), 
thus echoing Stewart's (1984) "performance" and "programme" levels of 
accountability. A role was acknowledged for FRS 13 disclosures in terms of 
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providing an account of treasury practices and procedures to interested shareholders 
and board members (Broadbent et aI., 1996). However, the disclosures themselves 
were viewed as being too complex to be understood by anyone other than fellow 
treasury experts. 
FRS 13 was viewed as a mechanism for improving organisational control by means of 
proyiding more focus on treasury activities at board level, which could potentially, aid 
goyemance. Accounting disclosures were viewed as one means of expanding control 
within organisations (Hopwood, 1976; Otley, 1980; Ouchi, 1980; Birkett, 1988). The 
disclosures provided by FRS 13 were seen to have the power to influence board 
members perspectives on what was important and concentrate their thoughts on 
treasury activities (Burchell et aI., 1980; Hopwood, 1983; Camaghan et aI., 1996; 
Gallhofer and Haslam, 1996). The disclosures are also viewed as legitimating the 
actions of both treasury departments and corporate boards with respect to the usage of 
derivative financial instruments. Derivatives reporting was seen to allow the treasury 
and finance functions to exercise a greater degree of control over outcomes, thereby 
preventing recurrences of previous financial scandals (Roberts and Scapens, 1985; 
Dunne and Helliar, 2002; Helliar and Dunne, 2004). The philosophical and moral 
rights and responsibilities of additional stakeholders were rarely acknowledged (Gray 
et aI., 1996; Stanton, 1997). 
6.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The results of this chapter appear to indicate a lack of homogeneity with respect to the 
treasury interviewees' views on FRS 13. The treasurers had very different views both 
on the impact of FRS 13 for treasury activities and on the potential benefits or 
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otherwise from the introduction of the standard. However, most treasurers considered 
FRS 13 to be beneficial to stakeholders. They indicated that the implementation of the 
standard had not been too onerous and considered that most treasurers should have 
been preparing most of the data before the standard was introduced. Their views about 
F AS 133 and lAS 39 were not so positive; many of the interviewees were very 
unhappy about the potential impact that any future standard would have on their 
reported earnings and any likely disruptions to treasury operations and hedging 
activity. In general, the interviewees considered the narrative disclosures to be far 
more useful for users than the numerical disclosures for investors and other 
stakeholders. The views of investors as users of financial statements are examined in 
Chapter 7. 
Although several limitations have been noted with the use of the interview technique 
(Section 4.4.3.1) the analysis in this chapter has provided valuable insight into the 
perspectives of preparers regarding the issues associated with the introduction of a 
derivatives reporting standard. Such perspectives provide a useful accompaniment to 
the analysis of the changes the standard has visited on financial statements. The 
interview method tends to produce non-standard, context-dependent responses 
(Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Yin, 1994; Denscombe, 1998) and is heavily dependent on 
the interviewees' recollection of events (Yin, 1994). However, the use of a semi-
structured technique imposes some discipline on the process and ensures the same 
questions are asked to all interviewees. All of the interviewees were experts in their 
field so the technical questions asked did not pose much difficulty for them. The more 
abstract questions concerning issues associated with corporate governance and 
accountability were explained where difficulties were encountered. 
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Chapter 7 
FRS 13 and Corporate Governance - A Fund Management 
Perspective 
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Chapter 7 - FRS 13 and Corporate Governance: A Fund 
Management Perspective 
7.1 Introduction 
The ainl of this chapter is to examine the impact of FRS 13 on issues relating to 
corporate governance. Chapter 2 highlighted a number of corporate scandals that had 
occurred in the past few years relating to treasury and derivatives activities. The 
introduction of a Financial Reporting Standard that made treasury activities more 
transparent might have implications for corporate governance. In particular, it might 
result in large investors asking questions about treasury policy and procedures, 
thereby making management more accountable to their stakeholders. A series of 
interviews was therefore undertaken with large institutional investors to investigate 
\\"hether: (i) UK institutional investors' general attitudes towards treasury 
management and derivatives usage had changed since the introduction of FRS 13; and 
(ii) the introduction of FRS 13 had any implications for corporate governance 
practices and procedures. 
7.2 Interview Survey Method 
In order to assess the impact of FRS 13 on institutional investors' decision-making, 
fifteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with fourteen large institutional 
investors and one stockbroker over a seventeen-month period from November 2000 to 
March 2002 (See Table 7.1). All of the institutional investor interviewees were 
heavily involved in the corporate governance functions within their respective 
investment institutions. As noted in Chapter 6, the use of a semi-structured interview 
technique imposed some formality on interview proceedings in terms of providing a 
list of topics to be discussed at all interviews in order to ensure consistency and to 
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allow for cross interview comparisons. A similar method was used to that discussed in 
Section 6.2. Interviews generally lasted for between one hour and one hour and thirty 
nlinutes and ranged from interviewing one person to interviewing three people. Most 
of the interviews were recorded and notes were taken. The questions concerned the 
inlpact of FRS 13 on annual report disclosures and the perceived impact of such 
disclosures on investment decision-making and corporate governance issues. While it 
is problematic to generalise from the interviewees, it is worth noting that the fourteen 
fund managers interviewed controlled a large proportion of the total funds under 
management by UK and Irish institutional investors. The interviewees represented 
large fund management houses, insurance companies, investment trusts and 
investment banks from all parts of the UK and Ireland. The issues included in the 
interview were partially shaped by a review of the literature relating to derivatives 
usage and reporting practices (Chapter 2). Each interview was divided into questions 
covering the following broad themes: Risk Management, Fund Management, FRS 13 
and Corporate Governance 137. 
137 Appendix 7.1 provides a list of the questions asked to the users of fmancial s~atements. T~s lis.t is 
by no means exhaustive, but provided a basis for discussions. The use of a senu-structured mtervlew 
technique allowed follow-up questions to be asked and areas of particular interest to be explored. 
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Table 7.1: Profile of the Institutional Investor Interviewees 
Fund Location Interviewees Type of Institution Funds Under 
Management 
A Scotland A.l, A.2 Insurance Company £75 billion 
B Scotland B.l, B.2 Investment Trust £2 billion 
C Scotland C Fund Management £200 billion 
D London D Fund Management £200 billion 
E London E Fund Management £50 billion 
F London F Insurance Company £ 150 billion 
G London G Fund Management £54 billion 
H London H Investment Bank £130 billion 
I London 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 Investment Bank £300 billion 
J London J Fund Management £19 billion 
K London K Investment Bank £35 billion 
L North of L.l, L.2 Insurance Company N/A 
England 
M Ireland M Investment Bank £1 billion 
N Ireland N Stockbrokers N/A 
0 Scotland 0 Fund Management £22 billion 
7.3 Interview Survey Results 
This section reports the results of 15 interviews with fourteen institutional investors 
and one broker (Table 7.1). These interviewees were drawn from a wide variety of 
funds and worked in a good geographical spread of firms. The fund managers worked 
in a variety of institutions although their job descriptions were relatively uniform. It 
was decided that the differing perspective of a broker might also be informative given 
their interest in corporate practices. It was hoped that this mix of interviewees would 
provide a broad cross-section of views on the issues raised. The results are divided 
into the following broad themes: Risk Management Practices, Fund Management 
Practices, The FRS 13 Reporting Standard and finally, the impact of FRS 13 for 
corporate governance and accountability. 
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7.3.1 Risk Management Practices 
The first part of the interview related to the importance which institutional investors 
attached to the hedging policies and risk management practices of their investee 
companIes. Eleven of the fifteen fund managers indicated that their investee 
companies' management of risk and hedging was an element in their investment 
decision making, although, none of the interviewees ever actually asked to see any 
documented policies. One fund manager claimed: 
"We don't look specifically at a company's hedging policy ... we do look at 
the type of decisions management take on these sorts of (hedging) issues as an 
indication of the quality of management." 
Interviewee I indicated that hedging issues only became important when such 
decisions went wrong and added that they would ask to see documentation only if 
they suspected a potential problem. Fund Manager K claimed that hedging policies 
and financial risk management were taken into consideration, although such matters 
were not seen as "crucial", while Fund Manager 0 suggested that financial risk 
management concerns were "quite high up the agenda". 
With respect to the types of financial instruments used and the reasons for using them, 
most fund managers agreed that this varied from company to company. However the 
most common instruments cited included interest rate swaps138 and currency 
forwards 139, while the most commonly hedged risk was thought to be related to 
currency volatility. This suggests that fund managers may focus more on currency 
risk than on interest rate risk, which is in contrast to the findings of most academic 
studies (Bodnar et al. 1995; 1996; 1998; Helliar, 1997). Fund Manager 0 indicated 
138 An interest rate swap is an agreement whereby two parties (called counterparties) agree to exchange 
periodic interest payments (Fabozzi and Modigliani, 1992). 
139 A currency forward contract is one in which one party agrees to buy ~ currency: a~d ~nother party 
agrees to sell that same currency at a designated date in the future (Fabozzl and Modlgham, 1992). 
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that, in his expenence, companIes tended to shy away from uSIng exotic 
d · . 140 b . envatIves , ecause of theIr lack of understanding of how these complex products 
worked. 
The fund managers interviewed did not place a great deal of emphasis on the amount 
of hedging carried out or the range of products used. For example, fund manager A.I 
claimed: 
'"In terms of the significance we attach to what type of instruments are used, 
we \vill generally defer to the judgement of the company and the board 
concerned, unless there is something that comes to our attention that suggests 
that the instruments are clearly inappropriate." 
This latter point was also mentioned by Interviewee K who suggested that questions 
would be asked where "it looks like they (the investee company) have 
disproportionately used an odd (instrument)". Fund Manager B.2 indicated that "the 
focus is on the fundamentals of the business ... hedging is almost still a peripheral 
issue." This general attitude was further evidenced by the comments of Fund Manager 
D: 
"I don't think investment institutions actually do take this into account as 
much as you would imagine." 
The fund managers expressed quite divergent VIews on the importance of the 
completeness of their investee company disclosures, although SIX indicated that 
greater disclosure was preferred. Fund Manager E placed a great deal of emphasis on 
140 Exotic derivatives are more difficult to price and are often model dependent. The risks tend to be 
more obscure and can often lead to unexpected losses (Wilmott, 1998). Examples include: (i) barrier 
options (whose payoff is contingent on the underlying asset reaching some specified level before 
expiry); (ii) Asian options (the payoff is dependent on the average value of the underlying over some 
period before expiry); and (iii) lookback options (whose payoff depends on the realised maximum or 
minimum of the underlying asset over some period prior to expiry) (Wilmott, 1998). 
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the completeness of company disclosures by highlighting the fact that more complete 
disclosures: 
"indic~te a willin~ess on t~e part of management to explain what it is they 
are dOIng and why If somethIng has gone wrong, or particularly right, that has 
happened. " 
However, Fund Manager C claimed that: 
"It's our belief that there is very little information and so it is a small part of 
the decision-making ... it is not really a major part of how we would come to a 
view of a company." 
Two of the interviewees suggested that the completeness of company disclosures was 
less of an issue for them because of the "quality" of investments handled by their 
particular firms. This suggested that financial reporting standards and disclosure 
issues were less likely to be of concern for holdings in large global companies, which 
is surprising given the use of more exotic derivatives within these companies (Bodnar 
et aI., 1995; 1996; 1998; Wilmott, 1998) and the preponderance of scandals affecting 
predominantly large companies (Culp and Miller, 1995; Overdahl and Schachter, 
1995; J ayaraman and Shrikhande, 1997). Several of the interviewees mentioned that 
the lack of timeliness of annual reports was a potential drawback for using them in 
their decision-making, irrespective of the volume of disclosure in them. Interviewee J 
indicated that any questions arising from disclosures in the annual report would be 
discussed in the one-on-one meetings with company management. 
7.3.2 Fund Management Practices 
All of the fund managers interviewed organised their activities on either a geographic 
or sectoral basis and none employed a particular individual member of staff to deal 
with the task of gathering portfolio risk information about their investee firms, such as 
exposures to certain currency movements. When asked if they considered the 
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financial risk exposure of a potential investment, the responses from the sample of 
fund managers again differed. For example, Fund Manager A.I indicated that his firm 
was "more concerned with the underlying activities of the company", while Fund 
Manager I.2 stated that "when financial risk becomes business risk it becomes 
absolutely key". Fund Manager C claimed that they looked at risk "very closely in the 
way that we think risk is important ... the actual impact of derivatives really doesn't 
come in to that." 
Only one of the fund managers interviewed indicated a preference for their investee 
companies to hedge all their overseas earnings back into sterling. He stated that "yes, 
any finance directors that didn't would be daft" (Interviewee J). However, for the 
other interviewees, such decisions were deemed to be the preserve of company 
management. 
Most of the fund managers stated that they were given specific mandates to manage 
portfolios relative to defined benchmarks and that it was the responsibility of the 
trustees to ensure an appropriate investment policy. Some of these mandates 
specifically prohibited the fund manager from hedging any net exposures, possibly 
because the trustees had a limited understanding of treasury practice. For example, 
when questioned about making hedging overlay decisions on their own investment 
portfolios, based on infonnation about individual company strategies, the response 
from the fund managers was again fairly mixed with less than half of the interviewees 
indicating that such decisions might even be taken on an occasional basis, and usually 
by their Asset Allocation Team. Fund Manager A.I stated that: 
"We will, and have, from time to time made hedging decisions, mainly on 
currency hedging, where we feel that one particular currency is significantly 
out of line and where we think our best interests lie." 
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However, these hedging overlay decisions were typically taken on a portfolio basis 
rather than on the basis of underlying company hedging policies and strategies. For 
example, Interviewee 1.2 claimed that ''we would do that on an economic view. We 
wouldn't do that. based on individual companies", while Interviewee M was even 
more adamant claiming that taking such decisions "would be clearly moronic, just 
insane to try to second guess the level of hedging which the companies themselves are 
doing." 
7.3.3 The Impact of FRS 13 
When questioned as to why some companies chose to disclose their derivatives usage 
prior to the mandatory introduction of FRS 13, most of the fund managers highlighted 
the scandals associated with derivatives usage, such as Barings, Orange County, and 
so on. For example, Fund Manager A.l commented that: 
"The Barings situation brought into sharp focus, particularly for the financial 
companies but also in a wider sense, some of the risk consequences of 
derivative transactions." 
Fund Manager C put forward a similar view: 
"There has been such controversy about the use of derivatives ... Equitable 
Life, Orange County ... (companies) want to be seen as whiter than white if 
possible and to report what they have." 
Another perceived reason for the early disclosure of FRS 13 information concerned 
the relative importance of the finance function within the firm and the finance 
departments' attitude towards openness and transparency. According to the 
interviewees, some companies might have had tactical reasons for not disclosing such 
information until it was absolutely necessary. 
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Fund Manager E adopted more of an accountability perspective when she stated that: 
"Some companies believe that this is part of the reasonable information that 
they should share with people who are interested in the company." 
Meanwhile, Fund Manager A.l cited the influence of changing corporate governance 
regulation as a possible reason for disclosing the non-mandated information prior to 
the introduction of FRS 13: 
""Whilst FRS 13 was chugging along ... the Turnbull Report was starting to 
prompt boards and audit committees to ask certain questions and anticipate 
changes that would be required of a disclosure and risk control nature." 
Stockbroker N argued that: 
"If a company is managing their risks and running their business properly they 
shouldn't have any problem or hesitancy in terms of meeting disclosures and 
meeting them early. I think it avoids people speculating as to what might not 
be in place or how bad things might be. I think investors wholly welcome it." 
Fund Manager 0 indicated that some companies simply "like to be ahead of the game 
in terms of disclosure", adding that such a strategy "gives them time to sort out any 
problems". Interviewee M was more cynical, claiming that companies tended to 
disclose early for "commercial reasons", while Interviewee 1.2 suggested that a "lack 
of information tends to be construed quite badly" and went on to argue that: 
"by making disclosures they (individual companies) can increase certainty and 
information flow to the capital markets and that can only be a good thing from 
the company's point of view". 
Interviewee K noted that the use of such information was meant to "reassure 
investors" of true underlying exposures. 
Most interviewees were unable to identify strong sectoral trends in this voluntary 
disclosure of FRS 13 type information, although a couple of interviewees identified 
banks as being proactive due to the nature of their business. Fund Manager K 
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suggested that those with large underlying exposures were more likely to report early. 
In addition, one fund manager argued that where one company in a particular industry 
disclosed particular information, others tended to follow. Fund Manager E stated that: 
"If management are happy that they are doing a good job, they are more than 
happy to put that in public ... (there is) no better disinfectant than sunlight." 
In general, however, larger companies were viewed as being more likely to comply 
early with FRS 13 requirements than were smaller companies, often because the 
former had the resources required for early compliance more readily available. 
Some of the interviewees posited reasons for not disclosing early. Fund Manager A.I 
felt that there could potentially be: 
"an attitude of enlightenment, or otherwise, to disclosure, whereby perhaps 
some companies at that time, and maybe still today, tend to take a minimalist 
approach. " 
Fund Manager C.I reiterated this point: 
"A lot of companies have to be dragged screaming before they do anything, 
until it is mandatory they will not do anything at all in any area." 
Interviewee M felt that many companies waited until it was absolutely necessary 
before disclosing such information; he cited the extra work involved and the various 
disclosure options as possible reasons for early non-disclosure and added that most 
waited to see what others were doing. Fund Manager K was more cynical, claiming 
that in some cases companies were using financial instruments in an "inappropriate 
manner" and often lacked a clear understanding about the usage of derivatives. 
Interviewee H claimed that many companIes were reluctant to disclose such 
information "on competitive grounds". 
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The majority of the fund managers interviewed relied on annual reports and their 
regular meetings with investee company management as their primary sources of 
hedging information. To this end, FRS 13 was seen as being of benefit. For example, 
Fund Manager F noted that the standard "can help in alerting you to some of the risk 
areas". For some interviewees. information about derivatives usage was a regular part 
of the company presentation to institutional investors. For other interviewees, 
information about derivatives usage would not be presented to institutional investors 
unless requested - which would presumably occur when there was felt to be some 
concern. Two of the interviewees mentioned using brokers as the primary source of 
this type of information. 
Although the interviewees were generally very positive about wider disclosure, only 
two of the fifteen interviewees indicated that their investment houses had had an input 
into FRS 13; one had a colleague on the ASB, while the other commented directly to 
the ASB and through a representative industry body. 
When asked about the perceived general impact of forced disclosure, the responses 
were mixed, with five interviewees indicating that forced disclosures had little or no 
major impact. Fund Manager C suggested that his fund had little use for annual 
reports as sources of information: 
"They (annual reports) are in written form which makes it much more difficult 
to compare one company with another, we can get all of the cash flow 
numbers on databases ... the Report and Accounts are out of date by the time 
we get them ... all of the information in those reports has already ~een 
digested by the market ... you don't know what the company has done SInce 
the Balance Sheet date, the whole risk exposure may have changed." 
However, in contrast to the views expressed by Fund Manager C, Fund Manager A.l 
noted that although "it wasn't as if we felt the earth move suddenly when it came in" 
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it did help to "create a level playing field" in terms of disclosure. Fund Manager K 
indicated that FRS 13 had forced companies to clarify their position about their 
motiYations and reasons for hedging, as well as the precise methods adopted. 
A majority of those interviewed felt that FRS 13 had not changed their investee 
companies' managerial behaviour towards hedging policy, their operating procedures 
or the methods of hedging employed. However, Fund Manager E, felt that they, as 
fund managers, wanted firms to be aware of their risks and commented that: 
"If disclosing how you are dealing with risk ... is seen as portraying yourself 
as risk averse, that might be a good thing, it might actually encourage 
management to communicate better what they are doing ... to be more 
comfortable with risk." 
There was a mixed response from the fund managers when they were asked if they 
had learned any more about their investee companies' derivatives usage since the 
introduction of FRS 13. In general, they claimed not to have gained any vital new 
information, although one potential benefit the fund managers identified was the 
internal impact that such disclosures might produce. This aspect was mentioned by 
Fund Manager B.2 who felt that a positive impact could be gleaned by "making sure 
that finance departments are being put through all the hoops and hurdles." Fund 
Manager A.l felt that what is often more important is what information is not 
disclosed: 
"Sometimes the biggest risk is actually what is not there, and because there 
may not be particular disclosures in particular areas, that might be as 
concerning as what might be disclosed." 
The majority of the interviewees considered that the narrative information provided 
by FRS 13 contained potentially important information, but that the numerical 
disclosures were too complex. The interviewees acknowledged that information 
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concerned with financial risk should potentially be of interest to institutional 
investors, however, fund managers typically paid more attention to the key 
management personnel and strategic decision-making than to risk management 
practices and procedures. 
Fund managers did not appear to be aware of how frequently their investee companies 
re-valued their derivatives portfolio or of the particular methods they used in 
evaluating the riskiness of specific derivatives transactions. Only Fund Manager A.l 
claimed that such information gave him "that degree of cuddly comfort". Others felt 
that this \vas an area where they, as shareholders, had poor visibility - although the 
information was not something they particularly needed. 
One area where it was felt that FRS 13 could possibly have gone further was with 
respect to 'counter-party risk' 141. This issue was mentioned by six of the interviewees. 
Another area for further potential development was with respect to the valuation of 
derivatives. Fund Manager C in particular felt that: 
"The most important thing, rather than pushing the actual disclosure further, is 
to try to get an agreed method of valuing derivatives." 
The majority of the fund managers interviewed felt that there was a difference 
between large and small companies with respect to their FRS 13 disclosures. Many 
thought that this was because larger firms were more likely to use and understand 
derivatives; small firms were less likely to have the in-house expertise to deal 
effectively with more complex financial instruments. Fund Manager K indicated that, 
141 The risk that the other party in an agreement will default. In an option contract, this is the risk to the 
option buyer that the writer will not buy or sell the underlying as agreed. In general, counterparty risk 
can be reduced by having an organisation with extremely good credit act as an intermediary between 
the two parties. 
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post FRS 13, the gap between large and small companies' disclosure had narrowed. 
He further argued that, with respect to derivatives, disclosure was even more 
important for these smaller companies. The perceived pressure from institutional 
investors was also cited as a possible reason for the predominance of larger firms in 
derivatives usage. However Fund Manager E noted that, in terms of disclosure: 
"Some of the smaller companies, who ... have obvious exposures because 
their main market is a foreign market ... tend to say something." 
With regard to adhering to the spirit rather than the form of FRS 13, most 
interviewees felt that their investee companies "try to be as succinct as possible" 
(Fund Manager B.2) and "do it because they have to" (Fund Manager B.2). Fund 
Manager 0 argued that most companies "will do the minimum" for two reasons: 
"One, generally disclosure is an administrative annoyance to them and they 
would rather get it over with, so they take a pretty boiler-plate approach to the 
whole process; and (second) most large companies are advised, probably by 
their auditor, on how to deal with these disclosures and they are given sample 
text, to insert the information." 
He added that this process resulted in a "minority of companies" providing "flexible 
and interesting disclosure". However, Fund Manager A.l appeared to be willing to 
give their investee companies the benefit of the doubt by suggesting that: 
"There has been a sea change over the last decade in terms of enlightenment to 
disclosure. Companies are, by and large, prepared to make greater 
disclosures. " 
When asked to comment on the relative costs and benefits of forced disclosure both 
for their investee companies and for themselves, all of the fund managers were of the 
opinion that the benefits outweighed the costs. The costs of lack of transparency, 
albeit tending to arise on an exceptional basis, were seen as being "distinctly painful" 
for shareholders to bear (Fund Manager A.l). Some interviewees questioned why 
corporates had incurred extra costs in producing the required information, claiming 
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that such information should have been readily available "and if not, why not?" (Fund 
Manager E). Even for the interviewees who doubted the merits of such disclosures 
from an investment management perspective, the exercise was deemed to be both 
useful and necessary: 
"There is an obligation on companies that they should be reporting on what 
their operations are all about and the risks involved in them on a regular basis 
... as a matter of historical record I think they should be doing this ... I think 
the benefits certainly justify the work that is involved." 
Fund Manager 0 questioned the use of all accounting standards; although he 
acknowledged a need for them, he indicated a preference for investee companies to 
follow "best practice disclosure" rather than follow mandated requirements. He added 
that mandatory disclosure was "very inflexible" and often resulted in unintended or 
unanticipated consequences. 
7.3.4 Implications for Corporate Governance and Accountability 
When questioned about whom the financial risk management department head was 
accountable to within their investee firms, the interviewees recognised that procedures 
varied from company to company. In the majority of cases, the risk management 
department (where present) tended to report to an audit committee or directly to the 
Finance Director or Chief Executive. Most believed (although rarely confirmed with 
their investee companies) that relevant issues were reported to the Board or to one of 
its sub-committees. As Fund Manager E articulated: 
"(funds) hope there is someone at Board level who has ultimate responsibility 
for ensuring that there are proper procedures and structures in place." 
The majority believed that the risk management department was normally a cost 
centre within their investee companies. Fund Manager E claimed that a large 
difficulty for risk management departments was "proving they add value". She 
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likened risk management departments to corporate governance departments in general 
claiming that they "'add value by preventing value being destroyed, which is a very 
difficult thing to prove" (Fund Manager E). 
All of the interviewees believed or assumed that non-executive directors had an input 
to the risk management function. However, the fund managers never attempted to 
discover if this assumption or belief was merited. The interviewees did not meet with 
the non-executive directors to discuss their role with respect to risk management. The 
fund managers believed that treasury committees tended to be a "blend of executive 
and non-executive participants" (Fund Manager A.l). However, for one interviewee 
this input was of slightly less importance. Fund Manager C felt that it was: 
"difficult for a non-executive to know all about those (derivatives) and really 
get to the bottom of what is going on in the company ... the most important 
thing to us is to know the guys who are running the company ... we are in 
many ways buying them." 
Fund Manager M argued that in his opinion "non-executive directors are not a very 
impressive bunch as a group". He questioned their financial literacy, before adding 
that "executive directors don't want impressive non-executive directors unless they 
are very confident". 
When asked to assess whether FRS 13 disclosures helped in the evaluation of 
corporate governance and accountability within their investee companies, the 
interviewees were again split. For those that viewed FRS 13 disclosures as an integral 
part of corporate governance evaluation, it was felt that good disclosures were 
indicative of a well-governed company. Fund Managers that did not find them a 
useful indication of good corporate governance practices acknowledged that the 
216 
disclosures provided a good measure of consistency across companIes that use 
derivatives. Many interviewees did not feel qualified to answer when asked how well 
FRS 13 requirements fitted in with or satisfied the Turnbull requirements142. The 
others thought that, on the issue of whether FRS 13 detracted or added to the spirit of 
Turnbull, it depended upon the approach adopted by individual companies. 
7.4 Discussion 
The results of this chapter indicate that institutional investors are aware of an increase 
in their in\'estee companies' use of derivatives. The explanations offered by firms, 
namely that the increased use of derivatives was related to the globalisation of their 
operations and the consequent impact on their risk profile, was accepted by the 
interviewees as valid. Most of the fund managers suggested that the amount of interest 
taken in risk management and treasury department derivatives activities had increased 
recently in light of the Barings, Allied Lyons and other highly publicised scandals. 
Despite the fact that the various codes emphasised the important role to be played by 
institutional investors in the corporate governance and risk management of their 
investee companies (Cadbury Report, 1992; Greenbury Report, 1995; Hampel Report, 
1998; Turnbull Report, 1999; Myners Report, 2001), the interviewees in our sample 
did not see this as their responsibility. Instead, the fund managers placed a greater 
emphasis on their investee companies' strategic and operational activities than on 
142 The Turnbull guidance indicates the company's internal control system should: (i) be embedded 
within its operations and not be treated as a separate exercise; (ii) be able to respond to changing risks 
within and outside the company; and (iii) enable each company to apply it in an appropriate manner 
related to its key risks. The guidance requires companies to identify, evaluate and manage their 
significant risks and to assess the effectiveness of the related internal control system. Boards of 
directors are called on to review regularly reports on the effectiveness of the system of internal control 
in managing key risks, and to undertake an annual assessment for the purpose of making their 
statements on internal control in the annual report (ICAEW, 1999). 
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financial risk management concerns. The fund managers pointed out that they were 
most interested in the fundamentals of the business. They were keen to determine the 
individual strategies adopted by, and the general operations of, their investee 
conlpanies. They placed less emphasis on detailed financial management and 
financial engineering. An indication of this was provided by the minimal emphasis 
placed by the institutional investors on actually viewing an individual company's 
documented policies with respect to derivatives and other financial instruments. The 
evidence supplied by Solomon (1999) which suggested that institutional investors 
required their investee companies to disclose information relating to their foreign 
exchange risk management policies was not confirmed by the present research. 
Although the fund managers saw some benefits to the extra information provided by 
the standard (Weetman et aI., 1996), they did not see such information as vital to their 
decision making. However, good treasury practice and compliance with FRS 13 was 
viewed as being indicative of good quality management. 
To be able to judge the relative performance of management and operations of their 
many investee companies, institutional investors need a vast array of information. 
One role of accounting standards in this context is to provide such information to 
these 'owners' on a consistent basis so that comparison between different companies 
and across time periods can be made. As an accounting standard, FRS 13 attempts to 
decrease the "large disparity" (Adedeji and Baker, 1999, p. 51), existing across 
corporate disclosure practices prior to the introduction of the standard. With the 
greater role played by hedging in company operations, interest rate and currency 
exposures can be changed quickly and easily, making it difficult for institutional 
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shareholders to assess the overall financial risk associated with owning shares in any 
particular company. FRS 13 provides information on this risk and enables fund 
managers to assert control by use of the 'exit and voice' framework postulated by 
Hirschman (1970) 143. 
One of the most notable findings of the present study relates to the lack of consistency 
in the views expressed by institutional investors. This finding supports the results of 
Sherman et aI. (1998) who documented significant heterogeneity amongst institutional 
investors. However, it appears that this variability is not recognised by the investee 
firms who frequently categorise institutional investors as a homogenous group 
possessing identical objectives and behaviours. The current research highlights the 
diverse range of opinions expressed by institutional investors with respect to the 
potential impact of derivatives usage. Such divergent requirements make it difficult 
for companies to meet the informational needs of all constituents. Accounting 
standards, such as FRS 13, provide a common basis for discussion and may help to 
make it easier for companies to meet such diverse needs. 
A considerable amount of empirical evidence supports the notion that non-executive 
directors have a vital role to play in corporate governance through the monitoring of 
management and the protection of shareholder interests (Coles et aI., 2001; Myners 
Report, 2001; Weir and Laing, 2001; Barratt and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). The 
present study indicates that the role played by non-executive directors may not be 
correctly understood by institutional investors. The fund managers all indicated an 
assumption or a belief that non-executive directors played an essential role in the risk 
143 Although voice would be more commonly exercised given the emphasis placed by fund managers 
on indexed/tracker funds. 
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management practices of their investee companies. However no evidence was sought 
of this involvement and the non-executive director's role was not questioned by the 
institutional investors, who indicated that risk management was not a topic that was 
discussed in their meetings with company management. The views of the institutional 
investors appeared to be more in line with a theoretical ideal that non-executive 
directors had an input to the risk management function, but no evidence was sought 
by the institutional investors to determine actual practice. This indicates a need for 
institutional investors to be more aware of some of the implications of accounting 
standards and to communicate with both executive and non-executive directors on 
these issues, within a corporate governance framework. 
A surprising finding of the present study was the perception amongst institutional 
investors that currency risk was the most frequently hedged exposure in their investee 
companies. This is contrary to recent evidence that suggests that interest rate risk is 
the most commonly hedged exposure by companies (Bodnar et al. 1995; 1996; 1998; 
Helliar, 1997). Institutional investors therefore appear to have an incorrect view of 
their investee firms' potential exposures. Perhaps this narrow view is based on their 
own institutions' operations; the nature of these is to invest in shares in different 
countries, thereby focusing themselves on currency risk. Fund managers do not 
normally borrow or lend (unless a hedge fund), thereby resulting in little exposure to 
interest rate risk. Perhaps fund managers are assuming the same exposures for their 
investee companies? FRS 13 provides more information on the broad range of 
potential company exposures, therefore making institutional investors more aware of 
the potential risks faced by their investee companies. 
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7.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In contrast to the analysis offered in Chapter 6 where the views of the preparers of 
FRS 13 infonnation were sought, in this chapter institutional investors were 
interviewed to provide a user perspective on the implementation of this accounting 
standard. The introduction of accounting standards may often lead to the 
improvements of corporate governance in corporations, and fund managers views 
were sought to discover whether these powerful institutional shareholders regarded 
the standard as advancing the governance at their investee finns. The results of this 
research indicate that institutional investors are aware of an increase in their investee 
companies' use of derivatives. In general, the interviewees support the main aims of 
the standard; they think that the more detailed annual reports allow them to gauge the 
hedging and derivatives activity of their investee companies more accurately. 
However, the fund managers place a greater emphasis on their investee companies' 
strategic and operational activities than on detailed financial risk management 
concerns. 
As noted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 several limitations have been noted with the use 
of the interview technique (Section 4.4.3.1 and Section 6.5). This chapter outlined the 
perspectives of institutional investors as users of annual reports regarding the impact 
of the introduction of a derivatives reporting standard. Such perspectives provide 
necessary feedback to standard-setters on the implications of the standard for 
investment decision-making and corporate governance and accountability 
relationships. Although, the use of the interview technique results in non-standard, 
context-dependent responses (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Yin, 1994; Denscombe, 
1998) and is heavily dependent on the interviewees' recollection of events (Yin, 
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1994), the use of a standard list of questions imposes some discipline on the process 
and ensures that the same topics are covered in all interviews. All of the interviewees 
were experts in their field so the technical nature of the questions asked did not cause 
them much difficulty. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 comprised the empirical elements of the current research. Chapter 
5 provided a description of the FRS 13 related disclosures found in corporate annual 
reports prior to, and following, the introduction of FRS 13 in March 1999. Chapter 6 
provided details of the perspectives of preparers of derivatives related information for 
these annual reports, while Chapter 7 presented an analysis of the users reaction to the 
increased disclosures resulting from the accounting standard. Chapter 8 will provide a 
summary of the main findings, details of the limitations of the research and will offer 
some suggestions for future research and extending the present analysis. 
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Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
223 
Chapter 8 - Summary and Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
The primary objective of this study has been to examine the impact of FRS 13 on 
corporate reporting practices as well as on corporate governance and accountability 
relationships. An assessment of the impact of FRS 13 on corporate reporting practices 
was facilitated by an examination of corporate annual reports before and after the 
implementation of this derivatives accounting standard. The financial statements for 
different-sized firms drawn from a wide variety of sectors were consulted to trace the 
impact of the standard on a diverse mix of companies. Once this was complete, both 
preparer and user perspectives regarding the implementation of the standard were 
sought in order to provide a better understanding of the issues associated with the 
introduction of an accounting standard. The impact of the resulting disclosures for 
corporate governance and accountability were then highlighted. 
The philosophical assumptions of the researcher pointed towards the use of qualitative 
methods of investigation. To this end, the study used two principal research methods: 
(i) interviews with both the preparers and the users of corporate financial statements; 
and (ii) the content analysis of 210 annual reports both before and after the 
implementation of FRS 13. The investigation employs information from sources such 
as corporate annual reports and Datastream as well as the views of practitioners 
distilled from interviews. The aim is to provide a descriptive account of derivatives-
related disclosures, as well as an examination of the perspectives of both treasurers (as 
preparers of the information needed by FRS 13), and fund managers (as potential 
users of the information provided by FRS 13). Therefore, the study is exploratory in 
nature and no attempt is made to focus on hypothesis testing. 
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 provides a summary 
of the three empirical chapters: (i) overviews of the content analysis as conducted in 
Chapter 5; (ii) the perspectives of preparers of derivatives related information as 
detailed in Chapter 6; and (iii) the views of users of financial statements as described 
in Chapter 7. The nlain findings and their implications are restated in Section 8.3. 
Section 8.4 offers some limitations of the current research. Section 8.5 provides 
summary details of avenues for further developments and future research. 
8.2 A Summary of the Empirical Chapters 
The derivatives reporting project was precipitated by several well-known corporations 
suffering large losses from using these novel financial products. The emergence of 
new, more complex, financial instruments was seen as a challenge to existing 
financial accounting practices. Prior to the introduction of FRS 13, these products 
were not included in company balance sheets and were thus a source of risk for 
stakeholders who were often unaware of such products being employed by a 
company. However, their recognition in company financial statements, as mandated 
by lAS 39, increases volatility in earnings, bec~use the value of derivative products 
varies as the price of the underlying security changes, and such changes now need to 
be reflected through the Profit and Loss account. 
Chapter 5 presents the results ofa content analysis survey of the annual reports of210 
companies prior to, and following, the implementation of FRS 13. The findings of this 
analysis suggest that the implementation of FRS 13 had a significant effect on the 
amount of derivatives-related disclosures presented in corporate annual reports. In 
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many cases the disclosure doubled between the pre- and post- FRS 13 annual reports. 
Such a finding probably understates the true rise in disclosure as several firms 
increased their derivative information content in the run-up to FRS 13's adoption. The 
change in disclosure was examined for 10 categories of disclosure mandated by the 
standard; all categories reported a rise but the increase was found to be especially 
pronounced for the 'Objectives, Policies & Strategies' and the 'Interest Rate Risk' 
categories of disclosure. The largest disclosers were found to be FTSE 100 listed 
companies while the industry grouping with the biggest average disclosure included 
companies from the Non-Cyclical Services sector. It was concluded, therefore, that 
the introduction of FRS 13 had a significant impact on the content of annual reports. 
The scale of this impact varied across companies, with some industrial sectors 
supplying more information than others. 
Seventeen treasurers were interviewed to investigate what impact the new accounting 
standard had upon the preparers of accounts and the results were discussed in Chapter 
6. Treasurers were deemed to have been most affected by the changes associated with 
the introduction of the standard, as they were the ones typically preparing the 
information for disclosure. The treasurers were, in general, very supportive of the 
standard, especially the narrative disclosures required. However, some did wonder 
whether such disclosures would be of much use to non-expert readers of the financial 
statements as they assumed some knowledge about what the instruments were and 
how they were used. In addition, most treasurers had not encountered any problems 
with the implementation of the standard and considered that the information required 
by the standard should have been produced by treasury departments anyway. There 
was far more dissatisfaction with the proposed new International Accounting 
226 
Standard, lAS 39; most treasurers thought that the requirements in this standard 
would give rise to a lot of changes to existing financial reporting and treasury systems 
and operating procedures in order to gather the necessary information needed for 
compliance. Discussions that centred around the implementation of lAS 39 reflected 
the treasurers' concerns about fair value accounting and the difficulty of putting 
systems and procedures in place to document how derivative transactions were 
"effective" hedges against operational activities, so that hedge accounting could be 
adopted. The treasurers were worried that if hedge accounting was not adopted, the 
bottom line earnings figure would be so volatile as to make comparisons between 
companies, and over time, meaningless. 
Institutional investors were interviewed to provide a user perspective on the 
implementation of FRS 13. Accounting standards are often introduced to improve the 
corporate governance of corporations, and fund managers' views were sought to 
discover whether these large shareholders regarded the standard as improving the 
governance at their investee companies. Institutional shareholders were selected for 
this purpose because (i) they are thought to be sophisticated users of financial 
statements (Mallin, 1996; Solomon and Solomon, 1999), (ii) they own a sizeable 
percentage of all shares on the London Stock Exchange (Gaved, 1997; Holland, 1998; 
Pike and Neale, 1999), and (iii) recent corporate governance reports have attributed a 
'special' monitoring role to them to ensure that companies comply with the highest 
standards of corporate governance (Cadbury Report, 1992; Greenbury Report, 1995; 
Hampel Report, 1998; Turnbull Report, 1999; Myners Report, 2001; Higgs Report, 
2003). In general, the interviewees were supportive of the standard, and thought that 
the annual reports allowed them to gauge the hedging and derivatives activity of their 
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investee companies more accurately. However, despite the emphasis placed on the 
important role to be played by institutional investors in the corporate governance and 
risk management of their investee companies as highlighted in the aforementioned 
codes. the interviewees in our sample did not see this as their responsibility. They 
placed little emphasis on the detailed financial management and financial engineering 
practices of their investee companies and concentrated instead on the fundamentals of 
the business. The current research also highlighted the diverse range of opinions 
expressed by institutional investors with respect to the potential impact of derivatives 
usage. Such diverging viewpoints are rarely taken into account by companies, who 
typically classify all investors together and direct their communications accordingly. 
8.3 Major Findings and Implications 
Three major findings emerge from this dissertation. First, following the 
implementation of FRS 13 there was a doubling of derivatives-related information 
presented in corporate annual reports. The scale of the impact varied across 
companies, with some industrial sectors and market groupings supplying more 
information than others. Second, both preparers and users of financial statements 
generally welcolned the adoption of FRS 13. They suggested that the increased 
transparency in financial reporting improved the corporate governance framework by 
means of providing a focus on treasury activities at board level, thereby improving 
internal control processes. The disclosures concerning companies' objectives and 
policies for using derivative instruments were particularly welcomed. However, the 
more complex numerical information provided under the standard was greeted less 
favourably due to the perceived complexity of the information disclosed. Third, 
although the interviewees broadly supported the implementation of FRS 13 and did 
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not find the process too onerous, there was far more dissatisfaction with the proposed 
new International Accounting Standard due to be implemented in the UK by 2005. 
The majority of the interviewees indicated that the requirements of this standard 
would give rise to a lot of changes in existing financial reporting and treasury systems 
as well as operating procedures in order to gather the necessary information needed 
for compliance. 
Clearly, both the users and the preparers of the annual report that were consulted for 
this study have welcomed the adoption of FRS 13 to some extent. The additional 
disclosure provided by the standard may have provided stakeholders with useful 
information about companies, thereby increasing levels of both corporate governance 
and accountability. Moreover, the increased transparency in the reporting of 
derivatives activity may have improved the corporate governance framework existing 
in the UK. The narrative disclosures covering companies' objectives, policies and 
strategies for holding or issuing financial instruments was especially welcomed, and 
companies doubled their reporting on these issues after complying with the standard. 
This additional disclosure might provide stakeholders with useful information about 
these companies. There was less enthusiasm for the quantitative tables required by 
FRS 13, because the preparers thought that it would be difficult for non-treasurers to 
understand this information. Both the users and preparers of financial statements who 
were interviewed found these tables difficult to understand and did not consider that 
their inclusion added anything extra to the accountability of the organisations' 
narrative disclosures. 
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The treasury interviewees indicated that the presence of FRS 13 infonnation did not 
improve the overall accountability or corporate governance of their finns. Treasury 
departments appear to be concerned solely with the narrow financial aspects of 
accountability; they only appeared to accept their responsibility to manage the 
financial resources entrusted to them by the shareholders and the need to account for 
their management of these resources. However, a role was acknowledged for FRS 13 
in tenns of providing more focus on treasury activities at board level, a situation 
which had the potential to improve organisational control and thus aid governance. 
Institutional investors, on the other hand, viewed increased disclosures as potentially 
indicative of a well-governed company. The FRS 13 disclosures provided a level of 
consistency across companies in tenns of providing infonnation about a broad range 
of company exposures and making investors more aware of potential risks. 
The dissatisfaction expressed over the proposed new International Accounting 
Standard, due for implementation in the UK by 2005, should be a major concern for 
policy makers. The findings of the current research suggest that the requirements of 
this standard will give rise to a lot of changes to existing financial reporting and 
treasury systems and operating procedures to facilitate the gathering of necessary 
infonnation needed for compliance. Companies are worried about the increased 
volatility that may result from not adopting hedge accounting techniques; this may in 
tum make firms appear riskier than they really are. Furthennore, the findings of the 
present research indicate that both the preparers and users of financial statements 
value the narrative disclosures provided under FRS 13. The more complex numerical 
infonnation is considered too complex for all but the expert reader. The international 
developments are geared towards a further increase in the quantity of complex 
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nunlerical infonnation. This development may, paradoxically, have an adverse effect 
on corporate accountability, rendering the financial statements even more 
incomprehensible to all but the most sophisticated of readers. 
8.4 Limitations of the Study 
This thesis has tried to elicit the views of users and preparers of annual reports on the 
introduction of Financial Reporting Standard 13. The findings are based on a number 
of interviews with institutional fund managers and treasurers. Clearly, the views of 
around 40 individuals may not represent the views of all treasurers and all 
shareholders, or indeed, all stakeholders in an organisation. Thus, the results of the 
interview strands of the research do not pennit any systematic generalisations. The 
decision to interview treasury personnel rather than other company representatives 
was based on the researcher's perception of those most affected by the standard. It is 
acknowledged that differing perspectives on the implementation of FRS 13 may have 
been gained by interviewing other corporate representatives. Likewise, the views of 
the institutional investors obviously do not reflect the views of all users of financial 
statements. For example, stakeholder groups such as the professions, banks, the 
government, customers, suppliers, employees, non-governmental organisations and 
society at large are not represented in the present analysis. The views of smaller 
investors are likewise not taken into consideration in the current analysis. However, 
because institutional investors own a large majority of the equity issued by quoted 
firms, it was considered reasonable, for the purposes of this study, to consult just large 
shareholders. The purpose of this study was not to examine whether accounting 
standards are aimed at target audiences, but to study the impact of the introduction of 
a new standard on some preparers of accounts and members of one major user group -
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the institutional shareholders. The data collected are, to an extent, unique owing to the 
specific context and the specific individuals involved, but do provide a flavour of the 
differing views expressed on the introduction of an accounting standard. 
The decision to examIne the annual reports published in the years prior to, and 
following, the introduction of FRS 13 can be considered a limitation of the present 
research. The finding about the doubling of derivatives related information presented 
in annual reports probably understates the true rise in disclosure as several firms 
increased their derivative information content in the run-up to FRS 13 's adoption. An 
analysis of these early adopters' annual reports for three or four years prior to the 
introduction of FRS 13 could potentially yield valuable insight into the decision 
process and motivations for disclosure of derivatives usage information. 
Other limitations relate to the research methods employed in the investigation. The 
aim is to provide a descriptive account of derivatives-related disclosures, and the 
perspectives of selected treasurers as preparers of the information, and the views of a 
number of fund managers as potential users of the information provided by FRS 13. 
The underlying philosophical assumptions of the researcher, as well as the broad 
objectives of the research, dictated the use of qualitative research methods. This 
research study employed two methods of qualitative data collection in order to satisfy 
the objectives of the study: (i) the content analysis of corporate annual reports; and (ii) 
interviews with treasury disclosure preparers and institutional users of corporate 
financial statements. Both of these research methods emanate from a subjectivist 
approach to social science whereby on-going processes are observed in order to gain a 
fuller understanding of individual behaviour. 
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There is a substantial element of subjectivity involved with the use of the content 
analysis technique. For example, the analysis of the annual reports of the 210 
companies is a lengthy process, and may be subject to human error in calculating the 
amount of disclosure in each annual report. The use of multiple coders helped in this 
regard. Difficulties associated with the use of the content analysis technique typically 
relate to the questions asked or the source materials available. However, the presence 
of an appropriate, reliable, valid and accurate coding scheme that guided the coders 
through the analysis of content, in addition to the use of a frequently utilised and well 
defined document such as the corporate annual report, helped to reduce this element 
of error. 
The use of the interview survey method is also subject to limitation. These limitations 
range from the possible inaccuracies and inconsistencies associated with the 
interviewee's recollection of events to the inability to make systematic 
generalisations. However, the use of the interview method in the present study 
facilitated the collation of various individual perspectives on the effects of the 
introduction of a derivatives accounting standard. This investigation provided a useful 
and informative accompaniment to the analysis of the changes the standard visited on 
corporate financial statements. 
8.5 Avenues for Future Research 
Six extensions of the work examined in this thesis are possible; two of these are 
currently underway. The first relates to the impact of FRS 13 on stock market 
participants. The introduction of a new Financial Reporting Standard often brings new 
233 
information to the market about corporate activities. An event study methodology will 
be employed to ascertain whether the pUblication of the exposure draft, and the 
standard itself, or the publication of the first annual report that complied with FRS 13, 
produced any market reaction. The preliminary results of this analysis by Dunne et a1. 
(forthcoming) have shown that the stock market responded adversely to the news of 
the standard. This effect seems to be particularly pronounced for large FTSE 100 
companIes. 
The second extension of the present work, which is also currently underway, will 
examine whether companies use derivatives for particular purposes and whether there 
were any factors that enhanced corporate use of, and disclosure about, these products. 
The preliminary results of this evaluation by Dunne et a1. (forthcoming) have found 
that larger companies, with complex overseas operations, often with weak financial 
ratios, are much more likely to be large disclosers with more active use of derivative 
products. 
Other possible extensions might also be considered. A third extension could extend 
the present analysis to investigate the potential consequences of other derivatives 
accounting standards. The views of the preparers of financial statements consulted for 
this thesis concerning the potential implications of IAS 39 were very negative; 
discussions typically reflected the treasurers' concerns about the use of fair value 
accounting techniques. Many of the interviewees were very unhappy about the 
potential impact that any future standard would have on their reported earnings and 
any associated disruptions to treasury operations and hedging activity. The European 
Commission requirement that all EU listed companies prepare their accounts under 
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international accounting standards by 2005 means that these issues will come to the 
fore over the next couple of years. Examining changes in corporate annual reports 
subsequent to the introduction of the new complex rules concerning fair value 
accounting would be an important extension of the present analysis. 
A fourth extension might be a cross-country comparative analysis in order to examine 
the application of lAS 39 in a European context; such an examination would facilitate 
an analysis of the impact of differing cultural norms on the implementation of an 
international standard such as lAS 39. A further content analysis could be conducted 
to examine the implementation of the standard at a European level. A questionnaire 
survey would give additional insights on the difficulties associated with applying an 
international standard in a variety of different economic and cultural environments. 
A fifth extension could expand the scope of the present analysis to include 
implications of the standard for other stakeholders. One of the limitations of the 
present research is that the users of financial statements were defined quite narrowly 
to only include large institutional shareholders. The justification for this definition 
was that these shareholders represented a large majority of UK shareholdings and 
were seen as important in the current corporate governance process. However, FRS 13 
and its international counterparts might also have implications for other users of 
financial statements, such as banks, retail investors, and so on. A questionnaire, or 
further interviews, with these interested parties might give further insight into the 
consequences of accounting standards for wider audiences. 
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A sixth extension might involve examining the consequences of derivative reporting 
standards for financial institutions. The implications of FRS 13 for this group of 
preparers were specifically excluded from the present analysis, because of the 
differing application of the standard for this group. These organisations typically trade 
in, and make much greater use of these instruments. A further study could however, 
usefully exan1ine both the differing affects of the derivative reporting requirements on 
these organisations' financial statements, and survey these preparers on the unique 
environment faced by them in their preparation of these documents. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Summary of FRS 13 - Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures 
General Application of the Standard 
FRS 13 was issued in September 1998, for implementation in accounting periods 
commencing on or after March 23fd , 1999. Earlier adoption is encouraged but not required. 
Corresponding an10unts should be disclosed for each of the disclosures required by the FRS. 
Howeyer. this n1ay not be practicable in all circumstances for the first accounting period in 
which the FRS comes into effect. Accordingly, such disclosure is not required for that period, 
although it is encouraged. 
Financial Reporting Standard 13 applies to all entities, other than insurance companies, that 
have one or more of their capital instruments listed or publicly traded on a stock exchange or 
market, and to all banks and similar institutions. 
Objective of the Standard 
The objective of this FRS is to ensure that reporting entities within its scope provide in their 
financial statements disclosures that enable users to assess the entity's objectives, policies 
and strategies for holding or issuing financial instruments. In particular, such infonnation 
should enable users to assess: 
(a) the risk profile of the entity for each of the maIn financial risks that anse In 
connection with financial instruments and commodity contracts with similar 
characteristics; and 
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(b) the significance of such instruments and contracts to the entity's reported financial 
position. performance and cash flows, regardless of whether the instruments and 
contracts are on balance sheet (recognised) or off balance sheet (unrecognised). 
The Approach Adopted in FRS 13 
The FRS requires both narrative and numerical disclosures. 
Narrative Disclosures 
The FRS requires an explanation to be provided of the role that financial instruments play in 
creating or changing the risks that the entity faces in its activities. The entity should also 
explain the directors' approach to managing each of those risks, including a description of the 
objectives, policies and strategies for holding and issuing financial instruments. Where the 
directors decide, before the balance sheet date, to change these objectives, policies or 
strategies, that change should also be explained. 
The narrative disclosures are mandatory, although the FRS permits them to be given in a 
statement accompanying the financial statements (such as the operating and financial review 
or the directors ' report) provided that they are incorporated into the financial statements by a 
suitable cross-reference. 
Numerical Disclosures 
The FRS requires specified numerical disclosures to be provided about: 
• interest rate risk 
• currency risk 
• liquidity risk 
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• fair values 
• financial instruments used for trading 
• financial instnnnents used for hedging 
• certain commodity contracts. 
To avoid the numerical disclosures becoming so detailed that their message is obscured, the 
FRS encourages, and in some cases requires, a high degree of aggregation. 
Disclosure of Objectives, Policies and Strategies 
The disclosures required by the FRS focus primarily on the risks that arise in connection with 
financial instnnnents (and certain similar contracts) and how they have been managed. These 
risks will typically include credit risk, liquidity risk, cash flow risk, interest rate risk, currency 
risk and other types of market price risk although the risks may be categorised in some other 
way. It is envisaged, but not required, that the information provided about these risks will 
usually be presented in the context of a discussion, in a statement such as the operating and 
financial review, of the entity's activities, structure and financing. This discussion will 
typically also consider the financial risk profile of the entity as a whole, before focusing 
specifically on financial instruments. Such an approach enables the disclosures required by 
the FRS to be put into their proper context and it ensures that the disclosures required focus 
on the risks of greatest significance to the entity. 
An explanation should be provided of the role that financial instruments have had during the 
period in creating or changing the risks the entity faces in its activities. This should include 
an explanation of the objectives and policies for holding or issuing financial instruments and 
similar contracts, and the strategies for achieving those objectives-in both cases as agreed by 
the directors-that have been followed during the period. This disclosure would usually 
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include a discussion of the nature of, and purposes for which, the main types of financial 
instruments and similar contracts are held or issued. Instruments used for financing, for risk 
nlanagenlent or hedging and for trading or speculation would all need to be covered, though 
separately from each other. 
The disclosure would also typically include a description of the main financial risk 
management and treasury policies agreed by the directors, including the policies, quantified 
"'here appropriate. on: 
(a) the fixed/floating split, maturity profile and currency profile of financial assets and 
liabilities; 
(b) the extent to which foreign currency financial assets and financial liabilities are hedged to 
the functional currency of the business unit concerned; 
(c) the extent to which foreign currency borrowings and other financial instruments are used 
to hedge foreign currency net investments; and 
(d) any other hedging. 
If this disclosure reflects a significant change from the explanations provided for the previous 
accounting period, this should be disclosed and the reasons for the change explained. If the 
period-end position is regarded as materially unrepresentative of the entity's position during 
the period or of its agreed objectives, policies and strategies, an explanation of the extent to 
which it is regarded as unrepresentative should be provided. 
If an entity uses financial instruments as hedges, it should describe: 
(a) the transactions and risks that have been hedged, including the period of time until 
they are expected to occur; and 
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(b) the instruments used for hedging purposes, distinguishing between those that have 
been accounted for using hedge accounting and those that have not. 
Interest Rate Risk Disclosures 
Fillancial Liabilities 
The aggregate carrying amount of financial liabilities should be analysed, by principal 
currency. to show separately those liabilities at fixed interest rates, those at floating interest 
rates and those on which no interest is paid. In preparing the analysis: 
(a) interest rate swaps, currency swaps, forward contracts and other derivative financial 
instruments whose effect is to alter the interest or currency basis of the financial 
liabilities should, as far as possible, be taken into account; 
(b) any financial liabilities and derivative financial instruments that cannot be adequately 
reflected in the analysis should be excluded and a summary of their main effects 
provided instead. 
The following should also be disclosed by reference to principal currency: 
(a) the weighted average interest rate of the fixed rate financial liabilities; 
(b) the weighted average period for which interest rates on the fixed rate financial 
liabilities are fixed; 
(c) the weighted average period until maturity for financial liabilities on which no interest 
is paid; and 
(d) the benchmark rate for determining interest payments for the floating rate financial 
liabilities. 
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The FRS requires the interest rate risk disclosures to be prepared on a gross basis, although 
this does not prevent entities from showing the figures on a net basis if the difference is not 
nlaterial. If the difference is material but an entity still wishes to show the position on a net 
basis. additional information showing the net position may be included in the analysis so long 
as the gross position is also shown. 
Financial Assets 
If an entity has material holdings of financial assets, the same information is required as is 
described for financial liabilities. The disclosures to be provided for such instruments will 
typically be limited to information about any currency exposures involved. 
Currency Risk Disclosures 
An analysis should be provided of the net amount of monetary assets and liabilities at the 
balance sheet date showing the amount denominated in each currency, analysed by reference 
to the functional currencies of the operations involved. In preparing this analysis: 
(a) to avoid excessive detail, the focus should be on the principal functional currencies 
and on the principal currencies in which the monetary items are denominated. 
(b) monetary assets and liabilities denominated in the same currency as the functional 
currency of the operations involved should not be included in the analysis. 
(c) if an entity has used foreign currency borrowings to finance, or provide a hedge 
against, foreign net investments and the exchange gains or losses on those borrowings 
are included in the statement of total recognised gains and losses in accordance with 
SSAP 20, those borrowings should not be included in the analysis. 
(d) account should as far as possible be taken of the effect of currency swaps, forward 
contracts and other derivative financial instruments that contribute to the matching of 
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foreign currency exposures and a summary should be provided of the main effect of 
any such financial instruments that have not been taken into account. 
Liquidity Disclosures 
A maturity profile of the carrying amount of financial liabilities should be presented, showing 
amounts falling due: 
(a) in one year or less, or on demand; 
(b) in more than one year but not more than two years; 
(c) in more than two years but not more than five years; and 
(d) in more than five years. 
The maturity profile should be detennined by reference to the earliest date on which payment 
can be required or on which the liability falls due. 
An analysis of the maturity of any material undrawn committed borrowing facilities of the 
entity should also be provided, showing those amounts expiring: 
(a) in one year or less; 
(b) in more than two years. 
If conditions precedent are attached to a committed facility, it should be included in the 
analysis only if all the conditions were satisfied at the balance sheet date. 
Fair Value Disclosures 
An entity should group its financial assets and financial liabilities (whether recognised or 
unrecognised) into appropriate categories and for each category should disclose either: 
(a) the aggregate fair value as at the balance sheet date together with the aggregate 
carrying amount; or 
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(b) the aggregate fair value of items with a positive fair value and, separately, the 
aggregate fair value of items with a negative fair value, in both cases as at the balance 
sheet date and in each case accompanied by the relevant aggregate carrying amount. 
The categories will typically follow the same structure as, but be in more detail than, that 
used in discussing the objectives, policies and strategies for holding or issuing financial 
instruments 
Fair yalues are to be disclosed regardless of whether the financial asset or financial liability 
involyed is held as a hedge. The methodes) and any significant assumptions used in 
determining fair value should be disclosed. No fair value need be disclosed if it is not 
practicable for the reporting entity to estimate with sufficient reliability the fair value of any 
financial asset or financial liability, or category of them, that is not traded on an organised 
market in a standard form. In such circumstances, the following should be provided instead: 
(a) a description of the financial asset or financial liability (or category of them) and its 
carrying amount. 
(b) the reasons why it is not practicable for the reporting entity to estimate the fair value 
with sufficient reliability. 
(c) information about the principal characteristics of the underlying financial asset or 
financial liability (or category of them) that is pertinent to estimating its fair value-for 
example the factors that determine or affect the instrument's cash flow-and the market 
for such instruments. 
Such information need not be provided if, at the level of aggregation and date at which the 
information would otherwise be disclosed, its disclosure is likely, in the opinion of the 
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directors, to be seriously prejudicial to the entity's interests. The fact that such infonnation 
has not been disclosed and the reasons for the omission should be stated. 
Disclosures about Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities used for Trading 
If the reporting entity trades in financial assets and financial liabilities, the following 
infonnation should be provided: 
(a) the net gain or loss from trading in financial assets and financial liabilities that has 
been included in the profit and loss account during the period, analysed by type of 
financial instrument, business activity, risk or in such other way as is consistent with 
the entity's management of this activity. 
(b) if the analysis provided in accordance with subparagraph (a) is other than by type of 
financial instrument, a description, for each line of that analysis, of the types of 
financial instruments involved. 
(c) the period-end fair value of financial assets and, separately, of financial liabilities, 
held or issued for trading. 
(d) if the period-end position disclosed in accordance with subparagraph (c) is regarded 
as materially unrepresentative of the entity's typical position during the period, the 
average fair value over the period of financial assets and financial liabilities held or 
issued for trading. The average fair value should be calculated using daily figures or, 
if the figures are not calculated daily, using the most frequent interval that an entity's 
systems generate for management, regulatory or other reasons. 
Disclosures about Hedges 
The following infonnation should be provided about gains and losses on financial assets and 
financial liabilities for which hedge accounting has been used: 
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(a) the cumulative aggregate gains and losses that are unrecognised at the balance sheet 
date. If the item's fair value is not disclosed under the FRS, any gain or loss on the 
itenl need not be dealt with in this disclosure. 
(b) the cumulative aggregate gains and losses carried forward in the balance sheet at the 
balance sheet date, pending their recognition in the profit and loss account. 
(c) the extent to which the gains and losses disclosed under (a) and (b) are expected to be 
recognised in the profit and loss account in the next accounting period. 
(d) the amount of gains and losses included in the reporting period's profit and loss 
account that arose in previous years and were either unrecognised or carried forward 
in the balance sheet at the start of the reporting period. 
If financial assets or financial liabilities previously accounted for as hedges are reclassified 
during the period and no longer accounted for as hedges and, as a result, gains and losses that 
arose in previous years have been recognised in the reporting period's profit and loss account, 
the amount of those gains and losses should be disclosed. 
Disclosures about Commodity Contracts 
Entities within the scope of this part of the FRS should treat cash-settled commodity contracts 
as if they were financial assets or financial liabilities for the purposes of: 
(a) the narrative disclosures described previously; 
(b) the fair value disclosures described previously; 
(c) the disclosures about financial assets and financial liabilities held or issued for trading 
described previously; and 
(d) the disclosures about hedges described previously. 
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Additional Disclosures about Market Price Risk 
Entities are encouraged, but not required, to provide numerical disclosures that show the 
nlagnitude of market price risk arising over the period for all financial instruments and cash-
settled commodity contracts and, if significant, all other items carrying market price risk. 
This information should be provided using a technique or other basis that is consistent with 
the \Yay the entity manages its risk exposures. Entities that use one approach to manage 
market price risk in one part of their business and a different approach in another part are 
encouraged to provide separate disclosures for each part. 
Entities are also encouraged to provide a discussion of their approach to market price risk so 
as to set the numerical information in context and to assist in its interpretation. 
It is important to choose a disclosure approach that gives meaningful information without 
oversimplifying the position or inundating the user with unmanageable amounts of data. 
Entities are encouraged to report in ways that reflect how the risk is managed. This could 
involve one of the methods described below, another method or a combination of approaches. 
(a) More details about positions at the reporting date and perhaps activity during the 
period. However, entities that use a large number of financial instruments may find 
such disclosures impractical. 
(b) Sensitivity analysis, i.e. the hypothetical effects on net assets or profits of various 
possible changes in market prices. 
(c) 'Gap' analysis of interest rate repricing and/or maturity dates. This approach involves 
analysing assets and liabilities into time bands by reference to interest rate repricing 
dates or maturity dates. 
(d) 'Duration' of instruments. This approach, which also deals only with interest rate 
risk, is a method of measuring sensitivity to interest rate changes. Duration is the 
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length (in years) of a hypothetical zero coupon bond whose value would change by 
the same amount as that of the instrument(s) in response to a change in interest rates. 
A shorter duration indicates a lower level of interest rate sensitivity. This approach 
suffers from the same drawbacks as gap analysis. 
(e) Value at risk. The value at risk of a group of assets and liabilities is the expected loss 
that will arise on those assets and liabilities from an adverse market movement with a 
specified probability over a specified period of time. 
If the disclosures described above are provided, they should be supplemented by: 
(a) an explanation of the method used and of the main parameters and assumptions 
underlying the data provided; 
(b) an explanation of the objective of the method used and of the limitations that may 
result in the information not fully reflecting the market price risk of the assets and 
liabilities involved; and 
(c) reasons for any material changes in the amount of reported market price risk when 
compared with that reported for the previous period. 
Disclosure of Accounting Policies 
SSAP "Disclosure of accounting policies" requires financial statements to include clear, fair 
and concise explanations of all material or critical accounting policies adopted. Disclosing 
the accounting policies used for financial instruments is of particular importance in view of 
the wide variety of accounting treatments that are adopted. In order to comply with SSAP 2, 
the description of accounting policies will usually need to include (if the choice of policy 
applied has had a material effect) a description of: 
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(a) the methods used to account for derivative financial instruments, the types of 
derivative financial instruments accounted for under each method and the criteria that 
determine the method used. 
(b) the basis for recognising, measuring (both on initial recognition and subsequently), 
and ceasing to recognise financial assets and financial liabilities. 
(c) how income and expenses (and other gains and losses) are recognised and measured. 
(d) the treatment of financial assets and financial liabilities not recognised, including an 
explanation of how provisions for losses are recognised on financial assets and 
financial liabilities that have not been recognised. 
(e) policies on offsetting. 
Where financial instruments are carried on the historical cost basis, features covered by the 
description of accounting policies would typically include (where the choice of policy applied 
has had a material effect) the treatment of: 
(a) premiums and discounts on financial assets; 
(b) changes in the estimated amount of determinable future cash flows associated with a 
financial instrument, such as a debenture indexed to a commodity price; 
(c) a fall in the fair value of a financial asset to below the asset's carrying amount; and 
(d) restructured financial liabilities. 
Where financial instruments are used as hedges and accounted for using hedge accounting, 
the description of accounting policies will usually need to include (if the choice of policy has 
had a material effect) a description of: 
(a) the circumstances in which a financial instrument is accounted for as a hedge; 
(b) the recognition and measurement treatment applied to an instrument used as a hedge; 
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( c) the method used to account for an instrument that ceases to be accounted for as a 
hedge; 
(d) the method used to account for the hedge when the underlying item or position 
matures, is sold, extinguished, or terminated; and 
(e) the method used to account for the hedge of a future transaction when that transaction 
is no longer likely to occur. 
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Appendix 5.1: Basic Information for Content Analysis Sample Companies 
Years Datastream Company Listing Sector 
Code 
1998 & 1999 905695 10 Group AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900780 Alexandra FTSE Other Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 312657 Allders FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900232 Allied Domecq FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 135209 Amco Corporation AIM Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 135744 Arney FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 953193 Amstrad FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 681552 Anglo Siberian Oil Co. AIM Resources 
1998 & 1999 917534 Anite Group FTSE Other Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 914162 Armitage Bros. FTSE Other Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 900631 Assoc. Brit. Engineering FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 900825 Associated British Foods FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 319608 AstraZeneca FTSE 100 N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 906416 Avesco FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 904710 Avingtrans FTSE Other Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 953553 BAA FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901419 BAE Systems FTSE 100 General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 974117 Berkeley Group FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 911488 BG Group FTSE 100 Resources 
1998 & 1999 899188 BHP Billiton FTSE 100 Resources 
1998 & 1999 312763 Biotrace International FTSE Other N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 135750 Bloomsbury Publishing FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900304 Blue Circle Industries FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 900451 BOC Group FTSE 100 Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 671549 Bond Internat. Software AIM Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 901192 Boots Company (The) FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900995 BP FTSE 100 Resources 
1998 & 1999 901815 Brammer FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 135539 Brancote Holdings AIM Resources 
1998 & 1999 901135 Brandon Hire FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 507342 Bristol Water FTSE Other Utilities 
1998 & 1999 900571 Brit. Bloodstock Agency AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 914447 British Airways FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901295 British American Tobacco FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 876252 British Energy FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 135116 British Sky Broadcasting FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900888 BT Group FTSE 100 N on-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 928781 Bum Stewart Distillers FTSE Other Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 901634 Cable & Wireless FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900286 Cadbury Schweppes FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 900382 Cakebread Robey FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 901604 Carlton Communications FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 319938 Celsis International FTSE Other Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 888276 Centrica FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 888469 Charlton Athletic AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901016 Charter FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 882671 Charterhouse Comrns. AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 135093 Clydeport FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 255049 Compass Group FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 136631 COMPEL GROUP FTSE Other Information Technology 
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Years Datastream Company Listing Sector 
Code 
1998 & 1999 892896 ComputerLand UK AIM Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 900433 Cookson Group FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 953191 CORUSGROUP FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 870916 Coutts (C.A.) Holdings AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 914182 Cradley Group Holdings FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 898687 CRC Group AIM Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 904283 Daily Mail & General Tst FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 943973 Dana Petroleum FTSE Other Resources 
1998 & 1999 900954 Davis Service Group FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901343 De La Rue FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900251 Diageo FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 882026 Digital Animations Group AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 910263 Dinkie Heel AIM Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 900906 Dixons Group FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901023 Elementis FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 910283 EMAP FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 914346 Emess FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 900559 EMI Group FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 671363 Energis FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 910473 Ennstone FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 870958 Epic Group AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 911809 Eurodis Electron FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 910229 European Colour FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 876253 Fayrewood AIM Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 136904 Filtronic FTSE Other Non-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 911448 First Choice Holidays FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 870219 Flomerics Group AIM Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 888093 Fountains AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 906275 French FTSE Other Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 897328 Gallaher Group FTSE Other N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 882647 GB Railways Group AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900350 George Wimpey FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 900754 GKN FTSE 100 Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 900479 G laxoSmithkline FTSE 100 N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 681307 Goldshield Group FTSE Other Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 931524 Granada FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 142283 Groupe Chez Gerard FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901199 GUS FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901932 Hanson FTSE 100 Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 953531 Hartstone Group FTSE Other Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 876265 Hat Pin AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901164 Hays FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 911982 Hewden Stuart FTSE Other Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 910437 Hilton Group FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 953573 Hogg Robinson FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900455 Imperial Chemical Inds. FTSE 100 Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 882240 Imperial Tobacco Group FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 910911 Infast Group FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 870011 International Greetings AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 928901 International Power FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 905110 Invensys FTSE 100 General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 910415 Jacques Vert FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 926054 Jarvis Porter FTSE Other Basic Industries 
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Years Datastream Company Listing Sector 
Code 
19988:: 1999 870203 Jasmin FTSE Other Information Technology 
19988:: 1999 952536 J enning Brothers AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 8:: 1999 882323 John David Sports FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 904486 Kelda Group FTSE Other Utilities 
1998 & 1999 940281 Kingfisher FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
19988:: 1999 953568 Kleeneze FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 8:: 1999 910215 Laura Ashley Holdings FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
19988:: 1999 901940 Logica FTSE Other Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 135730 London Clubs Internat. FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
19988:: 1999 892012 Longbridge International AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 902232 Lonmin FTSE Other Resources 
1998 & 1999 901352 Low & Bonar FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 905582 LPA Group FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 870899 M S B International FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901453 Macro 4 FTSE Other Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 136515 Magnum Power AIM General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 901155 Manganese Bronze Hldgs. FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 900498 Marconi FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901207 Marks & Spencer FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 906137 Mayborn Group FTSE Other N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 900336 McAlpine (Alfred) FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 901154 McKechnie Group FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 882297 Mears Group AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 282045 Melrose Resources FTSE Other Resources 
1998 & 1999 362536 Metrodome Group AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 926005 Microgen FTSE Other Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 914192 Misys FTSE 100 Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 905576 Morrison(WM.) Supermarket FTSE Other Non-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 870969 Mulberry Group AIM Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 870181 National Grid Group FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 888086 Netcall AIM Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 135529 N ightfreight FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901053 Novar FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 307411 NWF Group AIM General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 900828 Osborne & Little FTSE Other Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 870449 Oxford BioMedica AIM Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 301966 Pan Andean Resources AIM Resources 
1998 & 1999 953535 Parity Group FTSE Other Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 914021 Pearson FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 904302 Pendragon FTSE Other Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 901127 Peninsular & Oriental FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 676579 Pennant International AIM Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 904391 Pennon Group FTSE Other Utilities 
1998 & 1999 900917 Photo-Me International FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 953815 Pilkingtons Tiles Group FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 901433 PizzaExpress FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 897584 Powderject Pharmaceutic. FTSE Other N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 901328 Powell Duffryn FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 928903 Powergen FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 905498 Premier Farnell FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 943709 Prowting FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 904989 QS Group FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 905501 Queens Moat Houses FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
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Years Datastream Company Listing Sector 
Code 
19988.: 1999 907522 Rage FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 870956 Railtrack Group FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 940297 Ramco Energy AIM Resources 
1998 & 1999 900484 Reckitt Benckiser FTSE 100 N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
19988.: 1999 901080 Reed Elsevier FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 904335 Reliance Security Group FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900580 Renold FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 906480 Rentokil Initial FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 940420 Reuters Group FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 901714 Rio Tinto FTSE 100 Resources 
1998 & 1999 940793 Rolls Royce FTSE 100 General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 926002 Sainsbury, J FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 926029 Samuel Heath & Sons FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 892921 Science Systems AIM . Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 928738 Scot. & Southern Energy FTSE 100 Utilities 
19988.: 1999 900261 Scottish & Newcastle FTSE 100 N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 928741 Scottish Power FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 871674 Securicor FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900600 Senior FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 904373 Severn Trent FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 900998 Shell Transport & Trad. FTSE 100 Resources 
1998 & 1999 926773 Silentnight Holdings FTSE Other Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 900601 Simon Group FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900242 Six Continents FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900487 Smith & Nephew FTSE Other N on-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 900517 SmithKline Beecham FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 900943 Smiths Group FTSE 100 General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 896434 Solitaire Group AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 914596 Soundtracs AIM General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 695504 South African Brews. FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 319410 Stagecoach Group FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 911860 Tarsus Group FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 910707 Taylor Nelson Sofres FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 135090 Telewest Communications FTSE 100 N on-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900803 Tesco FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 904393 Thames Water FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 679683 Thomson Travel Group FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 974197 Tinsley (Eliza) Group FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 943417 Titon Holdings FTSE Other Basic Industries 
1998 & 1999 953808 Torex FTSE Other Information Technology 
1998 & 1999 135522 Trafficmaster FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 926704 UA Group AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 900789 Unilever FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 901106 United Business Media FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 904367 United Utilities FTSE 100 Utilities 
1998 & 1999 870890 Vernalis Group FTSE Other Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
1998 & 1999 953133 Vodafone Group FTSE 100 Non-Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 882272 Weeks Group (The) AIM Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 135506 Wellington Holdings FTSE Other General Industrials 
1998 & 1999 900271 Whitbread FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 926119 WPP Group FTSE 100 Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 953641 WSP Group FTSE Other Cyclical Services 
1998 & 1999 870806 Xansa FTSE Other Information Technology 
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Years Datastream Company Listing Sector 
Code 
19988:1999 507551 Xenova Group FTSE Other Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
Note: This Appendix provides basic details relating to market type and sector for the sample companies. Details 
relating to the annual reports used and the associated Datastream codes are also provided. 
290 
Appendix 5.2: Decision Rules - Categories of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies and Strategies 
o Discussion of the risks that arise from financial instruments and how these risks have 
been managed. 
o Discussion of the financial risk profile of the entity as a whole, before focusing 
specifically on financial instruments. 
o An explanation of the role that financial instruments have had during the period in 
creating or changing the risks the entity faces in its activities. 
o An explanation of the objectives and policies for holding or issuing financial instruments 
and similar contracts, and the strategies for achieving those objectives. 
o A discussion of the nature of, and purposes for which, the main types of financial 
instruments and similar contracts are held or issued, e.g. financing, risk management, 
hedging. 
o A description of the main financial risk management and treasury policies agreed by the 
directors, including the policies, on: 
(a) the fixed/floating split, maturity profile and currency profile of financial assets and 
liabilities; 
(b) the extent to which foreign currency financial assets and financial liabilities are 
hedged to the functional currency of the business unit concerned; 
( c) the extent to which foreign currency borrowings and other financial instruments are 
used to hedge foreign currency net investments; and 
(d) any other hedging. 
o Any significant changes from the explanations provided for the previous accounting 
period 
o Any proposed changes explained (SSAP 17) 
:J An explanation of how representative the period-end numerical disclosures shown in the 
financial statements are; any explanation of the extent to which Y/E position is regarded 
as unrepresentative 
o If financial instruments are used for hedging: 
disclosure about the transactions and risks that have been hedged 
disclosure about the instruments used and discussion of whether such instruments 
have been accounted for using hedge accounting or not 
Interest Rate Risk 
Financial Liabilities 
o The aggregate carrying amount of financial liabilities analysed, by principal currency, to 
show separately those liabilities at fixed interest rates, those at floating interest rates and 
those on which no interest is paid. 
o Interest rate swaps, currency swaps, forward contracts when included under IRR 
disclosure heading or where disclosure is preceded or succeeded by IRR disclosures. 
Notional principal amounts and option contract terms should be included. 
o Interest rate swaps, currency swaps and forwards should be taken into account as well as 
notional principal amounts and option contract terms. 
o With respect to principal currency: 
(a) the weighted average interest rate of the fixed rate financial liabilities; 
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(b) the weighted average period for which interest rates on the fixed rate financial 
liabilities are fixed; 
(c) the weighted average period until n1aturity for financial liabilities on which no interest 
is paid; and 
(d) the benchmark rate for determining interest payments for the floating rate financial 
liabilities. 
Financial Assets 
o As per financial liabilities 
Currency Risk 
o An analysis of the net amount of monetary assets and liabilities at the balance sheet date 
showing the amount denominated in each currency, analysed by reference to the 
functional currencies of the operations involved. 
:J Account should be taken of currency swaps, forward contracts, when included under 
currency risk disclosure heading or where disclosure is preceded or succeeded by 
currency risk disclosures. 
Liquidity Risk 
:J A maturity profile of the carrying amount of financial liabilities, showing amounts falling 
due: 
(a) in one year or less, or on demand; 
(b) in more than one year but not more than two years; 
(c) in more than two years but not more than five years; and 
(d) in more than five years. 
o An analysis of the maturity and carrying amount of financial liabilities including debt and 
finance lease obligations 
:J An analysis of the maturity of any material undrawn committed borrowing facilities of 
the entity, showing those amounts expiring: 
(a) in one year or less; 
(b) in more than one year but not more than two years; and 
(c) in more than two years. 
o A maturity analysis of financial assets 
Fair Value 
o Grouping of financial assets and financial liabilities (whether recognised or unrecognised) 
into appropriate categories and for each category disclosure of either: 
(a) the aggregate fair value as at the balance sheet date together with the aggregate 
carrying amount; or 
(b) the aggregate fair value of items with a positive fair value and, separately, the 
aggregate fair value of items with a negative fair value, in both cases as at the balance 
sheet date and in each case accompanied by the relevant aggregate carrying amount. 
o Financial assets and financial liabilities grouped into appropriate categories for the 
purpose of disclosing fair values. (For example, interest rate derivatives would usually be 
shown separately from currency derivatives and interest rate derivatives would usually be 
split between interest rate swaps and instruments such as caps and collars. As it will 
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generally be helpful to categorise like with like, financial assets would not usually be 
included in a category that also included financial liabilities.) 
CJ The method(s) and any significant assumptions used in determining fair value. 
CJ No fair value need be disclosed if it is not practicable for the reporting entity to estimate 
with sufficient reliability the fair value of any financial asset or financial liability, or 
category of them, that is not traded on an organised market in a standard form. In such 
circumstances, the following is provided instead: 
(a) a description of the financial asset or financial liability (or category of them) and its 
carrying amount. 
(b) the reasons why it is not practicable for the reporting entity to estimate the fair value 
with sufficient reliability. 
(c) information about the principal characteristics of the underlying financial asset or 
financial liability (or category of them) that is pertinent to estimating its fair value-for 
example the factors that determine or affect the instrument's cash flow-and the market 
for such instruments. 
Financial Instruments for which Hedge Accounting has been Used 
CJ The following information is provided about gains and losses on financial assets and 
financial liabilities for which hedge accounting has been used: 
(a) the cumulative aggregate gains and losses that are unrecognised at the balance sheet 
date. If the item's fair value is not disclosed under the FRS, any gain or loss on the 
item need not be dealt with in this disclosure. 
(b) the cumulative aggregate gains and losses carried forward in the balance sheet at the 
balance sheet date, pending their recognition in the profit and loss account. 
( c) the extent to which the gains and losses disclosed under ( a) and (b) are expected to be 
recognised in the profit and loss account in the next accounting period. 
(d) the amount of gains and losses included in the reporting period's profit and loss 
account that arose in previous years and were either unrecognised or carried forward 
in the balance sheet at the start of the reporting period. 
:J Financial assets or financial liabilities previously accounted for as hedges reclassified 
during the period and no longer accounted for as hedges and, as a result, gains and losses 
that arose in previous years have been recognised in the reporting period's profit and loss 
account, the amount of those gains and losses is disclosed. 
Commodity Contracts 
CJ Cash-settled commodity contracts treated as if they were financial assets or financial 
liabilities with respect to: 
(a) the narrative disclosures 
(b) the fair value disclosures 
(c) the disclosures about financial assets and financial liabilities held or issued for trading 
(d) the disclosures about hedges 
Market Price Risk 
o Entities are encouraged, but not required, to provide numerical disclosures that show the 
magnitude of market price risk arising over the period for all financial instruments ~d 
cash-settled commodity contracts and, if significant, all other items carrying market pnce 
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risk. This infonnation should be provided using a technique or other basis that IS 
consistent with the way the entity manages its risk exposures. 
o Possible approaches: 
(a) More details about positions at the reporting date and perhaps activity during the 
period. 
(b) Sensitivity analysis 
(c) "Gap" analysis of interest rate repricing and/or maturity dates. 
td) "Duration" of instruments. 
( e) Value at risk. 
o When provided these are supplemented by: 
(a) an explanation of the method used and of the main parameters and assumptions 
underlying the data provided; 
(b) an explanation of the objective of the method used and of the limitations that may 
result in the infonnation not fully reflecting the market price risk of the assets and 
liabilities involved; and 
(c) reasons for any material changes in the amount of reported market price risk when 
compared with that reported for the previous period. 
Disclosure of Accounting Policies 
:J Adopting of FRS 13 or FAS 133. 
:::J In order to comply with SSAP 2, the description of accounting policies will usually need 
to include (if the choice of policy applied has had a material effect) a description of: 
(a) the methods used to account for derivative financial instruments, the types of 
derivative financial instruments accounted for under each method and the criteria that 
detennine the method used. 
(b) the basis for recognising, measuring (both on initial recognition and subsequently), 
and ceasing to recognise financial assets and financial liabilities. 
(c) how income and expenses (and other gains and losses) are recognised and measured. 
(d) the treatment of financial assets and financial liabilities not recognised, including an 
explanation of how provisions for losses are recognised on financial assets and 
fmancialliabilities that have not been recognised. 
(e) policies on offsetting. 
o Where financial instruments are carried on the historical cost basis, features covered by 
the description of accounting policies would typically include (where the choice of policy 
applied has had a material effect) the treatment of: 
(a) premiums and discounts on financial assets; 
(b) changes in the estimated amount of detenninable future cash flows associated with a 
financial instrument, such as a debenture indexed to a commodity price; 
(c) a fall in the fair value of a financial asset to below the asset's carrying amount; and 
(d) restructured financial liabilities. 
:::J Where financial instruments are used as hedges and accounted for using hedge 
accounting, the description of accounting policies will usually need to include (if the 
choice of policy has had a material effect) a description of: 
(a) the circumstances in which a financial instrument is accounted for as a hedge; 
(b) the recognition and measurement treatment applied to an instrument used as a hedge; 
( c) the method used to account for an instrument that ceases to be accounted for as a 
hedge; . 
(d) the method used to account for the hedge when the underlying item or position 
matures, is sold, extinguished, or tenninated; and 
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( e) the method used to account for the hedge of a future transaction when that transaction 
is no longer likely to occur. 
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Appendix 5.3: Typical Examples of FRS 13 Annual Report 
Disclosures 
Narrative Disclosures 
The following extracts featured in the Financial Review sections of the annual reports 
and are typical examples of the narrative information provided under FRS 13. 
The group's operating activities generated a net cash inflow 
of £628.0 million (£628.2 million) including £566 million 
from Severn Trent Water and £61 million from Blffa. Capital 
expenditure (net of disposals and grants received) together 
'.' .. ith investment in associated undertakings amounted to 
£610 million Including £561 million In Severn Trent Water 
(£2.85 million) and £40 million in Blffa (£31 million). The 
group incurred cash outflows of £79.1 million on net interest 
and other financing costs: £209.6 million on taxation 
including the second installment of Windfall Tax: and 
£81.3 million on acquisitions. Free cashflow. Ie before 
payment of equity diVidends and other returns to 
shareholders and proceeds from share issues. amounted to 
an outflo'''" of £350.1 million (£77.5 million outflow). 
Dividends of £35.7 million (£91.4 million) ' .... ere paid in the 
year. Cash raised from the issue of shares was £2.9 million 
(£3.9 million: purchase of own shares cost £128.1 million). 
As a consequence. the group's net cash outflow ..... as 
£382.9 million (£293.1 million). Inception of finance leases 
amounted to £15.5 million (£94.5 million) and net debt 
acquired · .... Ith SUbsidiary undertakings was £1.5 million 
(£0.5 million). After currency exchange translation differences 
of £3.4 million (£0.5 million). the increase in net debt over 
the course of the year was £396.5 million (£387.6 million). 
Treasury management 
The group had committed borrowing facilities at 311vlarch 
1999 of £1.861 million. of which £1.482 million was utilised. 
In addition the group had borrowed £24 million from 
uncommitted facilities. The group had cash and short-term 
deposits at 31 March 1999 amounting to £32.2 million. Of 
the group's committed facilities £l.566 million are available 
to Sevem Trent Water. of ..... hich £l.207 million was utilised. 
On 27 January 1999 Sevem Trent V·/ater. through its wholly 
owned subsidiary Severn Trent Water Utilities Finance Pic. 
issued £300 million bonds repayable 2024 ..... Ith interest 
payable at 6.125% per annum. On 12 May 1999 Severn 
Trent Water. through the same subsidiary. Issued a further 
£300 million bonds repayable 2029 ..... ith interest payable at 
6.25% per annum. The proceeds of these bonds. together 
· .... ith the group's undrawn committed borrowing facilities. 
are adequate to finance the antiCipated cash outflow In 
1999/2000. On 12 July 1999 Severn Trent Pic will repay 
£150 million bonds on which Interest is payable at the rate 
of 11.5% per annum. 
The group's poliCY for thE' management of interest rate risk 
requires that not less than 50% of the group's borrowings 
should be at fiXed interest rates. or hedged through the use 
of interest rate swaps or fortlard rate agreements. 
At 31 March 1999 Interest rates on 58.5% of the group's 
borrowings were so fiXed. for periods ranging from 
1 to 25 years. 
The group's business does not involve material exposure to 
foreign exchange transactions. 
The group has investments in various assets denominated In 
foreign currencies. principally the US dollar and the Belgian 
franc. The group's current policy Is to hedge an element of 
the currency translation risk associated· .... ith certain US dollar 
denominated assets through the use of currency swaps. 
The sterling value of foreign currency denominated assets 
excluding capitalised goodwill exceeded the value of liabilities. 
including borrowings. in foreign currencies by £22.1 million at 
31 Marcil 1999 (£10.0 million). An unreallsed net translation 
gain of £3.9 million arose in the year (£4.3 million loss). 
Severn Trent Pic 25 
Tile group uses financial derivatives solely for the purposes 
of managl ng risk associated with financing its normal 
business activities. 
Details of the group's borrowings. investments and financial 
instruments are contained in note 16 to the accounts, · .... hlch 
Ilas been prepared in accordance witll FRS 13. 
Dividends 
The cost of the proposed equity dividends to tile company's 
shareholders for the year ended 31 Marcil 1999 was 
£146.5 million (£139.8 million). Dividends received or 
receivable by the company from its subSidiaries comprised 
£138.0 million from Severn Trent Water (£130.0 million. plus 
a special dividend of £309.6 million to cover the cost of the 
Windfall Tax) and £5.1 million from non-regulated businesses 
(£3.7 million). The group also received diVidends of 
£1.6 million from aSSOCiated undertakings (£1.7 million). 
Alan Costin 
Group Finance Director 
Over one third of 
turnover now comes from 
non-regulated activities. 
Extract from the Severn Trent pIc 1999 Annual Report (p. 25) 
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Extract from the Tesco pic 2000 Annual Report (p. 5) 
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The following disclosure featured in the discussion of accounting policies section of 
the annual report. It provides some idea of the accounting treatment afforded to 
derivative financial instruments under the provisions of FRS 13. 
r} Derivatives and other financial instruments 
The financial costs of debt instruments are charged to the profit and loss account over the term of the debt at a constant rate on 
the carrying amount. Such costs Include the cost of issue and any discount to face value arising on issue. or any premium arising 
on maturity. 
Differe~ces arising f~onl. the movement in exchange rates during the year on the translation into sterling of foreign currency 
borrowings and Similar IIlstruments lIsed to finance long-term equity investments. are taken directly to distributable reserves 
clllcl reported in the statement of total recognised gains and losses. 
Extract from Severn Trent pIc 1999 Annual Report (p. 45) 
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Extract from Tesco pIc 2000 Annual Report (p. 23) 
Fmnci.11 in<>truments 
FRS 13 "Derivaives <YY.l other firldllCial instnonents: disclosures" C<lme into df."cl for these financial slc1lements. The Group's financi<11 instruments. as 
defined in FRS 13 cOflllrise cash and liquid resources, together witl, debtors and creditors arising directly from operations. 
The Group does not enler into derivative transactions, and it is the Group's policy not to lnldertake any tradinq in financial instnunenls. The Group does not 
l1.ave <Y1Y COITfTlilled borrowing faciities, as its cash bal<'1I1ces are sufficient to finance its current operations. Cash balances are mainly held on short· term 
deposit with qlklity rnancial institL.(ions. in line with, the Group's policy to minimise Ihe risk of loss. The main risks associated withlhe Group's financial 
nstrumenlS relate to inleresl r:,I'c risk and foreign clnency risk. Numerical disclosures relating to these are givel1 in note 15 to the financial statements. The 
Gro~'s policy in relation to illl?l'est rate risk is to Illnllil':'r short and medium tl?rlll interest rates and to place cash on deposit for periods that optimise the 
amounl of inter<?5t earned while.' maintaining .10:(0055 to sulTicient funds In meet day to day cash requirements, In relation to foreign currency risk, tile Group's 
policy is to hold the r1k1jority 0( ils fmcis in slerlinq. 1 he";', poli.:j •• c, have been ,'ppli€'d consistently throughoulthe year. 
Extract from Oxford Biomedica Annual Report 1999 (p. 25) 
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Numerical Disclosures 
The detailed numerical information provided under FRS 13 is displayed in the Notes 
to the Accounts section of the annual report. The following extracts are typical 
examples of the numerical tables provided under FRS 13. 
15 Financial instruments 
Detail<; of the Group's obi<--:ctiV9S .1I1d policies with res-pi" t to fin,llK i.ll instruments <lre given in note 1 to the fin<lnci,ll skltement s. The numerical disclosures i 
this note deal with the fil"klllCial :1-;-';.'1" dnd H"bilitit:>s dofln,~d In FRS 13.1'". I1n.lI1cl.ll instruments. Except with respect to disclosures regarding currency risk. 
short term dd-.tors .md croolors l1.:wt:> been <?xduded frllill Ih,,' rinJnci<l1 inslrullwnh disclosure. 
Intl'rl'st ratl' risk profill' of fillanci.:!1 assets 
1999 1998 
Non NOli 
Floating interest Flor,ling inl·,r-c",.1 
rate bearing Total ,.11·, b~a'iIl9 Total 
£'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'OOJ E'C·JC 
Sleriing 3,027 44 3,071 3. SEQ 43 3.60~ 
US ~--.u..YS S 5 
3.027 49 3,076 3. SEQ '13 3.60~ 
ofwllich: 
Cash Jt b..rt <V1d in hand 3,027 12 3,039 3. SEQ 6 3.S6E 
Oth-?r debtors (rent depostl 37 37 37 37 
3,027 49 3,076 3. SEQ 43 3.60~ 
Throug-,ou. the ye..T Ule Group pklCed funds on short terlll fixed rate bank deposits for periods up to 3monlhs. On 31 Decemb?r 1999 md 31 December 1998 
all rtxed rate deposts had Illaturoo and the majority of funds ""ere held in a floating rate insk1l11 access account. Fixed rate deposits earned intemst at an 
average rate of 5. ,% per anl1lm over tile year. F lo"ting rate deposits eamed interest at prev<li1ing bank rates. 
Currency exposures 
The Gr~'s fllllCtiolkll currency is sterling. Other Ul<U1 a US doll<lr bank account whidl had a balance of £5.000 on 31 December 1999 (31 December 1998: £nil: 
th-?ro? were no rnallcial J-:'S,?15 or liabilities in currencies olher than sterling. 
Fair value 
The tiroctors consider Olat Ole fair values or the Company's rin.1llCial instruments do not significantly differ rrolll Uleir book values. 
Extract from Oxford Biomedica 1999 Annual Report (p. 31) 
16 Financial instruments 
The group's policies in respect of foreign currency and interest rate risk management and the related lise of finanCial instruments are 
set out in the Treasury management section of the Financial review Oil page 25, 
a) Borrowings analysed by currency and interest rate after taking account 
of various currency and interest rate swaps entered into by the group 
Currency 
Sterling 
Belgian Franc 
US Dollars 
Italian Li ra 
Total borrowings at 31 March 1999 
Total borrowings at 31 March 1998 
Floating rate borrowings bear interest based on LlBOR. 
1999 
Total 
£111 
1.503.7 
1.0 
3.1 
2.9 
1.510.7 
1.129.4 
Floating 
Interest 
£111 
620.9 
3.1 
2.9 
626.9 
524.3 
Fixed borrOWings 
Weighted 
average 
Weighted period for 
Fixed average which 
Interest Interest Interest 
rate rate Is fixed 
£111 % Years 
882.8 8.20 10.91 
1.0 6.27 2.24 
883.8 
605.1 9.25 4.47 
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16 Financ"11 instruments continued 
b) Investments in interest bearing assets 
1999 1998 
£m £m 
Currency 
Sterling deposits 14.4 16.1 
US Dollar deposits 13.2 
Belgian Franc deposits 8.5 3.4 
Total 22.9 32.7 
Investments in Interest bearing assets comprise short-term deposits placed on money markets with a maturity date not exceeding one 
year. and certificates of deposit. All interest rates are floating. 
c) Monetary assets and liabilities by currency. excluding the functional currency 
Net foreign currency Illonetary assetsl(liabillties) 
US Dollar Deutschmark Other Total 
£m £m £m £m 
Functional currency of operation 
Sterling 1.7 (0.6) 0.4 1.5 
Belgian Franc (0.1) (0.1) 
Total 1.7 (0.6) 0.3 1.4 
Net currency gains arising from monetary assets/(liabilities) not in the functional currency of an operation are recognised in its profit 
and loss account. Those arising from the translation of US Dollar and Belgian Franc functional currency financial statements into 
sterling are recognised in the staternent of total recognised gains and losses. 
d) Borrowings analysed by maturity date 
loans 
Repayable by 
instalments any 
of which are other 1999 1998 payable after repayment Finance 
Overdrafts five years terms leases Total Total 
£m £m £m £111 £m £m 
Group 
Borrowings due within one year (note 14) 4.7 4.4 276.7 0.2 286.0 128.4 
Borrowings due after one year: 
Between one and two years 4.5 158.1 0.1 162.7 181.4 
Between two and five years 13.5 203.2 0.5 217.2 269.3 
After more than five years 21.6 557.7 265.5 844.8 550.3 
Total borrow ings due after one year (note 15) 39.6 919.0 266.1 1.224.7 1,001.0 
4.7 44.0 1.195.7 266.3 1.510.7 1,129.4 
Rate of 1999 1998 
Interest 
% £Ill £m 
Loans repayable partly or wholly after five years cornprise: 
European Investrnent Bank loans - 2004-2008 5.1- 7.9 289.7 277.8 
Sterling bond (STWUF) - 2024 6.1 297.9 
Local authority loans - 2010-2035 6.0- 14.4 13.0 14.8 
Other loans 3.5 - 6.3 1.1 0.1 
601.7 292.7 
Company 
The company has other loans totalling £332.3 rnillion (1998: £286.2 rnillion) which are repayable within five years. 
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16 FinJllcial instruments continued 
e) Borrowings facilities 
The group has the following undrawn committed borrowing f<lcllities available at 31 March 1999: 
Expiring within one year 
Expiring in more than one but not more than two years 
Expiring <lf1er two ye<lrs 
f) Fair values of financial instruments 
Primary financial instruments held or issued to finance the 
group's operations 
Short-term deposits 
Cash at bank and in hand 
Borrowings falling due within one year 
Borrowings falling due after more than one year 
Derivative financial instruments held to manage the currency and 
interest rate profile 
Interest rate swaps and simil,lr instruments 
Currency swaps 
Other long-term assets/(liabilities} 
Interest in own shares 
Other fixed asset investments 
B Shares 
1999 
Book value Fair value 
£m £m 
22.9 22.9 
9.3 9.3 
(286.0) (288.4) 
(1.224.7) (1.284.4) 
(1.8) 
0.7 
1.9 1.6 
1.2 1.2 
(9.1) (7.9) 
1999 
£111 
179.0 
50.0 
150.0 
379.0 
Book value 
£m 
32.7 
14.7 
(128.4) 
(1,001.0) 
0.9 
0.4 
(9.1) 
1998 
£m 
175.0 
235.0 
75.0 
485.0 
1998 
Fair value 
£m 
32.7 
14.7 
(128.4) 
(1,037.1) 
(2.7) 
1.1 
0.4 
(8.1) 
Where Cl'/ailable. market rates have been used to determine fair values. When market prices are not available, fair values have been 
calculated by discounting cash flows at prevailing interest rates. 
Short-term debtors and creditors have been excluded from the above analysis. 
g} Unrecognised gains and losses on hedges at 31 March 1999 
Unrecognised gains and losses on hedges at 1 April 1998 
Arising in previous years that were recognised in the year 
Arising before 1 April 1998 that were not recognised in the financial year 
Unrecognised gains and losses arising during the financial year 
Unrecognised gains and losses on hedges at 31 March 1999 
Expected to be recognised 
In one year or less 
In later years 
Gains Losses Total net 
gains/(lasses) 
£m £m £111 
10.0 (lLO) (1.0) 
10.0 (11.0) (1.0) 
1.0 (1.9) (O.9) 
11.0 (12.9) (1.9) 
1l.0 ( 12.9) (1.9) 
The instruments used for hedging group exposure to movements in interest rates and exchanges rates are detailed in the Financial 
Review on page 25. Changes in the f<lir value of instruments used as hedges are not recognised in the financial statements until the 
hedged position matures. 
Extract from Severn Trent pic 1999 Annual report (pp. 55-57) 
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27 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED DISCLOSURES (CONTINUED) 
Clas'5ification and fair values of financial assets and liabilities 
TIle foIlo.ving trole sets out tllC classification of finJllclal asscts anclllal)lIItlcs ancl provldcs a roconclliatlon to Group nct dcl)t in Notc 16. 
Short-term debtors alCl crooltors llavo 1)0011 OXCILKlocl from financial assets and lIal)llitl05: provisions 11avc I)ccn includcd v.4lcrc tllere is a 
contractual obligation to settle in cas/l 
At 31.12.99 At 31.12.98 
Carrying Fair Carrying 
amount value amount 
Em Em Em 
Net debt 
Cash at bai< 217 217 240 
Liquid ill\~tlllonts 1.697 1.700 1.617 
Current ~ filuldal instrumonts 1.914 1.917 '1.857 
8.75 per ccnt stcrling ELl'o Bond 2005 (497) (546) (497) 
6.75 per cent USS Euro Note 2000 (311) (311) (301) 
6.125 per cent USS Euro Notc 2006 (308) (295) (298) 
7.0 per ccrt USS Euro Note 2002 (217) 
Currerx:y s'lvap (USSlyen) (40) 
(268) (257) (235) 
2.0 per Cet't CHF Bond 2004 (92) 
Currerx:y swap (CHFlyen) (24) 
(123) (116) 
Yen 64.1 billion loan 2000 (394) 
Currerx:y swap (yen/stcrting) (9) 
(400) (403) (400) 
Other medium-term IX>rrawings (64) (64) (73) 
Short-term loans and overctafts (1.539) (1.539) (1.317) 
Total borrowings (3.510) (3.531) (3.121 ) 
Interest rate swaps (3) 
Fcrvvard cxcllange contracts to purchase 2 
Forward excllange contracts to sell 40 
Total clerivativo instn.rnents 39 
Total net debt (1.596) (1.575) (1.264) 
Equity inve5tments - fixed assets 75 
Equity iWe5tmer'ts - curretlt assets 52 167 28 
Otl1er debtors due after 1 year 337 337 270 
Other creditors due after 1 year (50) (50) (99) 
Provisions (55) (55) (58) 
Total finaldal assets and liabilities (1.312) (1.176) (1.048) 
T ota I finaldal assets 2.303 2.463 2.230 
Total finaldal liabilities (3.615) (3.639) (3.278) 
Currerx:y swap> trave been presetltcd alongside tllC underlYHlg principal instrument. 
Fair 
valuc 
frn 
240 
1.627 
1.867 
(596) 
(307) 
(314) 
(221) 
3 
(218) 
(344) 
(54) 
(398) 
(73) 
(1.317) 
(3.223) 
(19) 
(1) 
(9) 
(29) 
(1.385) 
84 
296 
270 
(99) 
(58) 
(892) 
2.520 
(3.412) 
Tile difference betwoon ttlC carying allount and tile fall' va lue of equity and liquid investmcnts represents gros5 unreal is<Xl gains of i.11S Illi II ion 
ald £3miltion res~tively. 
80 RIlport & kamts'1999 
Notes (11 Ill? IlCCO.lI1ts 
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27 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED DISCLOSURES (CONTINUED) 
nle follo'o\~ng ana ~ .1rc provl<lccl primarily In accordancc with tllO requlremcnts of FRS 13. implemcntoo in 1999: accordingly comparative 
fi~lrcs are not provided. 
Currency and interest rate risk profile of financial liabilities Fixecl Floating Non interest 
Functional currcncy Total rate rate I:Xlaring 
US dollars 1.267 619 565 83 
~ncscyen 644 563 74 7 
Euro 660 350 310 
Ot/lor foreigl Qlrrcncy 424 417 7 
Sterling 620 497 115 8 
3.615 2.029 1.481 105 
Financial liabilities conlJlise total borrCM'ings of £3.510 million and otller cmelitors clue after 1 year of £50 million and provisions of £55 million. 
Creditors due wit/lin 1 year Ila~ been cxcluckxl. 
~ bcndllm rate for dotermining interest payments for all fioating rate flnanciallial)ilities is LlBOR, 
Interest Jl'0file of financial liabilities 
(A) Total financlallia)ilitios - weigllted average interest rate 
(B) Fix€d rate financialliaJilities - weigllted average period for Wllicll rate is fixed 
(C) Financial liabilities on wtlicJl no interest paicl- weigllted average period until maturity 
Functional currency 
US dollars 
~neseyen 
Euro 
Other forei91 currency 
Sterling 
Total Gr<ql 
Matllity of financial liabilities 
Witllin 1 ye;r or on clemand 
BetvoRen 1 and 2 years 
BetvoRen 2 and 5 years 
Mer 5yea5 
Currency and interest rate exposure of financial assets 
Liquiel 
ulVestl11cnts 
US dollars 1.313 
~neseyen 
Euro 93 
Otller forei91 currency 91 
Sterling 200 
1.697 
Casll 
at IXlnk Other 
14 186 
4 13 
36 11 
136 80 
27 99 
217 389 
Debt 
£m 
2.249 
4 
448 
806 
3.507 
Total 
1,513 
17 
140 
307 
326 
2.303 
(Al 
% 
6.4 
0.6 
2.9 
10.9 
8.0 
5.6 
Finance 
leases 
£111 
1 
2 
3 
Fixecl 
rate 
200 
200 
(B) 
Years 
3.2 
3.1 
0.2 
5.9 
3.3 
Otller 
£111 
105 
105 
(C) 
Years 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
Total 
£m 
2.250 
111 
448 
806 
3.615 
Floating Non-Blterest 
rate ooaring 
1.327 186 
4 13 
129 11 
227 80 
27 99 
1,714 389 
Financial assets COfl1lrise liquid investments of £1.697 million. casll at IXlnk of £217 l11i II ion. equity investments of £52 million and del)tors clue 
after 1 year of £337 million. Debtors due witllin 1 year llave IJOOn cxcluded. 
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27 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED DISCLOSURES (CONTINUED) 
ClITency exposure of net monetary assets/liabilities 
FLIlctional curTency 
Ster\ilg 
Total 
£111 
304 
USS 
£111 
191 
Yen 
fill 
23 
Elro 
£m 
39 
Otller 
£m 
51 
TllC Group's clrrency cx(X)Surcs til at give rise to nct currency gains ancllosscs tllat are rccognlsecl In tile profit anclloss account arise principally 
in sterling. Monetary assets ancillabilltics denomlnateclln overseas fl"lctlonal currency. ancll)orrowlngs designated as a Iledge against overseas 
not a~ts. arc 0.xduclcd. 
Hedges 
At 31st [)ocenner 1998 thefe were lIIT~nisccllosses of £10 million onlloogcs tllat were rocognisoo in 1999. At 31 st December 1999 tllere 
were lIITecoglisecl gains of £42 million wtlictl willt)e rocognised in 2000 3ncl lInrceogniS0ct losses of £76 million wtlietl willl)e rocognised llS to 
£13 milli<ll in 2000 ane! £63 Illilli<ll bct\\oOOn 2001 ancl2004. 
Committed facilities 
The Group IlaS c<lllmittecl facilities. to back l~ tile comrllCrdal paper programme. of £447 mi Ilion of 364 clays duration remwable annually. 
Extract from Glaxo Wellcome 1999 Annual Report (pp. 79-81) 
\ 
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Appendix 5.4: Content Analysis Grid 
--~ ~--------+--~ 
~---------~-------~ 
------+--~-------~~--_t__--------+-----------1 
I 
I 
Note: This grid is provided for illustration purposes only. The grid used in the content analysis was 
slightly larger than this to reflect a standard A4 sheet. 
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Appendix 5.5: Content Analysis Record Sheet 
Company Name 
Code (Year) 
Total Pages/ Accountancy Pages 
Category Propn of Page Evidence Auditable News Location Memo 
Objectives. Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair \" alues 
Financial Instruments for which 
hedge accounting is used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
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Appendix 5.6: Companies with a Reduction in Disclosure Post FRS 13 
Company 
Allied Domecq 
Avesco 
BAE Systems 
BGGroup 
Blue Circle Industries 
Brancote Holdings 
Cadbury Schweppes 
De La Rue 
Diageo 
Dixons Group 
Epic Group 
European Colour 
George Wimpey 
John David Sports 
Magnum Power 
Pennant International 
Reuters Group 
Shell Transport & Trad. 
Vernalis Group 
Whitbread 
AVERAGE 
Pre FRS 13 
No. of Pages 
2.80 
0.52 
5.74 
5.92 
4.50 
0.56 
11.08 
2.12 
5.62 
3.00 
0.20 
1.06 
4.24 
0.48 
0.48 
0.40 
5.80 
2.94 
1.64 
2.98 
Post FRS 13 
No. of Pages 
2.62 
0.38 
4.88 
5.82 
3.82 
0.20 
8.80 
1.92 
5.10 
2.92 
0.16 
0.80 
4.04 
0.44 
0.40 
0.36 
4.78 
2.54 
1.60 
2.56 
Difference 
No. of Pages 
(0.18) 
(0.14) 
(0.86) 
(0.10) 
(0.68) 
(0.36) 
(2.28) 
(0.20) 
(0.52) 
(0.08) 
(0.04) 
(0.26) 
(0.20) 
(0.04) 
(0.08) 
(0.04) 
(1.02) 
(0.40) 
(0.04) 
(0.42) 
(0.40) 
Note: This appendix provides details of the 20 companies included in the sample whose disclosure of FRS 13 
related information reduced following the introduction of the Standard. Details about the average reduction in 
terms of the number of pages of the annual report devoted to this information are also provided. 
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Appendix 5.7: Differences Pre and Post FRS 13 Disclosure by Companies 
Across all Categories (Number of Pages) 
Company 
10 Group 
Alexandra 
Allders 
,.\llied Domecq 
Amco Corporation 
,.\mey 
Amstrad 
Anglo Siberian Oil 
Anite Group 
Armitage Bros 
Assoc. Brit. Engineering 
.'\ssociated British Foods 
AstraZeneca 
. .\ wsco 
Avingtrans 
BAA 
BAE Systems 
Berkeley Group 
BG Group 
BHP Billiton 
Biotrace International 
Bloomsbury Publishing 
Blue Circle Industries 
BOC Group 
Bond Internat. Software 
Boots Company (The) 
BP 
Brammer 
Brancote Holdings 
Brandon Hire 
Bristol Water 
Brit. Bloodstock Agency 
British Airways 
British American Tobacco 
British Energy 
British Sky Broadcasting 
BT Group 
Bum Stewart Distillers 
Cable & Wireless 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Cakebread Robey 
Carlton Communications 
Celsis International 
Centrica 
Charlton Athletic 
Charter 
Charterhouse Comms. 
Clydeport 
Compass Group 
Compel Group 
Computer Land UK 
OBJS IRR CUR LIQ F V H A COMM MKTP ACPOL OTH TOTAL 
0,20 0.56 0.06 0.00 0.06 0,00 0.00 0,00 0.12 0.00 1.00 
1.10 OAO 0.00 0.24 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 2.66 
0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 
-0.10 -0.16 -0.64 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.00 
0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.94 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 
0.68 0.00 0.36 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0,08 0.32 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 
0.00 0.12 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.36 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
0.40 0.64 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.00 
-0.08 0.92 0.36 0.16 0.40 0.64 0.00 
-0.92 0.64 OAO 0.36 -0.60 OA8 0.00 
0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.08 0.12 0.68 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.08 0.60 0.12 0.28 0.32 0.16 0.00 
-1.24 0.22 0.26 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
0.22 0.46 0.00 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.00 
-0.14 -0.060.18 0.32 -0.16 0.00 -0.20 
1.64 1.28 0.24 0.32 1.00 1.44 0.00 
0.20 0.08 0.44 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.32 -0.44 -0.24 0.16 -0.20 0.32 0.00 
-0.56 1.38 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.92 0.00 
0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.24 0.56 0.32 0.48 0.40 0.20 0.00 
0.81 1.28 0.24 0.12 0.48 0.36 0.00 
-0.06 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.84 0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 
0.44 0.92 0.00 0.16 0.88 0.52 0.00 
0.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 
0.36 0.20 -0.16 0.08 0.24 0.12 0.00 
0.02 0.72 OAO 0.20 0.40 0.86 0.00 
0.08 0.04 -0.04 -0.24 0.12 0.00 0.08 
0.36 OAO 0.08 0.36 0.24 0.52 0.00 
0.42 0.80 0.40 -0.04 -0.20 0.28 0.00 
-0.04 0.56 0.28 0.32 0.08 0.00 0.00 
0.34 0.72 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.64 0.00 
0.16 -1.30 -0.50 -0.16 -0.36 -0.08 0.00 
0.08 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.12 0.560.120.380.160.12 0.00 
-0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.84 OA8 -0.04 0.40 0.56 0.72 -0.50 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.56 0.12 -0.04 0.24 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.06 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.00 
0.24 1.04 0.12 0.28 OAO 0.12 0.00 
-0.02 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.08 
0.00 
0.04 
-0.04 
-0.04 
0.20 
0.16 
0.00 
0.20 
0.12 
0.00 
0.02 
0.10 
0.02 
0.08 
-0.04 
0.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.48 
0.00 
0.16 
0.30 
0.08 
0.00 
0.04 
0.12 
0.04 
0.04 
0.22 
0.00 
0.28 
0.22 
0.16 
-0.02 
-0.20 
0.00 
0.14 
0.16 
0.28 
0.00 
0.28 
0.04 
0.14 
0.20 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 -0.18 
0.00 0.08 
0.00 2.10 
0.00 1.04 
0.00 0.44 
0.00 0.84 
0.00 OAO 
0.00 1.56 
0.00 2.60 
0.00 0.64 
0.00 -0.14 
0.00 0.78 
0.00 1.50 
0.00 -0.86 
0.00 1.08 
0.00 -0.10 
0.00 6.66 
0.00 0.84 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 -0.68 
0.00 2.80 
0.00 0.06 
0.00 2.36 
0.88 4.11 
0.00 0.54 
0.00 -0.36 
0.00 0.96 
0.08 3.12 
0.00 0.48 
0.00 0.88 
0.00 2.82 
0.00 0.04 
0.00 2.24 
0.12 2.00 
0.00 1.36 
0.00 2.56 
0.16 -2.28 
0.00 0.20 
0.00 1.36 
0.00 0.24 
0.36 3.10 
0.00 0.16 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.64 
0.00 0.84 
0.00 2.40 
0.00 0.10 
0.00 0.24 
Company 
Cookson Group 
Corus Group 
Coutts (CA.) Holdings 
Cradley Group Holdings 
CRC Group 
Daily Mail 8.: General Tst 
Dana Petroleum 
Davis Sen'ice Group 
De La Rue 
Diageo 
Digital Animations Group 
Dinkie Heel 
Dixons Group 
Elementis 
E\tAP 
Emess 
EMI Group 
Energis 
Ennstone 
Epic Group 
Eurodis Electron 
European Colour 
Fayrewood 
Filtronic 
First Choice Holidays 
Flomerics Group 
Fountains 
French 
Gallaher Group 
GB Railways Group 
George Wimpey 
GKN 
Glaxo Wellcome 
Goldshield Group 
Granada 
Groupe Chez Gerard 
GUS 
Hanson 
Hartstone Group 
Hat Pin 
Hays 
Hewden Stuart 
Hilton Group 
Hogg Robinson 
Imperial Chemical Inds. 
Imperial Tobacco Group 
Infast Group 
International Greetings 
International Power 
Invensys 
Jacques Vert 
Jarvis Porter 
Jasmin 
Jenning Brothers 
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0.12 0.48 0.32 0.40 0.28 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 2.06 
0.96 -0.02 0.08 -0.08 -0.16 0.16 0.00 0.10 -0.38 0.00 0.66 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
0.36 0.60 0.28 0.24 0.48 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 2.34 
0.12 0.24 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 
0.72 0.38 0.20 0.70 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 2.64 
0.40 0.60 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.00 2.52 
1.16 0.28 0.44 -0.36 0.44 0.32 0.00 
-0.28 -0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.32 -0.76 -0.20 -0.16 0.28 0.24 0.00 
1.00 0.48 0.48 0.40 0.12 0.00 0.00 
0.36 0.04 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.30 -0.40 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 
0.10 0.28 0.12 -0.28 0.20 -0.28 0.00 
2.68 1.80 0.36 1.28 1.04 0.60 0.00 
1.16 1.88 0.36 1.12 0.64 0.00 0.00 
0.42 -0.10 0.06 0.68 0.48 0.12 0.00 
0.56 -0.32 0.00 0.28 0.40 0.20 0.00 
0.60 0.52 -0.04 -0.44 0.04 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.32 0.68 0.40 0.08 0.20 0.40 0.00 
-0.14 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.24 1.36 0.72 0.72 0.28 0.00 0.00 
0.56 1.10 0.80 0.30 0.12 0.04 0.00 
0.32 0.44 0.00 -0.04 0.32 0.32 0.00 
0.28 0.12 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.60 0.64 0.08 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.48 0.40 0.28 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.24 0.32 0.24 0.44 0.28 0.32 0.00 
0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.32 -0.04 0.80 0.04 0.00 1.60 0.00 
0.16 1.08 0.40 0.76 0.00 0.12 0.00 
1.00 0.04 0.00 -0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.38 0.30 0.16 0.74 1.02 0.32 0.00 
0.08 0.08 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.20 1.00 0.16 0.36 0.24 0.32 0.00 
-0.06 -0.08 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.00 
0.14 -0.24 0.56 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
0.40 0.48 0.00 0.52 0.04 0.00 0.00 
1.12 1.20 0.00 0.40 0.08 0.08 0.00 
0.16 0.08 0.20 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 
0.86 
-0.06 
0.06 
0.76 
0.00 
0.62 
1.08 
0.54 
0.36 
0.84 
0.12 
0.12 
0.74 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.32 
1.52 0.44 -0.24 0.32 0.12 
0.08 0.00 0.48 -0.20 0.20 
0.92 0.32 0.76 0.40 1.00 
0.24 0.04 0.38 0.04 0.02 
0.56 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.00 
1.22 0.40 0.70 0.16 0.44 
0.58 0.10 0.12 0.56 0.52 
0.32 0.00 0.36 1.00 0.00 
0.32 0.42 0.38 0.08 0.00 
0.08 0.32 -0.08 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 0.00 2.64 
0.08 0.00 -0.20 
0.14 -0.08 -0.52 
0.12 0.00 2.60 
0.08 0.00 0.32 
0.12 0.00 -0.08 
0.04 0.00 0.18 
0.48 0.00 8.24 
0.20 0.00 5.36 
0.08 0.00 1.74 
-0.08 0.00 1.04 
0.04 0.00 0.72 
0.00 0.00 -0.04 
0.08 0.00 2.16 
0.00 0.00 -0.26 
0.00 0.00 3.32 
0.04 0.00 2.96 
0.24 0.00 1.60 
0.04 0.00 0.40 
0.20 0.00 1.84 
0.20 0.00 1.44 
-0.04 0.00 1.80 
0.00 0.00 0.08 
0.04 0.00 -0.20 
0.72 0.00 4.44 
-0.02 0.00 2.50 
0.12 0.00 0.84 
0.08 0.08 3.08 
0.00 0.00 0.50 
0.24 0.00 2.52 
0.52 0.00 0.78 
0.00 0.00 0.50 
0.04 0.00 1.48 
-0.04 0.00 2.84 
0.06 0.00 0.78 
0.44 
0.28 
-0.16 
0.36 
0.24 
0.00 
0.20 
0.50 
0.00 
0.08 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.80 
2.42 
0.56 
4.52 
0.96 
1.42 
4.52 
2.92 
2.04 
2.12 
0.64 
0.20 
Company 
John David Sports 
Kelda Group 
Kingfisher 
Kleeneze 
Laura Ashley Holdings 
Logica 
London Clubs Internat. 
Longbridge International 
Lonmin 
Low & Bonar 
LPA Group 
M S B International 
~lacro ..j. 
Magnum Power 
~langanese Bronze Hldgs. 
Marconi 
Marks & Spencer 
Mayborn Group 
~1cAlpine (Alfred) 
McKechnie Group 
Mears Group 
Melrose Resources 
Metrodome Group 
Microgen 
Misys 
Morrison( \\~\1) Supermarket 
~lulberry Group 
National Grid Group 
Netcall 
Nightfreight 
Novar 
NWF Group 
Osborne & Little 
Oxford BioMedica 
Pan Andean Resources 
Parity Group 
Pearson 
Pendragon 
Peninsular & Oriental 
Pennant International 
Pennon Group 
Photo-Me Intl 
Pilkingtons Tiles Group 
PizzaExpress 
Powderject Pharmaceutic. 
Powell Duffryn 
Powergen 
Premier Farnell 
Prowting 
QS Group 
Queens Moat Houses 
Rage 
Railtrack Group 
Ramco Energy 
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0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
0.10 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.28 0.32 0.00 
0.26 0.84 0.04 -0.04 0.28 -0.08 0.00 
0.26 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
0.74 -0.02 0.36 -0.16 0.00 0.20 0.00 
0.88 0.64 0.16 0.00 0.32 0.52 0.00 
0.76 0.44 0.28 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.00 
0.16 0.60 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.00 
0.52 1.60 0.36 0.08 0.28 0.16 0.00 
0.26 0.48 0.20 0.44 0.36 0.24 0.00 
0.00 0.00 1.40 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.12 0.52 0.08 0.52 0.16 0.00 0.00 
-0.24 0.64 0.16 0.08 0.32 0.32 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.16 0.48 0.28 -0.04 0.32 0.20 0.00 
1.08 0.92 0.60 0.32 0.40 0.28 0.00 
-0.20 0.96 -0.44 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.00 
0.14 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.12 0.60 0.08 0.44 0.36 0.08 0.00 
0.56 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.28 0.24 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.64 0.00 0.24 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.42 0.72 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.00 
0.32 0.06 0.08 -0.14 0.36 0.08 0.00 
0.80 -0.04 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.00 
0.40 0.44 0.88 0.12 0.48 0.24 0.00 
-0.28 0.68 0.00 1.04 0.44 0.48 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.80 0.60 0.28 0.40 0.00 0.12 0.00 
0.36 0.24 0.48 0.44 0.16 0.32 0.00 
0.60 0.24 0.00 -0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 
1.10 0.00 0.28 0.14 0.20 0.48 0.00 
0.16 0.48 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.98 0.16 0.32 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.44 0.92 0.76 -0.16 -0.16 0.24 0.00 
0.48 0.32 0.06 0.14 0.36 0.00 0.00 
0.08 0.98 0.16 0.26 0.64 1.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.18 1.20 0.36 0.16 0.64 0.84 0.00 
0.60 1.24 0.72 0.40 0.36 0.20 0.00 
0.86 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.12 0.00 0.00 
0.60 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.00 
0.22 0.56 -0.04 0.28 0.24 0.00 0.00 
0.16 0.64 0.08 0.28 0.40 0.60 0.00 
0.42 0.12 0.10 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.16 
0.04 0.92 0.72 -0.08 0.88 0.04 0.00 
0.28 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.06 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.52 -0.24 -0.08 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.00 
1.68 0.00 0.32 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.74 0.52 0.00 -0.90 -0.24 0.06 0.00 
1.20 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
O. 19 0.00 1 .09 
-0.04 0.00 1.10 
0.00 0.00 0.54 
0.04 0.00 1.16 
0.00 0.00 2.52 
0.00 0.00 2.00 
0.08 0.00 1.04 
0.04 0.00 3.04 
0.12 0.00 2.10 
0.04 0.00 1.68 
0.08 0.00 1.48 
0.00 0.00 1.28 
0.00 0.00 -0.08 
0.16 0.00 1.56 
0.46 0.00 3.98 
0.08 0.00 0.48 
0.00 0.00 0.24 
0.04 0.00 1.72 
0.44 0.00 1.80 
0.00 0.00 0.32 
0.16 0.00 1.18 
0.00 0.00 0.16 
0.14 0.00 1.64 
0.48 0.00 1.24 
0.06 0.00 1.12 
0.28 0.00 2.84 
0.24 0.00 2.60 
0.00 0.00 0.08 
0.56 0.00 2.76 
0.32 0.00 2.32 
0.00 0.00 1.00 
0.28 0.00 2.48 
0.16 0.00 0.92 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 1.50 
-0.08 0.00 2.96 
0.12 0.00 1.48 
0.36 0.00 3.48 
0.00 0.00 -0.04 
0.00 0.00 3.38 
0.20 0.04 3.76 
0.08 0.00 2.46 
0.04 0.00 0.92 
0.02 0.00 1.28 
0.00 0.00 2.16 
0.30 0.00 1.90 
0.48 0.12 3.12 
0.16 0.00 0.74 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.12 0.00 0.56 
0.00 0.00 1.84 
0.02 0.00 0.22 
0.28 0.00 2.24 
Company 
Reckitt Benckiser 
Reed Elsevier 
Reliance Security Group 
Renold 
Rentokil Initial 
Reuters Group 
Rio Tinto 
Rolls Royce 
Sainsbury, J 
Samuel Heath & Sons 
Science Systems 
Scot. & Southern Energy 
Scottish 8:: Newcastle 
Scottish Power 
Securicor 
Senior 
Severn Trent 
Shell Transport 8:: Trad. 
Silentnight Holdings 
Simon Group 
Si:\ Continents 
Smith & Nephe\\ 
SmithKline Beecham 
Smiths Group 
Solitaire Group 
Soundtracs 
South African Brews. 
Stagecoach Group 
Tarsus Group 
Taylor Nelson Sofres 
Telewest Communications 
Tesco 
Thames Water 
Thomson Travel Group 
Tinsley (Eliza) Group 
Titon Holdings 
Torex 
Traffi cmaster 
UA Group 
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0.48 0.12 -0.36 0.12 0.16 -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.20 
-0.04 0.32 -0.30 0.46 0.42 0.50 0.00 
0.12 0.28 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.16 0.40 0.48 0.56 0.40 0.04 0.00 
0.48 1.32 0.24 0.88 0.80 0.08 0.00 
-0.90 -0.16 -0.16 -0.08 0.12 0.04 0.00 
0.02 1.08 0.52 0.12 1.08 -0.04 0.00 
0.70 0.64 0.24 0.12 0.56 1.00 0.00 
1.36 0.76 -0.08 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.00 
0.28 0.24 0.68 0.28 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.76 0.18 0.00 0.34 0.36 0.00 0.36 0.00 
0.40 0.92 0.08 0.84 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.00 
-0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.36 0.00 0.00 
0.42 0.40 0.00 0.28 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.24 0.72 0.00 0.52 0.36 0.32 0.00 0.00 
0.12 0.04 -0.04 0.16 0.08 0.40 0.00 -0.08 
-0.32 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.00 
0.52 1.16 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.00 
0.08 0.68 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.08 0.00 0.00 
0.42 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.48 0.20 0.00 0.00 
0.12 0.24 -0.04 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.60 0.04 0.08 0.20 0.04 0.40 0.00 0.00 
-0.08 0.04 0.28 0.00 0.04 0.60 0.00 0.00 
0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.22 0.92 0.56 0.24 0.28 1.04 0.00 0.00 
1.48 0.32 0.80 -0.16 0.48 0.52 0.00 0.00 
0.20 0.58 0.52 0.26 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.00 
1.08 0.60 0.60 0.84 0.28 0.16 0.00 0.00 
0.80 0.56 0.90 0.50 0.64 0.20 0.00 0.00 
0.10 -0.08 -0.16 -0.44 0.40 0.16 0.00 0.00 
0.50 0.68 0.00 0.80 0.52 0.00 0.00 
1.72 0.48 0.24 0.40 0.28 0.24 0.00 
0.40 0.12 0.24 0.76 0.00 0.04 0.00 
0.80 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 0.00 1. 76 
0.08 0.00 0.56 
0.12 0.00 2.16 
0.24 0.00 4.04 
0.00 -0.28 -1.02 
0.16 0.00 2.94 
0.20 0.00 3.46 
0.60 0.00 3.36 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 1.56 
0.40 0.00 2.40 
0.36 0.00 3.60 
0.02 0.00 0.22 
0.08 0.00 1.42 
0.28 0.00 2.44 
0.32 0.00 1.00 
0.02 0.00 -0.40 
0.20 0.00 2.32 
0.20 0.00 1.68 
0.14 -0.08 1.32 
0.08 0.00 0.52 
0.30 0.00 1.66 
0.10 0.00 0.98 
0.08 0.00 0.32 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.76 0.00 4.02 
0.18 0.00 3.62 
0.32 0.00 2.32 
0.04 0.00 3.60 
1.92 0.00 5.52 
0.04 0.00 0.02 
0.16 0.00 2.66 
0.32 0.00 3.68 
0.04 0.00 1.60 
0.04 0.00 1.20 
0.00 0.00 0.96 
0.00 0.00 0.20 
0.00 0.00 0.04 
Unilever 0.40 1.08 0.20 0.12 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 2.38 
United Business Media 0.24 1.04 0.08 0.56 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 2.90 
United Utilities -0.20 0.80 0.00 0.40 0.16 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.40 0.00 2.14 
Vernalis Group 0.00 0.10 -0.26 0.24 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 
Vodafone Group 0.10 0.44 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.48 
Weeks Group (The) 0.00 0.64 0.08 0.64 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.68 
Wellington Holdings 0.60 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 
Whitbread -0.16 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.42 
WPP Group 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.44 
WSP Group 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.08 
Xansa 0.11 0.52 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.11 
Xenova Group 0.72 0.16 -0.04 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.92 
Note: This appendix shows the difference in the number of pages for each of the disclosure categories about 
derivative information pre, and post, the issue of FRS 13. The differences are shown for every company in the 
sample. 
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Appendix 5.8: Narrative and Numerical Disclosure for all Sample 
Companies Post FRS 13 Implementation 
Narrative Numerical 
Post FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
Com~any No. of pages No. of~ages 
10 Group 0.44 0.64 
Alexandra 1.60 1.36 
Allders 0.76 0.00 
Allied Donlecq 0.62 2.00 
AnlCO Corporation 0.12 0.96 
Anley 1.06 1.52 
Anlstrad 0.92 0.20 
Anglo Siberian Oil 0.64 0.20 
Anite Group 0.52 0.56 
Arnlitage Bros 0.52 0.12 
Assoc. Brit. Engineering 1.04 0.92 
Associated British Foods 0.64 2.68 
AstraZeneca 1.88 5.04 
AYesco 0.l4 0.24 
Avingtrans 0.98 0.28 
BAA 0.88 2.36 
BAE Systems 2.44 2.44 
Berkeley Group 1.12 0.00 
BG Group 2.50 3.32 
BHP Billiton 3.82 5.48 
Biotrace International 0.40 0.48 
Bloomsbury Publishing 0.12 0.28 
Blue Circle Industries 1.16 2.66 
BOC Group 2.52 5.72 
Bond Internat. Software 0.12 0.70 
Boots Company (The) 2.20 2.00 
BP 3.16 5.36 
Brammer 0.78 0.52 
Brancote Holdings 0.04 0.16 
Brandon Hire 1.00 0.56 
Bristol Water 1.04 2.28 
Brit. Bloodstock Agency 0.36 0.24 
British Airways 2.10 2.64 
British American Tobacco 1.94 4.06 
British Energy 1.36 1.00 
British Sky Broadcasting 1.28 2.24 
BT Group 3.44 2.88 
Bum Stewart Distillers 0.68 1.52 
Cable & Wireless 2.10 3.24 
Cadbury Schweppes 4.28 4.52 
Cakebread Robey 0.12 0.08 
Carlton Communications 1.82 2.72 
Celsis International 0.36 0.72 
312 
Narrative Numerical 
Post FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
Company No. of pages No. of pages 
Centrica 1.88 2.88 
Charlton Athletic 0.00 0.40 
Charter 1.02 3.56 
Charterhouse Comms. 0.68 0.24 
Clydeport 0.40 0.44 
Con1pass Group 1.60 2.44 
Compel Group 0.10 0.40 
ComputerLand UK 0.28 0.00 
Cookson Group 1.00 2.16 
Corus Group 2.00 2.04 
Coutts (C .A.) Holdings 0.04 1.08 
Cradley Group Holdings 0.58 2.00 
CRC Group 0.20 0.40 
Daily Mail & General Tst 1.60 2.64 
Dana Petroleum 1.24 1.52 
Davis Service Group 1.60 1.96 
De La Rue 1.56 0.36 
Diageo 1.46 3.64 
Digital Animations Group 1.28 1.36 
Dinkie Heel 0.52 0.24 
Dixons Group 1.16 1.76 
Elementis 1.08 1.96 
EMAP 3.80 5.88 
Emess 1.48 5.04 
EMI Group 1.66 2.64 
Energis 1.32 1.28 
Ennstone 0.72 0.88 
Epic Group 0.04 0.12 
Eurodis Electron 0.72 2.60 
European Colour 0.32 0.48 
Fayrewood 1.40 2.12 
Filtronic 0.92 2.80 
First Choice Holidays 0.90 1.28 
Flomerics Group 0.52 0.20 
Fountains 1.00 1.80 
French 0.72 1.40 
Gallaher Group 1.76 2.72 
GB Railways Group 0.16 0.00 
George Wimpey 0.76 3.28 
GKN 2.88 3.44 
Glaxo Wellcome 2.94 4.72 
Goldshield Group 1.20 0.00 
Granada 1.58 2.92 
Groupe Chez Gerard 0.30 0.44 
GUS 0.90 2.28 
Hanson 1.70 1.64 
Hartstone Group 0.76 1.12 
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Narrative Numerical 
Post FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
Company No. of pages No. of pages 
Hat Pin 0.56 1.00 
Hays 1.28 2.08 
Hewden Stuart 0.78 0.00 
Hilton Group 1.88 2.96 
Hogg Robinson 0.84 2.80 
Imperial Chemical Inds. 2.24 5.94 
Imperial Tobacco Group 2.04 5.48 
Infast Group 1.34 0.50 
International Greetings 0.72 1.40 
International Power 2.00 5.14 
Invensys 1.40 4.40 
Jacques Vert 0.56 1.76 
Jarvis Porter 1.20 1.28 
Jasmin 1.00 0.56 
J enning Brothers 0.20 0.12 
John David Sports 0.08 0.36 
Kelda Group 0.69 1.52 
Kingfisher 2.32 3.24 
Kleeneze 0.26 0.28 
Laura Ashley Holdings 0.90 0.72 
Logica 1.28 2.04 
London Clubs Internat. 1.08 1.16 
Longbridge International 0.32 0.76 
Lonmin 0.84 3.04 
Low & Bonar 0.74 1.80 
LPAGroup 0.08 1.64 
M S B International 0.42 1.38 
Macro 4 0.32 1.56 
Magnum Power 0.08 0.32 
Manganese Bronze Hldgs. 0.72 1.28 
Marconi 2.26 2.56 
Marks & Spencer 0.58 2.28 
Mayborn Group 0.22 0.36 
McAlpine (Alfred) 0.48 1.56 
McKechnie Group 1.14 1.04 
Mears Group 0.04 0.48 
Melrose Resources 1.00 0.68 
Metrodome Group 0.18 0.00 
Microgen 0.88 1.20 
Misys 1.48 0.92 
Morrison(WM) Supermarket 0.98 0.38 
Mulberry Group 1.32 1.84 
National Grid Group 2.32 2.04 
Netcall 0.08 0.20 
Nightfreight 1.52 1.44 
Novar 1.48 1.96 
NWFGroup 0.72 0.88 
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Narrative Numerical 
Post FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
Company No. of pages No. of pages 
Osborne & Little 1.76 0.80 
Oxford BioMedica 0.32 0.60 
Pan Andean Resources 0.04 0.04 
Parity Group 1.26 1.06 
Pearson 3.96 4.96 
Pendragon 0.70 1.06 
Peninsular & Oriental 1.40 4.04 
Pennant International 0.12 0.24 
Pennon Group 0.98 3.98 
Photo-Me IntI. 1.24 3.08 
Pilkingtons Tiles Group 1.10 2.40 
PizzaExpress 0.96 0.00 
Powderject Pharmaceutic. 0.80 1.08 
Powell Duffryn 0.70 2.88 
Powergen 2.34 1.92 
Premier Farnell 0.96 2.80 
Prowting 0.70 0.28 
QS Group 0.08 0.08 
Queens Moat Houses 2.26 4.32 
Rage 2.04 0.36 
Rai1track Group 1.70 2.74 
Ramco Energy 1.72 0.80 
Reckitt Benckiser 1.70 2.84 
Reed Elsevier 1.58 3.48 
Reliance Security Group 0.20 0.48 
Renold 0.86 2.00 
Rentokil Initial 1.48 3.68 
Reuters Group 2.30 2.48 
Rio Tinto 1.88 5.60 
Rolls Royce 2.02 3.08 
Sainsbury, J 2.98 2.16 
Samuel Heath & Sons 0.02 0.00 
Science Systems 0.80 1.04 
Scot. & Southern Energy 1.88 1.08 
Scottish & Newcastle 1.52 3.64 
Scottish Power 2.18 1.84 
Securicor 0.62 1.16 
Senior 1.32 2.56 
Severn Trent 0.86 2.40 
Shell Transport & Trad. 1.36 1.18 
Silentnight Holdings 1.36 1.72 
Simon Group 0.66 1.32 
Six Continents 2.20 1.88 
Smith & Nephew 0.74 1.04 
SmithKline Beecham 2.68 2.32 
Smiths Group 1.44 1.48 
Solitaire Group 0.32 0.00 
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Narrative Numerical 
Post FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
Company No. of pages No. of pages 
Soundtracs 0.04 0.16 
South African Brews. 2.66 5.16 
Stagecoach Group 2.86 3.76 
Tarsus Group 0.84 1.76 
Taylor Nelson Sofres 1.80 2.48 
Telewest Comnlunications 7.22 1.96 
Tesco 1.58 1.92 
Thames \Yater 1.38 2.92 
Thomson Travel Group 2.32 1.84 
Tinsley (Eliza) Group 0.48 1.60 
Titon Holdings 0.88 0.36 
Torex 1.00 0.48 
Trafficnlaster 0.16 0.04 
UAGroup 0.08 0.20 
Unileyer 2.42 2.56 
United Business Media 1.64 4.96 
United Utilities 4.08 1.32 
Vemalis Group 1.00 0.60 
Vodafone Group 2.08 2.52 
Weeks Group (The) 0.40 1.44 
Wellington Holdings 0.72 0.36 
Whitbread 1.24 1.32 
wpp Group 1.02 0.54 
WSP Group 0.96 0.56 
Xansa 0.24 1.44 
Xenova Group 0.98 0.72 
TOTAL 253.79 370.76 
MEAN 1.21 1.76 
STANDARD DEVIATION 0.96 1.45 
Note: This appendix shows the total narrative and numerical disclosure about derivative information following 
the issue of FRS 13 for every company in the sample. 
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Appendix 5.9: Total Disclosure for all Sample Companies Pre and Post FRS 
13 Implementation 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference 
Compan~ No. of Pages No. of Pages No. of~ages 
10 Group 0.08 1.08 1.00 
Alexandra 0.30 2.96 2.66 
Allders 0.12 0.76 0.64 
Allied Domecq 2.80 2.62 -0.18 
Arnco Corporation 1.00 1.08 0.08 
Arney 0.48 2.58 2.10 
Arnstrad 0.08 1.12 1.04 
Anglo Siberian Oil 0.40 0.84 0.44 
Anite Group 0.24 1.08 0.84 
Annitage Bros 0.24 0.64 0.40 
Assoc. Brit. Engineering 0.40 1.96 1.56 
Associated British Foods 0.72 3.32 2.60 
AstraZeneca 6.28 6.92 0.64 
Avesco 0.52 0.38 -0.14 
Avingtrans 0.48 1.26 0.78 
BAA 1.74 3.24 1.50 
BAE Systems 5.74 4.88 -0.86 
Berkeley Group 0.04 1.12 1.08 
BGGroup 5.92 5.82 -0.10 
BHP Billiton 2.64 9.30 6.66 
Biotrace International 0.04 0.88 0.84 
Bloomsbury Publishing 0.40 0.40 0.00 
Blue Circle Industries 4.50 3.82 -0.68 
BOC Group 5.44 8.24 2.80 
Bond Internat. Software 0.76 0.82 0.06 
Boots Company (The) 1.84 4.20 2.36 
BP 4.41 8.52 4.11 
Brammer 0.76 1.30 0.54 
Brancote Holdings 0.56 0.20 -0.36 
Brandon Hire 0.60 1.56 0.96 
Bristol Water 0.20 3.32 3.12 
Brit. Bloodstock Agency 0.12 0.60 0.48 
British Airways 3.86 4.74 0.88 
British American Tobacco 3.18 6.00 2.82 
British Energy 2.32 2.36 0.04 
British Sky Broadcasting 1.28 3.52 2.24 
BT Group 4.32 6.32 2.00 
Bum Stewart Distillers 0.84 2.20 1.36 
Cable & Wireless 2.78 5.34 2.56 
Cadbury Schweppes 11.08 8.80 -2.28 
Cakebread Robey 0.00 0.20 0.20 
Carlton Communications 3.18 4.54 1.36 
Celsis International 0.84 1.08 0.24 
Centric a 1.66 4.76 3.10 
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Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference 
Company No. of Pages No. of Pages No. of~ages 
Charlton Athletic 0.24 0.40 0.16 
Charter 4.58 4.58 0.00 
Charterhouse Comms. 0.28 0.92 0.64 
Clydeport 0.00 0.84 0.84 
Compass Group 1.64 4.04 2.40 
Compel Group 0.40 0.50 0.10 
ComputerLand UK 0.04 0.28 0.24 
Cookson Group 1.10 3.16 2.06 
Corns Group 3.38 4.04 0.66 
Coutts (C.A.) Holdings 1.04 1.12 0.08 
Cradley Group Holdings 0.24 2.58 2.34 
eRe Group 0.20 0.60 0.40 
Daily Mail & General Tst 1.60 4.24 2.64 
Dana Petroleum 0.24 2.76 2.52 
Davis Service Group 0.92 3.56 2.64 
De La Rue 2.12 1.92 -0.20 
Diageo 5.62 5.10 -0.52 
Digital Animations Group 0.04 2.64 2.60 
Dinkie Heel 0.44 0.76 0.32 
Dixons Group 3.00 2.92 -0.08 
Elementis 2.86 3.04 0.18 
EMAP 1.44 9.68 8.24 
Emess 1.16 6.52 5.36 
EMI Group 2.56 4.30 1.74 
Energis 1.56 2.60 1.04 
Ennstone 0.88 1.60 0.72 
Epic Group 0.20 0.16 -0.04 
Eurodis Electron 1.16 3.32 2.16 
European Colour 1.06 0.80 -0.26 
Fayrewood 0.20 3.52 3.32 
Filtronic 0.76 3.72 2.96 
First Choice Holidays 0.58 2.18 1.60 
Flomerics Group 0.32 0.72 0.40 
Fountains 0.96 2.80 1.84 
French 0.68 2.12 1.44 
Gallaher Group 2.68 4.48 1.80 
GB Railways Group 0.08 0.16 0.08 
George Wimpey 4.24 4.04 -0.20 
GKN 1.88 6.32 4.44 
Glaxo Wellcome 5.16 7.66 2.50 
Goldshield Group 0.36 1.20 0.84 
Granada 1.42 4.50 3.08 
Groupe Chez Gerard 0.24 0.74 0.50 
GUS 0.66 3.18 2.52 
Hanson 2.56 3.34 0.78 
Hartstone Group 1.38 1.88 0.50 
Hat Pin 0.08 1.56 1.48 
Hays 0.52 3.36 2.84 
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Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference 
Compan~ No. of Pages No. of Pages No. of~ages 
Hewden Stuart 0.00 0.78 0.78 
Hilton Group 2.04 4.84 2.80 
Hogg Robinson 1.22 3.64 2.42 
Imperial Chemical Inds. 7.62 8.18 0.56 
Imperial Tobacco Group 2.00 6.52 4.52 
Infast Group 0.88 1.84 0.96 
International Greetings 1.00 2.42 1.42 
International Power 2.62 7.14 4.52 
Invensys 2.88 5.80 2.92 
Jacques Vert 0.28 2.32 2.04 
Jarvis Porter 0.36 2.48 2.12 
Jasmin 0.92 1.56 0.64 
J enning Brothers 0.12 0.32 0.20 
John David Sports 0.48 0.44 -0.04 
Kelda Group 1.12 2.21 1.09 
Kingfisher 4.30 5.40 1.10 
Kleeneze 0.00 0.54 0.54 
Laura Ashley Holdings 0.46 1.62 1.16 
Logica 0.80 3.32 2.52 
London Clubs Internat. 0.24 2.24 2.00 
Longbridge International 0.04 1.08 1.04 
Lonmin 0.84 3.88 3.04 
Low & Bonar 0.44 2.54 2.10 
LPAGroup 0.04 1.72 1.68 
M S B International 0.32 1.80 1.48 
Macro 4 0.60 1.88 1.28 
Magnum Power 0.48 0.40 -0.08 
Manganese Bronze Hldgs. 0.44 2.00 1.56 
Marconi 0.84 4.82 3.98 
Marks & Spencer 2.38 2.86 0.48 
Mayborn Group 0.44 0.68 0.24 
McAlpine (Alfred) 0.32 2.04 1.72 
McKechnie Group 0.38 2.18 1.80 
Mears Group 0.20 0.52 0.32 
Melrose Resources 0.50 1.68 1.18 
Metrodome Group 0.02 0.18 0.16 
Microgen 0.44 2.08 1.64 
Misys 1.16 2.40 1.24 
Morrison(WM) Supermarket 0.24 1.36 1.12 
Mulberry Group 0.32 3.16 2.84 
National Grid Group 1.76 4.36 2.60 
Netcall 0.20 0.28 0.08 
Nightfreight 0.20 2.96 2.76 
Novar 1.12 3.44 2.32 
NWF Group 0.60 1.60 1.00 
Osborne & Little 0.08 2.56 2.48 
Oxford BioMedica 0.00 0.92 0.92 
Pan Andean Resources 0.08 0.08 0.00 
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Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference 
Compan~ No. of Pages No. of Pages No. of~ages 
Parity Group 0.82 2.32 1.50 
Pearson 5.96 8.92 2.96 
Pendragon 0.28 1.76 1.48 
Peninsular & Oriental 1.96 5.44 3.48 
Pennant International 0.40 0.36 -0.04 
Pennon Group 1.58 4.96 3.38 
Photo-Me Intl. 0.56 4.32 3.76 
Pilkingtons Tiles Group 1.04 3.50 2.46 
PizzaExpress 0.04 0.96 0.92 
PowdeIject Pharmaceutic. 0.60 1.88 1.28 
Powell Duffryn 1.42 3.58 2.16 
Powergen 2.36 4.26 1.90 
Premier Farnell 0.64 3.76 3.12 
Prowting 0.24 0.98 0.74 
QS Group 0.08 0.08 0.00 
Queens Moat Houses 6.02 6.58 0.56 
Rage 0.56 2.40 1.84 
Railtrack Group 4.22 4.44 0.22 
Ramco Energy 0.28 2.52 2.24 
Reckitt Benckiser 4.34 4.54 0.20 
Reed Elsevier 3.30 5.06 1.76 
Reliance Security Group 0.12 0.68 0.56 
Renold 0.70 2.86 2.16 
Rentokil Initial 1.12 5.16 4.04 
Reuters Group 5.80 4.78 -1.02 
Rio Tinto 4.54 7.48 2.94 
Rolls Royce 1.64 5.10 3.46 
Sainsbury, J 1.78 5.14 3.36 
Samuel Heath & Sons 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Science Systems 0.28 1.84 1.56 
Scot. & Southern Energy 0.56 2.96 2.40 
Scottish & Newcastle 1.56 5.16 3.60 
Scottish Power 3.80 4.02 0.22 
Securicor 0.36 1.78 1.42 
Senior 1.44 3.88 2.44 
Severn Trent 2.26 3.26 1.00 
Shell Transport & Trad. 2.94 2.54 -0.40 
Silentnight Holdings 0.76 3.08 2.32 
Simon Group 0.30 1.98 1.68 
Six Continents 2.76 4.08 1.32 
Smith & Nephew 1.26 1.78 0.52 
SmithKline Beecham 3.34 5.00 1.66 
Smiths Group 1.94 2.92 0.98 
Solitaire Group 0.00 0.32 0.32 
Soundtracs 0.20 0.20 0.00 
South African Brews. 3.80 7.82 4.02 
Stagecoach Group 3.00 6.62 3.62 
Tarsus Group 0.28 2.60 2.32 
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Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference 
Compan~ No. of Pages No. of Pages No. of~ages 
Taylor Nelson Sofres 0.68 4.28 3.60 
Telewest Comnlunications 3.66 9.18 5.52 
Tesco 3.48 3.50 0.02 
Thames Water 1.64 4.30 2.66 
Thomson Travel Group 0.48 4.16 3.68 
Tinsley (Eliza) Group 0.48 2.08 1.60 
Titon Holdings 0.04 1.24 1.20 
Torex 0.52 1.48 0.96 
Trafficnlaster 0.00 0.20 0.20 
UA Group 0.24 0.28 0.04 
Unilever 2.60 4.98 2.38 
United Business Media 3.70 6.60 2.90 
United Utilities 3.26 5.40 2.14 
Vernalis Group 1.64 1.60 -0.04 
Vodafone Group 3.12 4.60 1.48 
Weeks Group (The) 0.16 1.84 1.68 
Wellington Holdings 0.24 1.08 0.84 
Whitbread 2.98 2.56 -0.42 
wpp Group 1.12 1.56 0.44 
\YSP Group 0.44 1.52 1.08 
Xansa 0.57 1.68 1.11 
Xenova Grout! 0.78 1.70 0.92 
TOTAL 308.86 623.71 314.85 
~ote: This appendix shows the total disclosure about derivative information pre, and post, the issue of FRS 13 
for every company in the sample. 
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Appendix 5.10: Content Analysis Percentage of Annual Report by Market 
Type 
Table 1: FTSE 100 - Percentage of Annual Report (n=73) 
Panel A - Means 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 1.1746 1.5129 0.3383 0.0000 
Interest Rate Risk 0.6676 l.1763 0.5087 0.0000 
Currency Risk 0.2343 0.3526 0.l183 0.0010 
Liquidity Risk 0.5721 0.8376 0.2655 0.0000 
Fair Values 0.3097 0.6322 0.3225 0.0000 
Hedge Accounting 1T sed 0.1205 0.4717 0.3512 0.0000 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0640 0.0808 0.0168 0.3220 
Market Price Risk 0.0464 0.0467 0.0003 0.9820 
Accounting Policies 0.2933 0.5240 0.2307 0.0000 
General Other 0.0149 0.0340 0.0191 0.2420 
TOTAL 3.4970 5.6660 2.1690 0.0000 
Panel B - Medians 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 1.1824 1.5000 0.3176 0.0003 
Interest Rate Risk 0.5882 1.1500 0.5618 0.0000 
Currency Risk 0.1333 0.3117 0.1784 0.0019 
Liquidity Risk 0.5057 0.7302 0.2245 0.0004 
Fair Values 0.2474 0.5872 0.3398 0.0000 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0571 0.3894 0.3323 0.0000 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7692 
Market Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8060 
Accounting Policies 0.2000 0.4416 0.2416 0.0000 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3792 
TOTAL 3.4035 5.8082 2.4047 0.0000 
Table 2: FTSE Other - Percentage of Annual Report (n=100) 
Panel A - Means 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.4119 1.1742 
0.2327 0.8499 
0.0891 0.4703 
0.5880 0.8491 
0.0454 0.3597 
0.0771 0.2310 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0040 0.0077 
0.1066 0.3149 
0.0000 0.0053 
1.5550 4.2620 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.1633 1.0742 
0.0597 0.7274 
0.0000 0.3564 
0.5275 0.7243 
0.0000 0.2051 
0.0656 0.0909 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0861 0.2519 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.0619 4.l288 
Difference 
0.7624 
0.6173 
0.3812 
0.2611 
0.3143 
0.1539 
0.0000 
0.0037 
0.2083 
0.0053 
2.7070 
Difference 
0.9109 
0.6677 
0.3564 
0.1968 
0.2051 
0.0253 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1658 
0.0000 
3.0669 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.1760 
0.0000 
0.0770 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0011 
0.0000 
0.0001 
1.0000 
0.4154 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
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Table 3: AIM - Percentage of Annual Report (n=37) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objecti\'es. Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair \' alues 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
~larket Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOT.-\L 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.0370 0.6130 
0.1150 0.6000 
0.0015 0.2478 
0.6650 0.8600 
0.0000 0.1402 
0.0338 0.0481 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0997 0.2136 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.9520 2.7220 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.0000 0.3556 
0.1176 0.2857 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.3750 0.5000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1176 0.1429 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.6250 2.1540 
Difference 
0.5760 
0.4850 
0.2463 
0.1950 
0.1402 
0.0143 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1139 
0.0000 
1.7700 
Difference 
0.3556 
0.1681 
0.0000 
0.1250 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0253 
0.0000 
1.5290 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0070 
0.0530 
0.0010 
0.3550 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0010 
1.0000 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0025 
0.0007 
0.2772 
1.0000 
0.9160 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0384 
1.0000 
0.0000 
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Appendix 5.11: Content Analysis Results by Sector 
Table 1: Basic Industries Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure (n=20) 
Panel A - Means 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.4190 0.6340 
0.3660 0.5970 
0.1620 0.2550 
0.4110 0.5480 
0.1800 0.2480 
0.0980 0.1960 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0530 0.0620 
0.1650 0.2430 
0.0040 0.0040 
1.8580 2.7870 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.2000 0.5900 
0.0600 0.4500 
0.0000 0.2000 
0.2400 0.5400 
0.0000 0.2100 
0.0400 0.0400 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0400 0.1400 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.0200 2.5100 
Difference 
0.2150 
0.2310 
0.0930 
0.1370 
0.0680 
0.0980 
0.0000 
0.0090 
0.0780 
0.0000 
0.9290 
Difference 
0.3900 
0.3900 
0.2000 
0.3000 
0.2100 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1000 
0.0000 
1.4900 
P-Value 
0.0330 
0.0130 
0.0360 
0.0280 
0.0670 
0.0800 
1.0000 
0.2160 
0.0900 
1.0000 
0.0010 
P-Value 
0.0858 
0.0961 
0.2117 
0.4079 
0.1181 
0.5221 
1.0000 
0.6891 
0.0745 
1.0000 
0.0961 
Table 2: Cyclical Consumer Goods Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure 
(n=ll) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.1960 0.7400 
0.0727 0.3164 
0.0000 0.3491 
0.2473 0.3382 
0.0000 0.1727 
0.0290 0.2470 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0545 0.2582 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.6000 2.4220 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.1000 0.6000 
0.0000 0.3200 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.2000 0.3400 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0400 0.0400 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0400 0.2400 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.4400 2.1200 
Difference 
0.5440 
0.2440 
0.3491 
0.0909 
0.1727 
0.2180 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2036 
0.0000 
1.8220 
Difference 
0.5000 
0.3200 
0.0000 
0.1400 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2000 
0.0000 
1.6800 
P-Value 
0.0020 
0.0550 
0.0005 
0.0210 
0.0280 
0.1650 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0070 
1.0000 
0.0001 
P-Value 
0.0040 
0.0187 
1.0000 
0.2623 
1.0000 
0.2607 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0016 
1.0000 
0.0006 
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Table 3: Cyclical Services Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure (0=80) 
Panel A - Means 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 0.3668 0.7410 0.3742 0.0000 
Interest Rate Risk 0.2332 0.6140 0.3807 0.0000 
Currency Risk 0.0730 0.1900 0.1170 0.0000 
Liquidity Risk 0.3285 0.5115 0.1830 0.0000 
Fair Values 0.0713 0.2667 0.1955 0.0000 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0473 0.1585 0.1112 0.0000 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market Price Risk 0.0023 0.0075 0.0052 0.2970 
Accounting Policies 0.0700 0.1907 0.1207 0.0000 
General Other 0.0065 0.0055 0.0010 0.8100 
TOTAL 1.1990 2.6840 1.4850 0.0000 
Panel B - Medians 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
ObjectiYes. Policies & Strategies 0.0800 0.6200 0.5400 0.0000 
Interest Rate Risk 0.0800 0.5600 0.4800 0.0000 
Currency Risk 0.0000 0.0800 0.0800 0.0000 
Liquidity Risk 0.2200 0.4400 0.2200 0.0010 
Fair Values 0.0000 0.2000 0.2000 0.0000 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0400 0.0400 0.0000 0.0008 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
~larket Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8901 
Accounting Policies 0.0400 0.1300 0.0800 0.0000 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6897 
TOTAL 0.5600 2.4100 1.8500 0.0000 
Table 4: General Industrials Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure (n=21) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.4000 0.6340 
0.2200 0.6060 
0.0857 0.3238 
0.3780 0.5970 
0.0714 0.2771 
0.0695 0.2676 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0057 0.0104 
0.0600 0.1857 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.2900 2.9020 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.1600 0.6400 
0.0800 0.6000 
0.0000 0.2800 
0.2800 0.4600 
0.0000 0.2800 
0.0400 0.2000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0400 0.1600 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.7000 2.8600 
Difference 
0.2340 
0.3860 
0.2381 
0.2190 
0.2057 
0.1981 
0.0000 
0.0047 
0.1257 
0.0000 
1.6120 
Difference 
0.4800 
0.5200 
0.2800 
0.1800 
0.2800 
0.1600 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1200 
0.0000 
2.1600 
P-Value 
0.0420 
0.0010 
0.0020 
0.0040 
0.0000 
0.0040 
1.0000 
0.3290 
0.0010 
1.0000 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0195 
0.0092 
0.0005 
0.1243 
0.0020 
0.0234 
1.0000 
0.5925 
0.0025 
1.0000 
0.0011 
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Table 5: Information Technology Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure (n=18) 
Panel A - Means 
T~'pe of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
ObjectiYes, Policies & Strategies 0.1039 0.3600 0.2561 0.0070 
Interest Rate Risk 0.0678 0.3422 0.2744 0.0060 
Currency Risk 0.0000 0.1933 0.1933 0.0040 
Liquidity Risk 0.2611 0.3256 0.0644 0.1620 
Fair Values 0.0000 0.0800 0.0800 0.0220 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0244 0.0800 0.0556 0.1090 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Accounting Policies 0.0356 0.1033 0.0678 0.0330 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
TOTAL 0.4930 1.4840 0.9920 0.0000 
Panel B - Medians 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectiyes. Policies & Strategies 0.0000 0.2600 0.2600 0.0125 
Interest Rate Risk 0.0200 0.3000 0.2800 0.0009 
Currency Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Liquidity Risk 0.2700 0.3100 0.0400 0.3654 
Fair Values 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Hedge Accounting Used 
.... .... 
0.0400 0.0400 0.0000 0.4516 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Accounting Policies 0.0400 0.0400 0.0000 0.0779 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
TOTAL 0.4200 1.5200 1.1000 0.0010 
Table 6: Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure 
(0=25) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.8150 1.0350 
0.4890 0.7920 
0.2224 0.2960 
0.3432 0.5568 
0.2704 0.3880 
0.0800 0.2808 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0760 0.0704 
0.1888 0.3120 
0.0032 0.0080 
2.4880 3.7390 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.6000 0.9200 
0.2000 0.6400 
0.0800 0.3200 
0.2400 0.4400 
0.0000 0.0400 
0.0400 0.1200 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1200 0.2600 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.6400 3.3200 
Difference 
0.2200 
0.3030 
0.0736 
0.2136 
0.1176 
0.2008 
0.0000 
-0.0056 
0.1232 
0.0048 
1.2510 
Difference 
0.3200 
0.4400 
0.2400 
0.2000 
0.0400 
0.0800 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1400 
0.0000 
1.6800 
P-Value 
0.0060 
0.0130 
0.2350 
0.0010 
0.0300 
0.0100 
1.0000 
0.6890 
0.0030 
0.5240 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.2002 
0.0167 
0.0648 
0.0819 
0.0588 
0.0219 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0407 
0.5717 
0.0388 
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Table 7: Non-Cyclical Services Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure (0=10) 
T~'pe of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTA.L 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair \' alues 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.7460 1.3580 
0.3520 0.8380 
0.0700 0.3580 
0.3380 0.4980 
0.2080 0.4400 
0.0280 0.2520 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0080 0.0600 
0.5040 0.8420 
0.0000 0.0120 
2.2540 4.6580 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.6800 1.4400 
0.3200 0.8600 
0.0200 0.2400 
0.2800 0.5600 
0.0000 0.4000 
0.0400 0.2000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1200 0.4900 
0.0000 0.0000 
2.2800 4.7100 
Difference 
0.6120 
0.4860 
0.2880 
0.1600 
0.2320 
0.2240 
0.0000 
0.0520 
0.3380 
0.0120 
2.4040 
Difference 
0.7600 
0.5400 
0.2200 
0.2800 
0.4000 
0.1600 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1300 
0.0000 
2.1000 
P-Value 
0.0010 
0.0100 
0.0380 
0.0860 
0.0150 
0.0070 
1.0000 
0.4190 
0.1070 
0.3430 
0.0010 
P-Value 
0.0233 
0.0126 
0.0413 
0.1124 
0.0757 
0.0046 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.2265 
1.0000 
0.0091 
Table 8: Resources Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure (0=12) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.6290 1.0270 
0.2430 0.7370 
0.1680 0.3950 
0.3350 0.4180 
0.1430 0.4230 
0.0800 0.2430 
0.0917 0.0683 
0.0300 0.0000 
0.1983 0.3900 
0.0270 0.1000 
1.9460 3.8020 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.2200 0.8400 
0.0700 0.4000 
0.0100 0.3100 
0.3200 0.3500 
0.0000 0.2400 
0.0400 0.0400 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1200 0.4600 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.7000 2.6500 
Difference 
0.3980 
0.4930 
0.2270 
0.0830 
0.2800 
0.1630 
0.0233 
-0.0300 
0.1917 
0.0730 
1.8560 
Difference 
0.6200 
0.3300 
0.0300 
0.0300 
0.2400 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.3400 
0.0000 
1.9500 
P-Value 
0.0400 
0.0220 
0.0000 
0.1170 
0.0320 
0.2020 
0.0206 
0.3390 
0.0310 
0.3390 
0.0120 
P-Value 
0.2964 
0.1314 
0.0636 
0.6638 
0.0835 
0.4035 
0.9645 
1.0000 
0.1489 
1.0000 
0.2364 
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Table 9: Utilities Sector - Number of Pages of FRS 13 Disclosure (n=13) 
Panel A - Means 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objt'ctiyt's, Policies 8.: Strategies 0.7370 1.0450 0.3080 0.0190 
Interest Rate Risk 0.2290 0.7220 0.4920 0.0020 
Currency Risk 0.0692 0.1262 0.0570 0.2960 
Liquidity Risk 0.3600 0.6950 0.3350 0.0040 
Fair Values 0.1662 0.5000 0.3338 0.0010 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0246 0.3585 0.3338 0.0010 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.2000 0.2770 0.0770 0.2960 
Market Price Risk 0.0061 0.0000 
-0.0061 0.3370 
Accounting Policies 0.1415 0.3438 0.2023 0.0000 
General Other 0.0000 0.0338 0.0338 0.2480 
TOT.\l 1.9340 4.1010 2.1670 0.0000 
Panel B - Medians 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectiyt's. Policies & Strategies 0.5600 1.0800 0.5200 0.1510 
Interest Rate Risk 0.1800 0.6200 0.4400 0.0012 
Currt'ncY Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3957 
liquidity Risk 0.2800 0.4800 0.2000 0.0255 
Fair Valut's 0.0000 0.4400 0.4400 0.0041 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0000 0.3600 0.3600 0.0022 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5492 
}'larkt't Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Accounting Policies 0.1200 0.3600 0.2400 0.0103 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
TOTAL 1.7600 4.2600 2.5000 0.0003 
Table 10: Basic Industries Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=20) 
Type of Disclosure 
ObjectiYes. Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.5780 1.1000 
0.5160 0.9050 
0.2205 0.3809 
0.7020 0.9300 
0.2322 0.3664 
0.1579 0.2684 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0513 0.0635 
0.2260 0.3441 
0.0025 0.0027 
2.6870 4.3610 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.4671 1.0586 
0.1366 0.9139 
0.0000 0.4325 
0.5149 0.9293 
0.0000 0.3844 
0.0748 0.0990 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1043 0.2918 
0.0000 0.0000 
2.0400 4.5900 
Difference 
0.5220 
0.3890 
0.1604 
0.2270 
0.1342 
0.1105 
0.0000 
0.0122 
0.1181 
0.0002 
1.6740 
Difference 
0.5915 
0.7773 
0.4325 
0.4144 
0.3844 
0.0242 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1875 
0.0000 
2.5500 
P-Value 
0.0120 
0.0040 
0.0430 
0.0570 
0.0500 
0.0850 
1.0000 
0.2000 
0.0660 
0.3300 
0.0010 
P-Value 
0.0272 
0.0396 
0.1560 
0.2385 
0.0834 
0.4807 
1.0000 
0.6891 
0.0274 
1.0000 
0.0223 
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Table 11: Cyclical Consumer Goods Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=ll) 
Panel A - Means 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 0.4520 1.6050 1.1520 0.0020 
Interest Rate Risk 0.1510 0.6530 0.5020 0.0480 
Currency Risk 0.0000 0.8160 0.8160 0.0070 
Liquidity Risk 0.6170 0.7650 0.1479 0.1390 
Fair Values 0.0000 0.4070 0.4070 0.0240 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0740 0.4070 0.3330 0.0990 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Accounting Policies 0.1269 0.5142 0.3873 0.0010 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
TOTAL 1.4210 5.1680 3.7460 0.0000 
Panel B - Medians 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
ObjectiH's. Policies & Strategies 0.2500 1.3950 1.1450 0.0021 
Interest Rate Risk 0.0000 0.4167 0.4167 0.0143 
Currency Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Liquidity Risk 0.5714 0.6250 0.0536 0.4302 
Fair Yalues 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.1000 0.1053 0.0053 0.3529 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
~larket Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Accounting Policies 0.1143 0.4286 0.3143 0.0007 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
TOTAL 1.5000 5.5000 4.0000 0.0003 
Table 12: Cyclical Services Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=80) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.5072 1.1659 
0.3386 0.9547 
0.0977 0.3063 
0.5842 0.8775 
0.0891 0.4107 
0.0699 0.2181 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0028 0.0086 
0.1098 0.3108 
0.0073 0.0079 
1.8070 4.2580 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.1723 1.0349 
0.1436 1.0115 
0.0000 0.1788 
0.3967 0.7715 
0.0000 0.3299 
0.0449 0.1035 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0842 0.2667 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.0930 4.4430 
Difference 
0.6587 
0.6160 
0.2086 
0.2933 
0.3216 
0.1482 
0.0000 
0.0058 
0.2010 
0.0006 
2.4520 
Difference 
0.8626 
1.1551 
0.1788 
0.3748 
0.3299 
0.0586 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1825 
0.0000 
3.3500 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.2940 
0.0000 
0.9050 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0010 
0.0000 
0.0001 
1.0000 
0.5564 
0.0000 
0.2579 
0.0000 
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Table 13: General Industrials Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=21) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
ObjectiYes. Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
~larket Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.6420 1.1390 
0.3590 1.0180 
0.1390 0.5950 
0.7360 1.1280 
0.1141 0.4575 
0.1112 0.4165 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0095 0.0200 
0.1130 0.3027 
0.0000 0.0000 
2.2240 5.0770 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.3478 1.1563 
0.1311 1.0000 
0.0000 0.5246 
0.5581 0.9412 
0.0000 0.4375 
0.0656 0.3889 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0870 0.2623 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.7460 4.9370 
Difference 
0.4970 
0.6590 
0.4560 
0.3920 
0.3434 
0.3053 
0.0000 
0.0105 
0.1897 
0.0000 
2.8530 
Difference 
0.8085 
0.8689 
0.5246 
0.3831 
0.4375 
0.3233 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1753 
0.0000 
3.1910 
P-Value 
0.0200 
0.0010 
0.0030 
0.0100 
0.0000 
0.0030 
1.0000 
0.3220 
0.0010 
1.0000 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0129 
0.0096 
0.0003 
0.1823 
0.0011 
0.0109 
1.0000 
0.5355 
0.0008 
1.0000 
0.0003 
Table 14: Information Technology Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=18) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.2210 0.6930 
0.1870 0.6810 
0.0000 0.3780 
0.6900 0.7480 
0.0000 0.1305 
0.0582 0.1349 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0896 0.2231 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.2460 2.9890 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.0000 0.5091 
0.0408 0.6342 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.6357 0.6762 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0685 0.0700 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0985 0.1177 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.1190 2.8650 
Difference 
0.4720 
0.4930 
0.3780 
0.0580 
0.1305 
0.0767 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1335 
0.0000 
1.7430 
Difference 
0.5091 
0.5934 
0.0000 
0.0405 
0.0000 
0.0015 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0192 
0.0000 
1.7460 
P-Value 
0.0050 
0.0050 
0.0040 
0.4940 
0.0180 
0.1040 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0310 
1.0000 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0144 
0.0027 
1.0000 
0.7159 
1.0000 
0.5461 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.1593 
1.0000 
0.0012 
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Table 15: Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=25) 
Panel A Means 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value Objecti\'t's, Policies & Strategies 0.8820 1.2550 0.3730 0.0070 Interest Rate Risk 0.5340 0.9630 0.4280 0.0040 
Currency Risk 0.2717 0.3762 0.1045 0.1980 
Liquidity Risk 0.4760 0.7050 0.2290 0.0340 
Fair Values 0.2452 0.4107 0.1655 0.0100 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.1109 0.3118 0.2009 0.0170 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market Price Risk 0.0683 0.0487 0.0197 0.2210 
Accounting Policies 0.2304 0.3921 0.1617 0.0020 
General Other 0.0040 0.0065 0.0025 0.7030 
TOTAL 2.8230 4.4690 1.6460 0.0000 
Panel B - Medians 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 0.9057 1.3793 0.4736 0.0456 
Interest Rate Risk 0.3265 0.8889 0.5624 0.0109 
Currency Risk 0.0845 0.3273 0.2428 0.0825 
Liquidity Risk 0.5085 0.5435 0.0350 0.1771 
Fair Values 0.0000 0.4545 0.4545 0.0361 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0656 0.1379 0.0723 0.0137 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9507 
Accounting Policies 0.1778 0.3704 0.1926 0.0091 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5717 
TOTAL 2.5710 4.4250 1.8540 0.0034 
Table 16: Non-Cyclical Services Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=10) 
Panel A - Means 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 0.9570 1.6720 0.7150 0.0040 
Interest Rate Risk 0.5210 1.0260 0.5050 0.0640 
Currency Risk 0.0940 0.4460 0.3530 0.0620 
Liquidity Risk 0.5110 0.7150 0.2040 0.0850 
Fair Values 0.2360 0.5440 0.3070 0.0150 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0396 0.3147 0.2751 0.0120 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market Price Risk 0.0095 0.0582 0.0487 0.4380 
Accounting Policies 0.5970 0.8230 0.2260 0.1210 
General Other 0.0000 0.0071 0.0071 0.3430 
TOTAL 2.9660 5.6070 2.6410 0.0020 
Panel B - Medians 
Type of Disclosure Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 Difference P-Value 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 0.8890 1.6690 0.7800 0.0376 
Interest Rate Risk 0.3479 1.0230 0.6751 0.0757 
Currency Risk 0.0250 0.2304 0.2054 0.0539 
Liquidity Risk 0.2883 0.6909 0.4026 0.3847 
Fair Values 0.0000 0.5317 0.5317 0.0858 
Hedge Accounting Used 0.0488 0.2349 0.1861 0.0082 
Certain Commodity Contracts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market Price Risk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Accounting Policies 0.2400 0.5940 0.3540 0.3258 
General Other 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
TOTAL 3.1730 5.5080 2.3350 0.0046 
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Table 17: Resources Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=12) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.6900 1.1180 
0.2430 0.7520 
0.1477 0.4445 
0.4342 0.4578 
0.1360 0.3960 
0.0983 0.2413 
0.0951 0.0673 
0.0337 0.0000 
0.2340 0.4530 
0.0300 0.1090 
2.1420 4.0380 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.5900 0.8930 
0.1892 0.6363 
0.0225 0.4576 
0.4238 0.6134 
0.0000 0.3071 
0.0894 0.0958 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1861 0.4327 
0.0000 0.0000 
1.4320 4.0930 
Difference 
0.4280 
0.5090 
0.2969 
0.0236 
0.2600 
0.1430 
0.0278 
-0.0337 
0.2190 
0.0790 
1.8960 
Difference 
0.3030 
0.4471 
0.4351 
0.1896 
0.3071 
0.0064 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2466 
0.0000 
2.6610 
P-Value 
0.0360 
0.0290 
0.0030 
0.7970 
0.0110 
0.1620 
0.1660 
0.3390 
0.0750 
0.3390 
0.0100 
P-Value 
0.2345 
0.0984 
0.0202 
0.7503 
0.0420 
0.4350 
0.8939 
1.0000 
0.2477 
1.0000 
0.0885 
Table 18: Utilities Sector - Percentage of Annual Report (n=13) 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Type of Disclosure 
Objectives, Policies & Strategies 
Interest Rate Risk 
Currency Risk 
Liquidity Risk 
Fair Values 
Hedge Accounting Used 
Certain Commodity Contracts 
Market Price Risk 
Accounting Policies 
General Other 
TOTAL 
Panel A - Means 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
1.0630 1.5160 
0.3680 1.1090 
0.1093 0.1795 
0.5780 1.0170 
0.2200 0.7870 
0.0360 0.5400 
0.2710 0.3910 
0.0103 0.0000 
0.1952 0.4923 
0.0000 0.0608 
2.8510 6.0910 
Panel B - Medians 
Pre FRS 13 Post FRS 13 
0.7742 1.7705 
0.2105 0.9118 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.3256 0.8000 
0.0000 0.6000 
0.0000 0.4865 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1618 0.4138 
0.0000 0.0000 
3.0470 6.2650 
Difference 
0.4530 
0.7400 
0.0702 
0.4390 
0.5670 
0.5040 
0.1200 
-0.0103 
0.2971 
0.0608 
3.2400 
Difference 
0.9963 
0.7013 
0.0000 
0.4744 
0.6000 
0.4865 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2520 
0.0000 
3.2180 
P-Value 
0.0250 
0.0005 
0.2300 
0.0090 
0.0060 
0.0030 
0.2090 
0.3370 
0.0000 
0.2180 
0.0000 
P-Value 
0.0812 
0.0018 
0.4644 
0.0513 
0.0041 
0.0024 
0.6278 
1.0000 
0.0023 
1.0000 
0.0002 
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Appendix 6.1: Preparer Semi-Structured Interview Questionnaire 
Data Collection 
1. When did you adopt FRS 13 - before it was mandatory or after March 1999? 
-, Which departn1ents were responsible for collating the data? 
3. \Yas a particular individual assigned to collect the information? 
4. Was the information all collected at a point in time or gathered during the course of the 
year? 
5. If at a point in time, was this before or after the year end? 
6. How much of the data was new or required in a different format from that used previously 
for either financial or management reporting? 
7. Do you use this additional data for other purposes now? 
333 
8. Does the extra infonnation necessary under the standard allow a greater degree of control 
over treasury activities? 
9. Do you think about the potential consequences of the infonnation that is now provided? 
Cost of Data Collection 
10. How easy was it to obtain the data? 
11. Do you need to build/buy new systems? 
12. Did you incur direct additional costs to collect the data? 
13. Were there other costs incurred in collecting the data and are these costs recurring? 
14. Were there any problems with the implementation of the standard? Were problems that 
were encountered resolved by group meetings? 
334 
15. If so, who was involved? 
Reporting Standard 
16. Was the Standard clear on a careful reading? 
17. Did you seek assistance on its interpretation? 
18. Ifso, who did you ask, and on which Sections of the Standard? 
19. What is your overall impression of the Standard? Do you find the Standard useful? 
Treasury Practice 
20. Have you undertaken any hedges or changed your hedging practices in any way following 
the adoption of, and because of, FRS 13? 
21. Has the introduction of FRS 13 changed the perceptions of using derivatives? 
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22. Do you ~se options, caps, collars or floors? Would FRS 13 stop you or make you think 
about uSIng them? 
F AS 133/138 and lAS 39 
23. \Yill FAS 1331138 or lAS 39 affect you in any way? 
2'+. What about the hedge accounting and effectiveness requirements? 
25. Will you adopt hedge accounting for existing products/new contracts? Do you want to 
adopt hedge accounting if possible? What about option style contracts? 
FRS 13 and Accountability 
26. Do you think the information required under FRS 13 is useful to anyone including 
shareholders and potential investors? 
27. Have external parties asked you for further information about your disclosure? 
28. Do you think that accountability is your responsibility and do you think that your 
accountability extends beyond shareholders? 
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29. How would you define accountability and whom do you see yourself as accountable to? 
30. Has FRS 13 had any unanticipated consequences? 
31. What do you see as the benefits, if any of the standard? 
32. If at all, how would you have preferred the standard to have been changed? 
33. Is there anything that we should have asked about the standard and its consequences that 
we haven't already asked? 
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Appendix 7.1: User Semi-Structured Interview Questionnaire 
Risk Management 
(1) Could you provide us with some background as to your fund's investments: FTSE 
100, mid 250, AIM, overseas equities, bonds etc. 
(2) How important are investee companies' hedging policies and their management of 
risk? 
(3) Do you ask to see your investee companies' documented policies on the use of 
derivatives and other financial instruments? 
(4) From your experience which derivative or other financial instruments tend to be used 
most frequently by your investee companies and what are they mainly used for? 
(5) What emphasis do you place on (a) the amount of hedging and the products used and 
(b) the completeness of company disclosures. 
Fund Management 
(6) Do you currently assign a particular staff member to the task of gathering hedging 
infonnation about investee finns? 
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(7) Do you consider the financial risk exposure of a potential investment? What criteria 
do you use, how frequently is it reviewed by whom? 
(8) Given that you may be managing UK pension assets which will ultimately pay 
pensions in pounds or euro, do you expect UK-based companies that you are invested 
in to be hedging all their overseas earnings back into sterlingleuro? 
(9) Do you make hedging overlay decisions on your investment portfolios based on 
information about individual company strategies? Who makes this decision, how 
frequently is it reviewed and does the fund have a policy towards foreign exchange or 
interest rate risk management? 
FRS 13 
(10) Why do you believe that some companies disclosed information about their usage of 
derivatives and other financial instruments prior to the introduction of FRS 13, (and 
perhaps in particular prior to the Discussion Paper published in July 1996 and the 
Exposure Draft a year later)? 
(11) What types of companies disclosed such information prior to FRS 13? 
(12) Why do you think that some companies chose not to disclose details of their usage of 
derivatives and other financial instruments? 
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(13) How did you find out about investee companies' exposure and usage of derivatives: 
Disclosures in company reports? 
Through your private lines of communication with the investee company? 
(l .. n Do you have any input into FRS l3? Did you comment on the FRED? Were you 
consulted about it? 
(15) What has been the impact of forced disclosure, if any? Were there any differences 
between narrative and numerical disclosures? 
(16) Has FRS 13 changed managerial behaviour towards their firms' hedging policy, for 
example, the operating procedures of companies or the precise methods of hedging 
the firm employs? 
(17) Have you learnt more about investee companies' derivatives usage since the 
introduction of FRS 13? Do you feel that FRS 13' s required disclosures have 
provided helpful information about company risk and strategy? Have the narrative 
disclosures helped in this regard? 
(18) How frequently do investee companies revalue their derivatives portfolio? What 
methods are used to evaluate the riskiness of specific derivatives transactions or 
portfolios in your investee companies? 
(19) Could/should FRS 13 have gone further with its required disclosures? 
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(20) Have you noticed any difference in 
(a) disclosure levels (including quality of disclosure) and (b) improvement In 
disclosure levels pre and post FRS 13, between larger and smaller companies? 
(21) Do you feel that investee company compliance with FRS 13 is in accordance with the 
spirit as well as the form of the FRS? 
(11) How \yould you weigh up the relative costs and benefits of forced disclosure (i.e. do 
the benefits of FRS 13 exceed the costs for investee companies)? 
Corporate Governance 
(13) To whom is the risk management head accountable in your investee companies? 
Who reviews their activities and what actions are taken as a result of these reviews? 
(24) Is the risk management department normally a cost or investment center and how are 
employees in that department remunerated? 
(25) Is derivatives activity reported to the Board of Directors in your investee companies, 
and if so, how frequently? 
(26) Do non-executive directors have any input to the risk management function (i.e. via 
board meetings?) 
341 
(27) Do you feel that FRS 13 disclosures help you to evaluate the corporate governance 
of investee companies? 
(28) How well do you feel that the requirements of FRS 13 fit in with (satisfy) the 
Turnbull reconlnlendations'? 
FAS 133, lAS 39 and the JWG Proposals 
(29) Do you think recent international developments will have a greater impact? What 
about the fair value requirements? 
(30) Is there anything that we should have asked about the standard and its consequences 
that \\'e haven't already asked? 
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